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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an examination of the main tendencies in the trade 
union movement in South Africa during the currency of the 
Industrial Cenci 1 iation Act from 1924 to 1979, and of state 
labour policy of direct relevance to worker organisation. It 
considers in particular the reasons for the predominance of 
protectionist strategies, frequently amounting to racial 
monopolies and exclusion, among the unions catering for white 
artisan and production workers. Attention is given to the 
deployment of legislative and other policy instruments by the 
South African state intent on providing support for the 
prevailing protectionist demands and the exclusionary stance of 
large sections of the trade union movement. In analysing these 
developments, reference is made to the history of the trade union 
federations reflecting the divergent interests of different 
sections of the South African labour movement during this period. 
The evolution of trade unions for the workers occupying a 
subordinate role in the South African "racial order" is also 
traced. Consideration is given to the barriers to the full 
development of such trade unions, and to the incipient decline 
of the era of racial exclusion which the 1970s witnessed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Patterns of inclusion and exclusion among human aggregates remain 
one of the most significant, if least understood, of social 
phenomena. Having arisen at the heart of large-scale societies, 
classical sociology for the most part ignored, or at least 
marginalised, the issues of societal membership and the drawing 
of boundaries against non-members. Max Weber's penetrating 
remarks on the constitution of status and ethnic groups are 
perhaps the foremost exception to the foregoing observation. 1 
Taking membership largely for grahted and dwelling but little on 
the issues of boundaries and systematic exclusion, sociology 
directed its attention rather to the patterns of interaction 
among secondary groups constituted on functional grounds. There 
is thus perhaps little to wonder about in the spectacle displayed 
in South African social science over the past two decades, where 
the so-called "Race-class" debate has raged with no conclusive 
outcome. 2 A sociology in which boundary problems could largely 
be ignored was imported to a "society" (the very concept as used 
in sociology betrays the bias of its own social origin) in which 
boundary problems for central historical reasons were altogether 
salient. In the process arose an often very sterile argumentation 
over the "real" nature of South African society and its 
fundamental dynamic. "Race" and "class" were counterposed and 
contrasted to one another, instead of analysing the mutual 
interdependence and existential unity of the phenomena to which 
these terms refer. 
This thesis examines one aspect of the dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion in South Africa in the recent past: the extended period 
of 20th century labour history during which the sectionalism 
inherent in one prominent type of functional grouping in an 
industrial society - the trade union - was compounded by the 
radical segregationism and subordination already existing among 
the inhabitants of the Southern African region. As is hopefully 
clear from the previous remarks, this study does not take one or 
l 
other side in the long-standing theoretical debate over the Race-
class issue. In the face of an intractable scientific problem 
which presents at the same time the most pressing of political 
and social dilemmas, it ill fits the social scientist to claim 
definitive knowledge. The fact of the matter is that we do not 
yet properly understand on a theoretical or practical plane 
matters which are referrred to as "ethnic", "racial" and so on. 
The recent vogue for the "Social Construction of Ethnicity and 
Race 11 would be laughable were it not taken so seriously, 
purporting as it does to provide an adequate explanation for the 
rise and prevalence of "ethnic" identities. 3 In this thesis the 
main focus falls on the social or (to use what is in many ways 
a more accurate term which has been out of fashion in social 
science for several decades) "ecological 11 factors in which ethnic 
sectionalism and racist domination came to characterise the 
foundations of trade union activity. In so doing it is implied 
that further consideration of a topic such as this from other 
perspectives such as the psychological or sociobiological is not 
rejected but only bracketed as beyond the conscious scope of this 
study of South African trade unionism from a sociological 
perspective. 
The focus of this study - the "explanandum" - is the myriad of 
exclusionary rules, laws, legi timations and practices which 
characterised South African trade unionism for most of the 
present century. While such exclusionary phenomena arose almost 
from the inception of formal trade unions at the end of the 
nineteenth century, they achieved their most pervasive effects 
with the first adoption of a nation-wide industrial relations 
system given a legal basis by the state in the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924. From this date all trade union activity 
was confronted by a fundamental legal and political division of 
potential union members in the industrial and urban working 
classes, a division which was at bottom one of "racial" exclusion 
of large numbers of wage earners concentrated at the lowest end 
of the occupational and wage hierarchy. Such an exclusion of a 
large segment of the South African labour force from the benefits 
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of formally recognised and legally privileged trade unions was 
palatable to some of the main union actors involved, but was also 
vehemently contested by others. The consequence was a continuing 
tension between those forces supporting the status quo of 
exclusion - and even seeking to extend it - and those others who 
stood for a variety of reasons for inclusive trade unionism in 
a unitary system of industrial relations. This tension was only 
resolved (at one level at least) in 1979 with the major revision 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act in that year which embodied 
the basic principles of an integrated industrial relations 
system. The years from 1924 to 1979 can thus be argued to 
constitute a clear period in the history of South African 
industrial relations and trade unionism, an era of racial 
exclusion formalised in terms of the major relevant rule-making 
instrument, namely the statute itself. It is this period which 
forms the object of study for the present work. 
A Theoretical Perspective 
Trade unions are not quite as old as the Industrial Revolution 
which began in the eighteenth century, and are clearly a reaction 
to it. Aside from its technical achievements, the Industrial 
Revolution was the culmination of a process of drastic social 
change, and brought in its train a restructuring of the class 
composition of society. Small farmers in particular found it 
impossible to maintain their position - or at least that of their 
children - on the land and were forced to the cities and hence 
to the factories of the new order. Trends in factory production 
and mechanisation displaced handicraft workers and the 
traditional journeyman. Increasingly, working for oneself and 
one's family in relative independence ceased to be an option for 
entrants to the labour market, compelling acceptance of 
subordination to others in the factory system and the expanding 
urban areas. That was not all. Industrialisation brought with it 
both the ubiquity of the labour market and the business cycle. 
The first meant that people had to sell their ability to work to 
someone able to set them to work; the second meant that 
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employment was not a lifelong guarantee. Similarly wages, which 
for long periods of history had been a matter of custom and 
regulation as much as a product of market forces, now became 
subject to the pressure of a competitive economy. The net result 
was uncertainty, both as regards job tenure and as regards what 
constituted a fair day's wage for a fair day's work. Adding to 
this uncertainty were the continual pressures on employers to cut 
costs by reorganising the methods of work, either by such 
procedures as the fragmentation of previously multi-tasked jobs 
or the introduction of more mechanisation. Workers who had 
invested much human capital in skill acquisition were thereby 
forced onto the defensive in an attempt to maintain their 
position in the productive process against the re-organising 
imperatives transmitted from the market. 
Trade unions, as organisations of subordinate workers committed 
to the furtherance of their members' interests, were thus a 
reaction to the conditions created by the Industrial Revolution. 
They were in the first instance protectionist organisations 
responding to the uncertain economic environment which came to 
characterise the new system of competitive industrial capitalism. 
Protection could be sought either in the process of combination 
and the solidarity of collective action among larger and larger 
numbers of workers in corresponding economic positions, or in the 
exclusivist drive to create pockets of monopoly in one or other 
aspect of the work situation. Which option was chosen in any one 
case was the outcome of a complex set of specific influences. 
Commonality of interest was the overriding factor, but such 
shared concerns could be found both in small cohesive groups of 
highly skilled workers, or among large groups of lesser skilled 
employees sharing no common cause with the former group. At one 
level, that of broad social class, both kinds of workers could 
be argued to share a common interest vis-a-vis the other more 
affluent or powerful classes in society. At another level, that 
of the specific functional groupings in which the whole class of 
employees and trade union members was distributed, commonality 
of interest might well be replaced by direct opposition or 
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conflict, as when employers sought to replace expensive skilled 
labour by cheaper, untrained workers. Thus, as representatives 
of sections of the subordinate industrial labour force, trade 
unions were Subject to what one writer has referred to as "the 
dynamic tension between the orientation to extend and unify and 
the opposing orientation to exclude and maintain sectional 
privilege". 4 
Different theoretical positions have attempted to argue which of 
these two orientations inclusion and unification versus 
exclusion and sectionalism - would likely be dominant in the long 
run. The former possibility has been argued most forcefully from 
within the Marxist perspective. The fundamental assumption here 
concerns the salience of the division of society into different 
classes defined by their relationship to the means of production. 
5 In the historical stage of capitalism the proletariat or 
working class is structurally constituted by its lack of 
ownership of the means of production (most notably land and 
industrial enterprises) and is thus subordinated to the owners, 
the class of capitalists. Forced by want to sell the ability to 
labour to the employing class, workers are flung into competition 
with one another as they seek work at subsistence wages and under 
inhuman working conditions. Gathered together in the 
proliferating industrial towns brought about by 
industrialisation, workers begin to perceive the advantages to 
be gained by combining together in one organisation to assert 
their collective strength against employers. Hence arise the 
first "combinations" or trade unions of workers. At first in a 
local and intermittent fashion, these unions of workers attempt 
to bring about improvements in the immediate day-to-day 
conditions of their members: this is the so-called "economic 
struggle". These localised combinations give way sooner or later 
to more extensive organisations which lead, in Marx's words, to 
"the ever-expanding union of the workers". 6 For Marx, thus, 
trade unions were part and parcel of the unifying impulse to 
which the working class was subject in its attempt to better its 
conditions of existence in modern society. The struggle of the 
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working class, argued Marx, would not remain at the level of 
"economism" (to use a phrase which later Marxists introduced) but 
would lead to a political movement to change the whole character 
of industrial capitalist society: 
... out of the separate economic movements of the 
workers there grows up everywhere a political 
movement, that is to say, a movement of the class with 
the object of achieving its interests in a general 
form, in a form possessing the virtue of being 
compulsory for a society as a whole. If these 
movements pre-suppose a certain degree of previous 
organisation they are themselves in like measure a 
means for the development of this organisation. 1 
The assertion of the latent or potential unity of the working 
class is an important theorem in Marxist social science. But it 
has also formed a major working assumption among left-wing trade 
unionists in South Africa as elsewhere. Both as theory and as 
practice thus the influence of the Marxist model with regard to 
the role of trade unions as bearers of the long-term interests 
of the working class needs to be comprehended in any study of a 
subject such as this one. 
The classical literature of early industrial sociology contains 
within it however a separate and to some extent rival tradition 
to that of Marxism, one which emphasises the di verse and 
sectional character of the modern industrial proletariat. Writers 
such as Selig Perlman reacted against what was seen as an unduly 
schematic and ideological view by Marxists of modern industrial 
life. Perlman described the Marxist view of the working class 
rather unkindly as "an abstract mass in the grip of an abstract 
force", 8 and argued that the reality of working class life had 
to be grasped at a more concrete, mundane level. Drawing on his 
study of trade unions in the United States, Perlman wrote about 
workers or "manualists" as above all conscious of scarcity of 
opportunity and of insecurity of employment. In response to their 
situation, such workers developed a group consciousness which 
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stressed the need to gain job control at the level of the work-
place, trade or industry. 9 Inherent in such a job control 
orientation was the potential for division and for the exclusion 
of rival groups of workers as the struggle to monopolise job 
opportunities was joined. 
Perlman's analysis complemented that of other earlier writers, 
some of whom themselves had originated within the ranks of the 
Marxist-inclined European labour movements. Writing at the turn 
of the century, the Italian socialist and author of the classic 
work Political Parties, Roberto Michels, noted the deeply 
grounded sectionalism of European trade unions: 
The skilled and better-paid workers hold aloof from 
the unskilled and worse-paid workers. The former are 
always organised while the latter remain "free" 
labourers; and the fierce economic and social 
struggles which occur between the two groups 
constitute one of the most interesting phenomena of 
modern social history ... The trade unions, having 
become rich and powerful, no longer seek to enlarge 
their membership but endeavour rather to restrict it 
by imposing a high entrance fee, by demanding a 
certificate of prolonged apprenticeship, and by other 
similar means, all deliberately introduced in order to 
retain certain privileges in their own hands at the 
expense of other workers fol lowing the same 
profession. 10 
The radical divide between skilled and unskilled workers was a 
feature most characteristic of the earlier period of 
industrialisation, when only limited job fragmentation and 
dilution due to advancing technology and Taylorism had taken 
place, and when the all-round artisan was able to maintain a 
scarcity value of skilled labour through the restrictive 
practices of the craft union. More developed industrial systems 
have created a diversified, complex occupational structure among 
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manual and other workers. Most notably, the former simple 
demarcation between skilled, or artisan labour, and unskilled 
work has given way in the course of this century, in South Africa 
as in other industrialising countries, to a complicated gradation 
of posts. A large and heterogeneous stratum of semi-skilled 
"operatives" has come into being. 
This development, eroding craft integrity on the one hand, and 
offering opportunities for advancement to lesser-skilled labour 
on the other, had momentous consequences for trade unionism. The 
early hegemony of restrictive and exclusivist craft unions was 
forced to accomodate inclusive industrial unionism aiming at the 
broadest possible organisation of workers in each sector. Well-
known landmarks in this development include the challenge to the 
Model Unions of skilled workers in Britain in the 1890s by the 
"New Unionism" organising the masses of semi- and unskilled 
labourers in key industries. In the USA a parallel occurrence was 
the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in the 1930s 
which broke the dominance of the largely artisan dominated 
American Federation of Labor. 
While industrial unionism has often been considered to constitute 
a victory for working class unity over sectional interests, 
several writers have argued that the internal diversification of 
the labour force has been accompanied by a growing stratification 
among the traditional working class. Dahrendorff, for example, 
has pointed to the phenomenon of the "decomposition of labour": 
The working class of today, far from being a 
homogeneous group of equally unskilled and 
impoverished people, is in fact a stratum 
differentiated by numerous subtle and not-so-subtle 
distinctions ... In modern industry, the "worker" has 
become precisely the kind of abstraction which Marx 
quite justly resented so much. In his place, we find 
a plurality of status and skill groups whose interests 
often diverge ... As with the capitalist class, it has 
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become doubtful whether speaking of the working class 
still makes much sense. 11 
Dahrendorff 's remarks have not convinced all students of modern 
industrial society that the notion of an industrial working class 
has lost its utility for sociological analysis. Both Marxists and 
non-Marxists have responded to the substance of the decomposition 
of labour thesis by refining and elaborating the conceptual range 
of class analysis. Giddens for example has argued that while the 
simplistic notion of a united and expanding working class must 
be abandoned, the core of the idea retains explanatory power for 
the analysis of the "advanced" societies. 12 The leading 
Marxist Michael Burawoy concedes that it would be foolhardy to 
"restore the working class to its messianic role"; on the other 
hand he states that "the record of the industrial working class 
is not as insignificant as its detractors would lead us to 
believe". The process of production, argues Burawoy, "decisively 
shapes the development of working class struggles". 13 
Production in industrial societies still retains sufficient of 
its coercive, toilsome and oppressive nature to warrant the 
attention given to the victims of this process of production, and 
to expect that the working class for the moment remains both an 
objective reality and, through its organisations, a historical 
subject. 
Clearly, it is not altogether the same thing to argue that the 
industrial labour force is riven by sectional interests as it is 
to argue that it has undergone "decomposition", although both 
processes may to some extent capture something of the true 
situation. A truly "decomposed" working class would presumably 
deal a death blow to the viability of even the defensive Marxism 
that has developed since the late 1980s. The existence of 
sectional interests among the working class does not pose such 
a severe problem for Marxists, at the level of theory at least. 
For the moment, it is perhaps fair to conclude that the notion 
of a working class has not yet lost its usefulness for 
sociological analysis, but that it has, as Przeworski suggested 
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was the case already by the turn of the century, "lost that 
immediate intuitive sense that it conveyed at the time of the 
[Communist] Manifesto". 14 
In spite of their theoretical bias towards the assumption of the 
fundamental unity of the working class, Marxist theorists too 
have paid considerable attention to the divided, sectional 
character of much trade union activity. Marx and Engels remarked 
frequently on the conservative, sectional character of the 
British craft unions in the mid-nineteenth century. It appears 
to have been Engels who coined the term "aristocracy of labour" 
to refer to this kind of phenomenon. 15 The term has been used 
by Marxists to refer to any group of unionised workers able to 
control employment opportunities and bid up wages at the expense 
of unorganised workers. Analysts of South African labour history 
have utilised the term to refer to the position of white workers 
in South Africa. F A Johnstone for example has written: 
The white mine workers occupied something of an elite 
position within the South African working class, 
enjoying a position of considerable strength in 
relation to the capitalist class. This strong position 
reflected various factors: their possession of scarce 
and highly required skills, together with the economic 
importance of the industry within which they were 
employed; their control, through trade unions, over 
the distribution of these skills to workers and of the 
supply of skilled labour to employers; and their 
general political freedom. This strong class position 
enabled the white mine workers to secure substantial 
wages and benefits. With this class position, and the 
conditions of employment following from it, the white 
labour force of the gold mines constituted a sort of 
labour aristocracy. 16 
The trouble with this argument around the concept of the 
aristocracy of labour, as Nicolaus has pointed out, is that it 
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comes perilously near to equating a labour aristocracy with 
organised labour itself. 11 Further specification is clearly 
required. Hobsbawm has argued that a labour aristocracy arises 
where special conditions allow a group of workers to escape the 
full rigour of a competitive labour market. Such special 
conditions must be sought in the "law" of the "uneven development 
of capitalism" - uneven both within a particular society, and 
between societies (as between metropolis and colony). 18 Whether 
or not one agrees with this argument, which demands acceptance 
of the Leninist theory of imperialism, the basic point remains 
that the foundation for labour aristocracies is seen in the 
ability to escape competition through exclusion and monopoly -
and in this the Marxist view tends to fall into line with more 
conventional analyses of trade union sectionalism. 19 
Theoretical attempts to understand the dynamics of South African 
trade unionism have thus been able to draw on the insights to be 
found in the literature developed in other industrial societies. 
Writers from a variety of perspectives, both "liberal" or 
orthodox ne,o-classical, and "radical" or Marxist, have commented 
on the compatibility of the sectionalist impulse inherent in 
trade union protectionism with the contours of a society 
characterised by deep ethnic or racial divisions, sometimes 
referred to as "primordial" identities. Where in other 
circumstances trade unionists may have erected age or sex bars 
to entry to job opportunities in an attempt to restrict the 
supply of labour, white unionists in South Africa were able to 
take advantage of the dominant cleavage between white and black 
to superimpose a race bar on a skill barrier. Writers within the 
Marxist school have gone further and added to the practices of 
trade unionists what they consider to be the more fundamental 
strategies of the dominant white capitalists and the state in 
engineering a coercive system of cheap labour by means of what 
Johnstone called "exploitation colour bars". 20 In what is 
perhaps the single best work on the registered trade unions in 
the first half of this century, Jon Lewis has attempted to relate 
11 
changes in work organisation and technology the "labour 
process", in Marxist terminology - to changes in the sectionalist 
practices of South African trade unions. 21 What all these have 
in common is an attempt, as befits writers in the Marxist 
tradition, to relate material and class factors to the phenomenon 
of pervasive racial or ethnic differentiation in industrial life. 
An important work which attempts to combine the insights of 
orthodox industrial sociology with those of class analysis in a 
sensitive and empirically responsible way is that of Stanley 
Greenberg's Race and State in Capitalist Development. 22 
Following a typology suggested by the British student of trade 
unionism, H A Turner, Greenberg suggested that strong tendencies 
towards "closed" or exclusive unionism will arise where workers 
are in a position to control the supply of labour to a particular 
trade or industry. Such a possibility is present most frequently 
in the case of skilled workers, but is not necessarily restricted 
to such situations. ln particular, in circumstances of ethnic 
diversity, as in a colonial society, established workers who are 
members of the dominant ethnic segment may make use of the 
prevailing ethnic or racial cleavages to enforce ethnic 
monopolies by way of exclusive trade unions. Greenberg argues 
that in South Africa there existed a "bounded working class": 
that is, a class delimited by the boundary of ethnic difference, 
from which workers from the subordinate groups were excluded on 
ascriptive grounds. In such a case trade unionists from the 
dominant section utilised traditional trade union strategies to 
maintain a monopoly for that class over a whole range of job 
opportunities. Depending on their position in the labour market, 
white workers turned either to craft excl usi vism or to an 
"exclusive industrial unionism", both of which had the effect of 
preventing black workers from posing an effective threat to white 
job security. 23 
Greenberg's analysis can usefully be supplemented by the 
surprisingly neglected work by Edna Bonacich in developing her 
notion of the "split labour market". 24 Bonacich conceives of a 
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split labour market as one in which at least two groups of 
workers are present and whose price of labour (that is, the price 
the employer must pay in order to induce the~ to work) differs 
for the same kind of work. (Or would differ if both groups were 
permitted to perform the same work, which is often not the case.) 
This differing price of labour is a function of a number of 
factors, which can be classified under two headings: "resources" 
and "motives". Under the former fall such factors as a group's 
level of living (something which can be equated to the idea of 
the "established expectations" of workers referred to by Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb in their classic study of trade unionism) 25 ; 
its economic resources outside the labour market; and its degree 
of effective political organisation. "Motives" include the 
reasons why a group of workers seeks entry to a labour market, 
with perhaps the most important being whether such workers 
consider themselves as temporary or long-term employees. 
Temporary workers who are also low on "resources" will in general 
constitute cheap labour for employers; for example because they 
might have only supplementary income goals, as was for long 
alleged to be the case with black workers on the Rand gold mines, 
or because their temporary status does not lend itself to 
unionisation, which can be a cost to an employer. 
It can quite readily be grasped that this situation is 
frequently, if not invariably, the case where two or more ethnic 
groups are entering the same labour market. Not ethnicity as 
such, but ethnically-correlated characteristics such as differing 
standards of living, unequal bargaining power and varying motives 
for seeking employment give rise to a stratified or split labour 
market. In such a market one group constitutes higher paid labour 
while another provides a pool of cheap labour. In this respect, 
the possession of job-related skills is not an overriding factor 
in the long run for in most cases cheap labour can over time be 
trained in the requisite skills. In other words, the split labour 
market is also an antagonistic one, in which higher-paid labour 
comes to perceive members of the other group as potential or 
actual undercutters and displacers. In such situations the 
13 
higher-paid group may solidify into an exclusive group (or, to 
use Greenberg's term, a bounded working class), and attempt to 
introduce rigid job demarcations and monopolies. At the furthest 
extreme, these workers may succeed in excluding their potential 
rivals from entry to the particular territory at all, as was the 
case with the "White Australia" policy of the earlier part of 
this century, or the successful campaign by the representatives 
of white labour to exclude Chinese labour from the mines in South 
Africa after 1907. Employers, for their part, will tend to resist 
the entrenchment of such a "labour aristocracy", although they 
may find compromise convenient under specific conditions. 
Bonacich's concept of the split labour market is clearly 
applicable to the South African situation in this century. White 
workers early on in the process of industrialisation perceived 
the presence of large numbers of low-paid black workers in 
subordinate positions as a potential threat to their wages and 
job security, particularly on the gold mines. The predominant 
response was one of open exclusion or of the erection of skill 
barriers which also functioned as race barriers. But, as the 
dynamic of the split labour market implies, exclusion faces a 
constant pressure from employers seeking to cut costs by hiring 
the cheaper labour. A split labour market, with its typically 
highly discontinuous wage divide, as in South Africa, is 
potentially an unstable one, as coalitions of employers and cheap 
labour attempt to circumvent the barriers erected by the higher 
paid labour. Under such circumstances, the dominant section of 
the labour movement which is at the same time usually the most 
unionised sector, finds that its exclusivist practices are 
continually under challenge. Tension arises between the 
tendencies to exclusion and inclusion, and these tendencies find 
reflection in the lines of cleavage along which organised labour 
is fissured. Since the situation is not static, and the tension 
more than intermittent, it should come as no surprise that as in 
this country the precise divisions among the trade unions have 
proved to be shifting and fluid under the pressure of events. 
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The recurring elements of South African trade union history for 
much of this century have thus been exclusion, monopoly and 
racial discrimination. In this sense a Weberian analysis of the 
impulses to "social closure" evidenced among status and ethnic 
groups is altogether apposite to South African trade unions. 
The impulse to social closure has rested on compelling material 
or economic grounds: the maintenance of wages at their 
established expectation, or security of job tenure in a 
competitive labour market. Here the Marxist emphasis on material 
factors and class antagonism has ample play. A recurring feature 
of the South African (split) labour market has been the presence 
of distinct (to the people concerned) groups of workers similar 
to many other situations of ethnic group competition elsewhere 
in the world, but in a situation best described as "internal 
colonialism", where the social differentiation has been so 
pervasive and formalised as to constitute in Greenberg's phrase 
a "racial order". 26 In such a situation considerations of 
material welfare are frequently conjoined with fears of status 
dep.rivation - what Max Weber called issues of social honour. 
The analysis presented in the fol lowing chapters takes as a 
fundamental point of departure the notions of "racial order" and 
"colonial-type societyn as complex conceptual indicators of the 
social phenomena with which this work is concerned. The directive 
hypothesis which informs the discussion in the succeeding 
chapters is that such colonial orders - to combine the two 
preceding terms into one omnibus one - are inherently unstable 
and tend to dissolution, both as a result of resistance from the 
dominated but also as a result of inclusivist tendencies within 
the dominant bloc - be it a single ethnic group or an alliance 
of more loosely defined collectivities. This underlying 
hypothesis can be regarded as a rejection of the interesting 
claim by the well-known American sociologist Erik Olin Wright 
that of the various forms of domination - class, race and gender 
- "only class relations have an internal logic of development 
which generates a trajectory of transformations of the class 
structure. No other form of domination appears to have a similar 
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developmental trajectory". 21 In opposition to this argument it 
can be maintained that forms of racial domination do not maintain 
themselves in an arbitrary fashion but are subject to strains 
generated within both the dominant and subject strata which press 
for their overthrow. Racial orders contain thus within themselves 
a "developmental trajectory" which moves from subordination to 
dissolution via either fission or fusion. This thesis can perhaps 
be 1 ikened to the classic idea of a 11 race relations cycle 11 
developed by Robert Parks and other theorists in the Chicago 
school, but is more specifically directed at an understanding of 
colonial-type situations. In particular, this thesis argues that 
the underlying drive towards an inclusivist trade unionism and 
racial equality within a colonial-type society is likely to be 
the dominant one in the long-run should the society not itself 
dissolve into a more homogenous one by partition, expulsion or 
genocide. 
In conclusion, the point can be made that common to both 
conventional liberal and Marxist analyses of this situation has 
been one theoretical gap at the heart of the argument: the nature 
of ethnic or racial groupings. For the most part taken as a given 
or primitive term, or sometimes discussed in terms of 
"primordial" identities, "ethnicity" and its commonly viewed 
cognate concept of "race" has lacked any proper theoretical 
foundation. It is this fact that makes the whole "Race-class" 
debate such a frustrating one, and explains its inability to come 
to a terminus. While "class" as a theoretical concept has been 
grounded by writers in the theoretical web of Marxism, and as 
such could be meaningfully employed, the status of "ethnic" or 
"racial" group has remained unclear, with writers even at times 
seeming to conjure away the very existence of such groups as some 
kind of ideological construction of malign and oppressive class 
actors. 28 As has been noted at the outset of this chapter, the 
scientific understanding of these matters is as yet 
underdeveloped. The question of ethnic identity, its dynamics and 
genesis, is one which still awaits satisfactory elucidation at 
the hands of students of the phenomenon. To declare that it needs 
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theoretical clarification is however not the same as to declare 
that ethnicity is some monolithic fixture akin to the role played 
by the concept of nation in volkische nationalist ideologies such 
as Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s. Tendencies to 
the formation of ethnic identities are clearly very sensitive to 
ecological influences, and in this sense are indeed "socially 
constructed". That they are mere "social constructions", an 
ideology like any other, is however to explain a puzzling 
phenomenon by dismissing it. Whether rooted in the human psyche, 
or even for that matter the human genome, 29 or not, the human 
inclination to constitute "communities of solidarity" which 
overlap class and other social cleavages is a remarkable fact 
whose roots remain to be fully explicated. It is a fact without 
which this topic, as many others concerning our society, cannot 
begin to be comprehended. 
A Note on Method and Sources 
The present work is largely an exercise in historical sociology; 
its method thus largely that of the analysis of primary and 
secondary written sources. Considerable use was made of archival 
material from the Trade Union Archive at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, which is probably the most useful collection of 
documents relevant to research on trade unions in the country. 
The small library which was maintained by the Trade Union Council 
of South Africa during the existence of that body also furnished 
an invaluable source of relevant material which is now housed in 
the Archive. Further research dependent on primary sources was 
made possible by the collections of state and public documents 
maintained at the University of Stellenbosch. The holdings of old 
press material at the Johannesburg Public Library, in particular 
the now defunct newspaper Forward, were also consulted. 
Some thirty interviews with trade union officials proved useful 
in providing an orientation to the field and in furnishing 
information about individual trade unions which was not readily 
available from written sources. These interviews were conducted 
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with the help of an interview schedule covering four broad areas: 
Union structure and activity; relations with employers and the 
process of collective bargaining; trade union policy and 
affiliation to co-ordinating bodies; and political matters. The 
use of this interview schedule made for some standardisation of 
replies from respondents, but this was not the primary aim in the 
conduct of the interview, which were looked upon as information-
gathering opportunities in which a wide variety of points could 
be raised. This interview material was supplemented by access to 
similar material collected by Stanley Greenberg in his own 
research on South African trade unions, which he generously made 
available to the present writer. 
As regards secondary material on South African trade unionism, 
the situation is considerably better than it was in the 1970s.r 
Since that time, a great expansion of interest in trade unions 
and labour matters in South Africa has occurred. The result has 
been a great increase in the quantity and quality of both books 
and periodical literature relevant to trade unionism. 
Prior to that time the quality of material was very uneven. Two 
histories of trade unionism written by former trade unionists 
were available but lacked the necessary rigour and scholarship, 
and were very partial in their coverage. 3° Far superior to these 
works, and indeed still to some extent unrivalled as an account 
of South African trade unionism and radical political movements 
since the nineteenth century is the work by Jack and Ray Simons, 
Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, first published in 
1969 but for long unavailable in this country for censorship 
reasons. Simons himself was probably the foremost academic 
commentator on trade union affairs in South Africa until the 
recent development of interest in labour studies. Otherwise, work 
on trade unionism was scattered in a variety of sources authored 
by historians and economists, though few were devoted exclusively 
to trade unionism as such. For this earlier academic literature, 
see the works cited in the Bibliography by Clack (1963); de 
Kiewiet (1941); Doxey (1961); Hancock (1942); Horrell (1959) 
(1969); Horwitz '1:1967); Johns (1967); Kahn (1943); Katz (1969); 
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Katzen (1961); Piercy (1960); Steenkamp (1962); van der Horst 
(1942) (1954); Viljoen (1961). Related literature on labour 
conditions, occupational structure and similar matters can be 
found in the works 1 isted in the Bibliography under Albertyn 
(1948); Pauw (1946); Theron (1944); van Wyk (1968). 
A considerable secondary 1 i terature by trade unionists and 
political activists relevant to this topic had also been produced 
before the 1970s, for example the biographies and related work 
to be found in Adam (1952); Andrews (1940); Barlow (1952); 
Boydell (1948); Cope (1944); Creswell (n.d.); Downes (1952); 
Hepple (1954); Kadalie (1970); Naude (1969); Roux (1948); Sachs 
(1952 (1957). It was however with the upheavals caused by the 
Durban Strikes of 1973 that the first upsurge of the current 
interest in labour matters really took place, and the production 
of academic work of a high standard since that time has proceeded 
apace. The most relevant books concerning the topic of this 
thesis have already been mentioned in the previous section of 
this Chapter; to which can be added periodical material to be 
found in the South African Labour Bulletin and the Industrial 
Relations Journal of South Africa, as well as other journals 
devoted to African studies. Other relevant work which should be 
singled out here includes Lipton (1986); Maree (1987); Thomas 
(1974); Webster (1978); Yudelman (1983). 
In conclusion, it can perhaps be noted that the vast scope of the 
field to which reference is made in this work precludes any 
notion that this thesis can provide an exhaustive review of the 
whole topic. The availability of more archival material as new 
material is released from restrictive conditions will add greatly 
to our knowledge of this period and our understanding of trade 
unionism in these years. Material in the University of the 
Witwatersrand Trade Union Archive remains far from fully 
exploited. The work of many more students will be required before 
matters treated in the pages to follow can be considered to have 
been fully elucidated. 
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Chapter 2: Central Themes in White Labour's 
Response to the Conditions of a 
Heterogeneous Labour Market 
The racial exclusion which came to typify the practice of the 
dominant trade unions and which underlay the legislative 
cornerstone of the system of industrial relations after 1924 did 
not of course spring into being overnight. It was indeed part and 
parcel of the very origins of South African trade unionism. White 
organised labour on the Kimberley diamond fields early on 
objected to the "cheap labour competition of any Inferior Race", 
and such attitudes were readily transferred to the newly opened 
gold mining industry on the Witwatersrand. 1 The mining industry 
was thus almost from its inception an occupational sphere where 
white workers reacted most vehemently to the competition provided 
by both indigenous and immigrant black or Asian labour. The 
record of the craft unions was more ambiguous, but their lack of 
overt colour bars, as Lewis has argued, was on account of the 
fact that such unions "succeeded in maintaining the position of 
their members by virtue of their monopoly of skills and therefore 
had no need of legal colour bars". 2 With the future Union of 
South Africa still to be created, labour organisation in the four 
colonies developed under varying legislative frameworks and by 
virtue of a distinctively different colonial ethos in the Cape 
and the Transvaal. While the latter was the centre of white 
labour's most vehement rejection of multi-racial union 
organisation, the Cape evolved a pattern of interracial 
cooperation which provided a rival model to the northern 
practice. With Union the new country thus incorporated two 
incompatible forms of trade unionism as developed under the aegis 
of the dominant white workers. The dominant industrial position 
of the Transvaal, and the tendency of Natal and the Orange Free 
State to follow suit, meant however that the Cape always 
represented a somewhat embattled minority position. It was the 
premises of white protectionism which found the readiest 
acceptance, and the opposing appeal to interracial labour 
solidarity could make but little headway amon~ the rank-and-file 
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of white labour. The adoption of the Industrial Conciliation Act 
in 1924 both formalised the de facto exclusion of African workers 
from the ranks of organised labour, while offering the 
possibility of an alternative evolution by the incorporation of 
coloured and Indian South Africans. The racial exclusion of large 
numbers of (African) workers from the institutions of an nation-
wide industrial relations system was fundamental to its character 
so much so that its acceptability in the circles of the 
dominant grouping was hardly questioned. Yet the partial 
opportunity of interracial solidarity and cooperation in the 
industrial sphere offered by the "mixed" trade unions of white, 
coloured and Indian workers kept alive the Cape tradition outside 
of that province. 
For much of the twentieth century, thus, South African organised 
labour practised racial exclusion while debating the alternative 
of racial cooperation. For most of the period covered by this 
study, however, it was the spirit of the former rather than the 
possibility of the latter which seemed to possess the soul of 
white labour. This chapter attempts to analyse why this was so. 
Public debate over labour issues in the circles of the dominant 
white grouping tended to revolve around two competing 
interpretations of South African labour history. The one, 
largely the argument of the white middle-class, insisted that 
what had taken place since the turn of the century had been a 
continual process of upward occupational mobility, in which 
whites had increasingly moved from less-preferred, less-
remunerative work into more pleasant, better-paid occupations. 
And as they had done so, black workers had been drawn in to fill 
the positions so vacated. The other perspective, expressed by 
spokesmen of the white working class, claimed that South African 
labour history had been the stage of a continual struggle between 
white and black in the labour market, in which the white worker 
had fought a rear-guard action against competition from blacks. 
The apparent paradox was not new. 
1914 put the matter as follows:-
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The Economic Commission of 
It is a plausible view that some of the so-called 
encroachments of the non-Whites should properly be 
regarded as a filling of the gaps left by the 
attraction of Whites to superior situations, which 
superior situations could not have existed in the 
absence of competent people to fill the lower 
positions . . . . But here and there White labour may 
have been displaced, and a constant fear of 
displacement is prevalent ... 3 
The purpose of this chapter is not to argue which of the two 
views - upward mobility versus white displacement - was more 
accurate. The aim is rather to examine just one pole in the 
controversy: the views and behaviour of trade unionists 
representing the interests of the white labour force. An attempt 
will be made first to consider some of the grounds on which 
organised labour in South Africa resisted the introduction of 
black workers; second, the strategies of the various sections of 
the white labour movement in response to the problem of 
interracial labour competition will be discussed. Finally, an 
evaluation of these strategies will be attempted in the context 
of the alignments amongst registered trade unions in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
White sectional interest and interracial labour competition 
For some scholars and left-wing activists the major turning point 
in South African labour history was the failure of white South 
African workers to perceive their community of interests as 
workers with men of different ethnic origin, and to turn instead 
to the pursuit of sectional interest defined in racial terms. 
Some commentators indeed accepted as the prime explanatory factor 
in South African labour history the sheer primitive racial 
antagonism of the majority of white workers towards blacks. 4 
Certainly this factor, however defined, cannot be ignored. What 
is partly at issue here was the influence on labour dynamics of 
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prevailing group attitudes not in themselves derived from 
experience in the labour market. White workers tried to carry 
over into the work-place the social distinctions and patterns of 
association which prevailed in South African society as a whole, 
although with some differences of emphasis between the coastal 
cities (Cape Town in particular) and the rigidly segregationist 
practices in the industrial heartland of the southern Transvaal. 
In the latter area there was a widespread acceptance of 
segregatory measures in the work-place, and after agitation 
around the issue of mixed working in factories in the late 1930s 
such work-place segregation was given legislative support by 
regulations issued in terms of the Factories Act of 1941 and 
otherwise established by administrative and conventional 
pressures. On another level there was frequent resistance to the 
idea of the association of white and black in spheres arising out 
of trade union activity, so that, in the 1970s just as fifty 
years ago, one major difference between the two major wings of 
the organised labour movement was the question of the association 
of white and black trade unionists at meetings and conferences. 
Playing on the racial susceptibilities of white workers was a 
tactic whereby certain labour leaders and trade unionists further 
complicated the intricate problems arising from the real conflict 
of interests between white and black in the labour market. 
But of more concern at this point is a consideration of white 
trade unionists' attitudes towards black workers as a function 
of their experiences in the labour market. The point, perhaps 
an obvious one, needs to be stressed that the interrelationship 
of white and black in the labour market frequently involved a 
clash of material interests rather than questions of racial 
prejudice. 5 One can recall that it was trade unionists such as 
Blake and Huyser, men in themselves not unsympathetic to black 
aspirations, who led the resistance of the building unions to the 
proposals by government to provide training facilities to black 
bui !ding workers in the early post-war years. In the main, three 
real or imaginary fears tended to influence the behaviour of 
white unionists towards black workers. These three fears were 
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wage under-cutting, job competition and power rivalry. Each of 
these will now be discussed in turn. 
(i) Wage under-cutting. Perhaps the commonest preconception 
of white trade unionists concerning black workers was that the 
latter constituted "cheap labour". As a memorandum composed in 
1928 by two leading left-wing trade unionists put it: 
The European worker is haunted by the fear of 
competition by the great masses of native labourers 
with their low standard of comfort, and consequent 
willingness to accept wages which to the European 
means degradation, if not starvation. 6 
This standpoint, in short, argued that the South African labour 
market was supplied with two classes of workers: the one, the 
white, with a relatively high standard of living which demanded 
a correspondingly high wage rate; and a black section, willing 
to work at rates much lower than the whites because of a lower 
standard of 1 i ving. Economists have been apt to show scant 
sympathy for this argument, urging instead that labour should be 
paid according to the criterion of marginal productivity. It was 
also argued that the idea that the black worker has a lower 
standard of living was fallacious, since he like other examples 
of economic man tended to strive for the highest reward for his 
labour. It would however seem true that the objectively existing 
discrepancies between the income received by whites and that by 
blacks had their subjective correlate in differing group norms 
regarding what is a minimum acceptable rate for particular work, 
even if no worker had a maximum acceptable rate. The problem 
tended to come down to the question: to what extent had white 
workers a legitimate case in demanding that their "established 
expectations" regarding wages be respected in the labour market, 
if these are threatened by black competition? The answer, 
naturally enough, tended to differ according to one's position 
in the labour market. 
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The point can be filled out by reference to the play of the 
labour market in South Africa. The sanction of convention and 
trade union pressure tended to eliminate labour surpluses first 
and foremost among white workers, if indeed there had been any 
in the first place. Continual shortages of whites ensued - first 
in the skilled trades, and more lately in semi-skilled positions. 
Trade union resistance and employer lethargy combined to prevent 
the immediate supplementation of the labour force by suitable 
black workers. The result was a general scarcity value of white 
employees, which bid up wages to levels which even trade 
unionists - in private - admitted were not fully justified. At 
this stage the pressure for the introduction of black workers, 
as an under- and unutilized labour source, became irresistible. 
But by this time the "established expectations" of white workers 
had been set at a level which employers, aware often of the 
relative abundance of black workers, were reluctant to apply to 
the new-comers to the industry. One of the cardinal problems of 
the labour situation in South Africa in the early 1970s was 
precisely how to reconcile the desire of white (and, of coloured 
and Indl,an) trade union members to maintain these relatively high 
rates with the possible depressive effects on wages of the 
introduction on a larger scale of black workers into posts 
hitherto barred to them. Economists, preoccupied more with the 
need for an expanding economy than the possible harm to sectional 
interests which might ensue, tended to shirk this question. 
(ii) Job competition. One step beyond the lowering of the wage 
rate through black competition the white union official feared 
the loss of jobs for his or her members. Displacement of white 
workers by under-cutting blacks is a hardy theme of South African 
labour history, as the quotation from the report of the Economic 
Commission at the beginning of this chapter indicates. It was 
the main rationale (though not the only one) given by government 
spokesmen for the introduction of statutory job reservation in 
the 1950s. And this in spite of the apparent fact that "White 
workers are being replaced, and not displaced, by Africans, 
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coloureds and Indians". 7 In truth, evidence for the actual 
displacement of white workers by blacks is rather scarce. 
Perhaps the dismissal of white miners which led to the 1922 Rand 
Strike is the only major case on record. Trade unionists have 
referred to the furniture, leather, building and clothing 
industries as evidence for the widespread displacement of whites 
and the consequent "blackening" of these trades. But in the 
first place, a large proportion of the workers in these 
industries seem to have been black from the start; and, secondly, 
it is plausible to argue that whites left low-wage occupations 
in these industries largely because more attractive work existed 
elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of white fears of displacement seems 
to suggest that they could not be altogether dismissed by a wave 
of the hand. Upward occupational mobility on the part of whites 
was not always by their own choice. The General Secretary of 
Spoorbond, Mr. D.J.J. Jacobs, remarked in 1970 on the difficulty 
experienced by his union and the Railways Administration in 
persuading semi- and unskilled white workers to leave these 
occupations for more responsible, better-paid work. Of some 5 
000 or so whites approached, around a half were unwilling to 
accept promotion, for one or another reason. 8 In other cases, 
occupational mobility may have been "sideways" rather than 
upwards, with whites leaving jobs on account of the introduction 
of black workers for other work which was not necessarily more 
preferred or better paid. 
Besides wage-undercutting, another, more intangible factor was 
operative in the mobility of white workers, which relates closely 
to the racial attitudes of white workers mentioned briefly at the 
beginning of the Chapter. White workers may perceive a social 
stigma attaching to work increasingly being performed by black 
workers, and left it for this if for no other reason. It is 
interesting to note that the government responsible for the first 
statutory job reservation clauses in the Industrial Conciliation 
Act of 1956 found it necessary three years later to introduce an 
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amendment to the Act which allowed the Minister of Labour to 
institute job reservation proceedings on grounds other than only 
the fear that the economic welfare of a particular racial group 
was being threatened. As the Minister of Labour of the time, 
Senator Jan de Klerk commented: 
.... whites are often pushed out not just as a result 
of a lower wage structure of non-Whites, but perhaps 
mainly as a result of undesirable contact during 
employment in the same work. The Whites move out and 
the work sphere is lost to them. 9 
"Undesirable contact" is a vague term, with variable meaning. 
(The Industrial Tribunal was presumably recording a case of this 
phenomenon when it reported the complaint of a white scraper 
driver that he had been exposed to the dirty look ("vuil kyk") 
of a black worker performing the same task). 10 Perhaps the 
problem can be summed up in the statement that white workers were 
often unwilling to perform work of the same nature and status as 
blacks in close contiguity with them. A further factor was that 
faced with recurrent shortages of white labour, employers could 
shift their opinion on what was the appropriate race of the 
workman for a particular task. Taken together, white status 
apprehensions and employer preferences could lead to the fact 
that certain work became "psychologically and realistically 
inaccessible" 11 to white workers, otherwise suited though they 
may have been for the particular job. 
It is plain that this whole question after 1950 was at its most 
acute in semi-skilled occupations - jobs such as bus and heavy 
lorry drivers, crane and other construction equipment operatives, 
shunters, barmen and other occupations in the hotel industry, 
certain factory operative jobs, lift attendants, blockmen in the 
meat industry, some mining occupations, and so forth. The main 
effect of the statutory job reservation introduced in terms of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 was to preserve 
relatively small pockets of semi-skilled work in the private 
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sector; mainly for whites, to a lesser extent for coloureds and 
Indian South Africans. Administrative reservation accomplished 
the same task on a wider scale in central and local government 
service and in public utilities. 
(iii) Power rivalry: The entrance of black workers into 
industry inevitably raised the question of what role they would 
come to play in the structures of power and authority of labour 
institutions. In its most acute form, the fear of the white 
unionists was of bloc formation on racial lines (something to be 
learnt from the behaviour of the white workers themselves). In 
a contest of this nature the whites might have the upper hand in 
the beginning, but would unavoidably stand to lose as black 
numbers and self-confidenee increased. There were numerous 
possibilities in such a confrontation. Blacks might for example 
enter existing mixed unions and sooner or later come to dominate 
them by force of numbers. Or exclusively black unions might seek 
to further the sectional interests of their members by collusion 
with the employers to undercut the position of unions catering 
for whites in the same or allied occupations. In either case the 
possibility existed that black unionists would attain positions 
of such authority within unions or within such institutions as 
industrial councils as to exercise the dominant influence which 
had hitherto rested in the hands of white unionists. (Such a 
contingency was actually adopted by the South African Congress 
of Trade Unions (SACTU) after 1954 as a strategy to oppose the 
dominance of whites in the trade union movement, but with little 
success.) 
In any event, this potential interracial power struggle did not 
materialise on a significant scale before 1979. Black workers 
eligible for recognised trade union membership (that is, mainly 
coloured and Indian South Africans before 1956, and solely these 
workers until 1979) showed themselves in the main willing to 
follow the lead of white unionists. In part this may be because 
the numbers of black journeymen in some mixed unions dominated 
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by artisans was never large enough for a struggle for power to 
be even remotely feasible, even if desired. In other unions, 
sympathetic white leadership managed to maintain the confidence 
of the black majority. (A position which the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956, with its stipulation that mixed unions 
must in all but exceptional cases be controlled by all-white 
executive committees helped to maintain.) Perhaps the only cases 
where black unions, helped in cases by sympathetic white 
officials from mixed unions, were in a position of preponderant 
influence vis-a-vis fellow white workers in the early 1970s were 
the industrial councils for the building industry in the Western 
Cape and the furniture industry. The picture was to change 
considerably after 1979, when black workers in numerous "mixed" 
unions rebel led against their subordinate status. But this takes 
the story beyond the confines of this study. 
White Protectionist Strategies 
Early attempts by white workers to obtain protection in the 
labour market against competition by black workers frequently 
encountered the resistance of an employing and governing class 
imbued with the ideals of classical laissez-faire economics. 
This view, which might be termed the "expansionist" strategy, 
argued that the only valid way of meeting the desire of white 
workers to maintain and improve standards of living was 
unfettered and rapid economic growth produced by the working of 
a free, competitive 1 abour market. It was argued that the 
demands for protection by whites through union activity and 
government regulation were incompatible with economic "laws" and 
hence not only undesirable in themselves but also self-defeating. 
Short-term protection for whites, however attractive it might 
seem, was in the long-run a contradiction in terms, since it 
I 
restricted the capitalist system in furthering economic expansion 
in the most efficient manner possible. Moreover, "artificial" 
protection would merely lead to the moral degeneration of the 
white worker, since it would remove the heal thy spur of the 
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competitive struggle for existence. 
Commission put the matter as follows: 
The 1916 Grants-In-Aid 
(The White worker) must be satisfied with the market 
value of his services, measured by the standard of the 
value of the services of the native. It is no use his 
demanding a higher wage on the plea that being a white 
man he is entitled to preferential treatment .... 12 
Commission after Commission in the first three decades of the 
century rejected the idea of protective measures for white 
workers. For example, the most the first report of the 1925 
Economic and Wage Commission was prepared to recommend was a 
process of "level 1 ing-up", whereby public wage regulation set 
down standards of pay for the lowest class of workers, 
irrespective of colour: 
"The best hope for the poorer White workers is the 
establishment of standards of pay for unskilled 
labour, which will encourage a reorganisation of 
industry on the basis of utilising all labour to its 
maximum capacity, without depriving of employment any 
of the workers now employed, 
stated the report. 13 
The implications of the expansionist view were "progressive" in 
race relations and long-term in the promise of fulfilment. 
Colour bars, of the conventional or legal sort, hindered the free 
flow and occupational mobility of the available labour, and were 
a check on expansion. Despite the alleged appetite of the mines 
for "cheap black labour", it was not in the interests of the mine 
managements to keep the black worker confined solely to the 
unskilled, meagrely-paid work. The long-term aspects of the 
expansionist view was self-evident: economic growth, in a region 
as underdeveloped, industrially speaking, as South Africa was at 
the turn of the century, offered no short term panaceas. The 
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rewards of the expansionist policy, pursued in its purest form, 
would only become really visible when the pool of unskilled 
labour began to run dry and wages ceased to be held back through 
the influence of the industrial reserve army of the unemployed. 
While the white artisan may have been able to benefit by reason 
of the skill differential, semi- and unskilled whites would have 
had to endure a long period of minimal rewards along with their 
black fellow workers. 
The failure of the expansionist view to offer anything but the 
vaguest of distant prospects in response to the sectional 
pressure of white workers left it extremely vulnerable to attack. 
Essentially it propounded a policy of laissez-faire in an era of 
protectionism. State intervention soon began to demonstrate that 
economic laws or not, short term protection could and would be 
afforded to the country's white workers. Admittedly, the 
protection was often not lavish; the subsidised five shillings 
a day received by thousands of unskilled whites in the 1920s and 
1930s hardly allowed for a luxurious life-style. But it showed 
that the "natural" working of the labour market could be 
interfered with without obvious harm occurring to the economy, 
and expansion still took place despite the early entrenchment of 
white workers in particular occupations. 
The heyday of the expansionist view in South African public life 
was in the years before 1924. Important in this respect had been 
the early conversion of Smuts to sympathy with the di lemma of the 
mine magnates in trying to produce gold at a time of rising 
production costs. But the refusal of Smuts to show positive 
partiality for the cause of the white workers was an electoral 
blunder of the first order. It alienated a wide section of white 
public opinion in South Africa, and led to the fall of Smuts's 
South African Party government in 1924. After 1924 no major 
white political party could afford to neglect paying some 
attention to the interests of white workers who claimed to be 
threatened by labour competition from blacks. 
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Expansionism's most extreme policy implications ceased to count 
in a South Africa control led by the representatives of an 
urbanised and industrialised white population. Since 1924 public 
debate among whites in the white-control led political system 
tended to accept that whites had the right to expect protection 
against the free play of the labour market. Argument thus 
centred not on whether but how such protection could best be 
afforded. Two competing doctrines in this regard were espoused 
by the various sections of white labour, and it is to a 
consideration of these that we now turn. The first, for the sake 
of convenience, can be termed the "unionist" strategy, the 
second, the "separationist" strategy. 
The Unionist Strategy. The di lemma of the founding fathers - the 
white immigrant artisans and miners - of South African trade 
unionism was how to reconcile the trade union principles they had 
brought with them with the conditions of a heterogeneous labour 
market. Two main themes dominated their response: the first, the 
protectionist emphasis of craft union practices, the second, the 
universalist, often socialist, creed of the working classes of 
the metropolitan countries from which they were derived. In the 
South African context, the two were often radically incompatible. 
An early cleavage emerged between the Western Cape, where some 
artisan unions from the beginning accepted coloured workers 
within their ranks, and the Rand, where unions were mostly 
racially exclusive. 
Even in the latter case, however, the labour movement tended to 
be divided between "left" and "right" points of view with respect 
to racial questions. The division was carried over into the 
South African Labour Party, the political vehicle of the 
immigrant unionists. It was a state of affairs which was to 
result in the ultimate dissipation of the Labour Party's 
political effectiveness. 
Unionists in the Western Cape and like-minded colleagues in the 
Transvaal argued that the proper trade union response to the 
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problem of interracial labour competition or the possibility of 
it, was the formation of mixed unions which would maintain the 
position of the established white workers by enforcement of the 
current rates prevailing in the particular trade, that is, the 
rate for the job. The issue was expressed in the following words 
in a motion before the First Annual South African Trade Union 
Congress held in Johannesburg in 1917: 
That in the opinion of this Congress the successful 
organisation of the South African Working Class for 
the maintenance of the highest possible standards of 
life and labour requires the co-operation of all 
workers irrespective of colour who agree to observe 
the standards for the respective trades and callings. 
And in support of the motion, one delegate argued: 
The relation of the Coloured workers to the White 
workers was not a social question. It was not a 
question of being in love with the coloured man It 
was a matter of organising labour irrespective of 
colour. There were only two classes in society today 
- the capitalist class and the working class ... 14 
Such in brief was what here is termed the "unionist" strategy. 
Its proponents argued no matter what the social divisions within 
the country, the economic interests of white and black workers 
were indivisible. White self-interest if nothing else demanded 
the total organisation of workers irrespective of colour, for 
only thereby could union rates received by established workers 
be protected. 
After coming to power as partners in the Pact Government in 1924, 
some Labour Party politicians wished to extend the unionist 
strategy of the rate for the job to industries where workers were 
either al together unorganised or possessed insufficient 
bargaining power to force employers to the negotiating table. 
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The creation of the Wage Board in terms of the Wage Act of 1925 
provided the government with an instrument whereby minimum wage 
rates could be established in industries where industrial 
councils were absent. The role envisaged for the Wage Board 
enabled trade unionists who were otherwise uneasy about the 
propriety of job colour bars to argue that such measures were of 
a purely transitional nature designed as stopgaps until such time 
as union activity and the operation of the Wage Board were able 
to lay down minimum wage rates as a level acceptable to whites 
as well as blacks. H.W. Sampson, Cabinet Minister in the Pact 
government, and a life-long member of the South African 
Typographical Union, was for example able to claim that the Mines 
and Works Act passed by the Pact, whereby certain jobs on the 
mines were reserved for whites and certain categories of coloured 
persons only, was a "temporary palliative", something which was 
to be put into force "until some other form of protection against 
the encroachment of 1 ow wage servi 1 e natives" was put in its 
place. 15 In theory, at least, the Wage Board was to provide this 
protection by laying down minimum wage rates irrespective of 
race, and to push up the overall wage floor, thereby removing the 
enormous discontinuities which were so distinctive of the South 
African wage structure, and which tended to run along the racia~ 
di vi de. The result of the trade union activity and of the 
operation of the Wage Board would thus be to so raise the 
standard of living of the black groups that they would cease to 
constitute cheap labour and would, economically speaking, be on 
the same footing as white workers. 
Monumental practical difficulties, as well as dissension among 
union leaders, made implementation of this strategy utopian. The 
Wage Board did not exercise the influence which some had hoped 
for, and usually operated by way of incremental increases which 
did not radically reduce the gap between skilled and unskilled, 
white and black. Within the South African Labour Party itself, 
arising out of the somewhat differing relations between white, 
coloured and Indian workers on the one hand, and white and 
African workers on the other, a distinction tended to be drawn 
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between policy applicable to black workers eligible for trade 
union membership in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 
1924, (mainly coloureds and Indians), and those not eligible 
(pass-bearing black workers). Indeed, so great did the problem 
posed by the presence of large nl,.lillbers of African workers seem 
to trade unionists within the Labour Party that a total 
territorial segregation policy for Africans was adopted by the 
Party. Many union leaders regarded this proposal as no more than 
a pipe dream, claiming that "segregation - either industrial or 
geographical - can only be partly successful and then only for 
a time ... sooner or later the National Trade Union Movement must 
include all genuine labour industrial organisations, irrespective 
of craft, colour or creed. 1116 Africans too would at some future 
date have to be drawn within the ambit of established unions, and 
treated in the same manner as the unionist strategy dictated for 
other blacks. Economic integration, argued these unionists, was 
irreversible, and an expanding economy could only result in more 
and more blacks being pulled into the industries of the country. 
These arguments which underlay the unionist strategy of fifty and 
sixty years ago have been cited at some length because they 
remained the animating principles for one section of the white 
trade union leadership throughout the period of this study. 
Precisely the same arguments, often in the same terminology, were 
urged in the 1970s in favour of mixed unions attempting to apply 
the rate for the job. 
At this point it is perhaps opportune to attempt a short 
evaluation of this strategy, considered from the point of view 
of the protection of white workers which it was claimed to have 
afforded. To begin with, it is worth noting that the rate for 
the job policy was attacked for altogether conflicting reasons. 
Mr. J.H. Liebenberg of the Artisan Staff Association stated in 
1970, for example, that: 
We know that the rate for the job, to be brief about 
it, was probably the reason that it was necessary some 
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time ago to bring in job reservation. We know of 
industries that on account of the rate for the job 
have become completely non-White, and as a means to 
maintain the labour adaption pattern it has already 
failed. 17 
On the other hand, Professor W.H. Hutt, a figure somewhat out of 
favour in trade union circles of the 1930s and 1940s, claimed 
that: 
The 'Rate for the Job' was the most vital principle in 
the most powerful yet most subtle colour bar that has 
ever operated ..... When the standard wage rate is 
forced above the free market level thereby 
reducing the output which can be produced profitably, 
it must have the ef feet of preventing the entry of 
subordinate races or classes into the protected field 
or of actually excluding them f ram it. 18 
Verification for either one of these two broad views is not easy 
to obtain. Detailed studies of the effect of the rate for the 
job policy over a wide range of industries and work-spheres would 
be necessary before one could conclude which statement, if any, 
was the most accurate description of the actual state of affairs. 
Lacking such evidence, this chapter will not attempt to provide 
a conclusive answer. But such diametrically opposed statements 
indicated the extent to which observers at the time reached quite 
different conclusions from the same available evidence. 
Leaving aside the question of the extent to which rate for the 
job acted as a brake on the employment of black labour, let us 
here briefly consider some of the objections white unionists 
claimed made rate for the job an ineffective protective device 
for white workers. First, it was contended that while rate for 
the job might apply, mixed unions could set the rate so low that 
white workers found the wage unacceptable. Of interest here 
would be a systematic comparison of wage rates prevailing in 
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similar work spheres which were organised by a white union and 
a mixed union respectively, for example, municipal transport in 
the various urban centres; the building industry at the coast and 
in the Transvaal, and so forth. Second, white unionists claimed 
that the rate for the job policy could be nullified by the 
difficulty of creating a sufficiently efficient inspectorate to 
enforce it. Third, in a reiteration of a frequent theme in South 
African labour history since the 1930s, the process of dilution 
of artisan work was frequently accompanied by a drastic lowering 
of the rate paid to semi-skilled workers performing work 
previously done by artisans. It was in response to this problem 
that a major policy report issued by the Trade Union Council of 
South Africa in 1969 declared: " .... the unions will have to 
have a policy of opposition to wage downgrading, which is the 
chief means whereby the rate for the job policy is 'sabotaged' 
in present practice. 1119 Perhaps the most striking example of 
this tendency was the recurrent revisions of the technical 
schedules and wage rates in the industrial counci 1 agreements for 
the engineering industry. Finally, and perhaps most serious in 
its potential, was the general practice of paying premium rates 
for white artisans, rates which were considerably higher than 
those ·set down in the relevant industrial counci 1 agreements. 
The possibility existed thus that employers could legally employ 
black tradesmen at rates much lower than those paid to whites, 
and the evidence suggests that they frequently did. One union10 ) 
argued that the answer was the use of union power to enforce the 
"effective" (i.e. white) rate for the job in agreements, and so 
seriously did unionists view this problem that the South African 
Typographical Union for one contemplated strike action over the 
issue in the 1970s. 20 
While these objections did not necessarily confirm the inability 
of the rate for the job policy to maintain established wage 
rates, they suggest that application of the policy was by no 
means as straight-forward as was sometimes claimed. Perhaps the 
trade union proponents of the rate for the job policy were 
themselves partly responsible for this misapprehension. Rate for 
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the job enforced by a mixed Qnion was rarely the only protective 
device employed by such unions to protect the interests of their 
white members. Perhaps it was not even the main one. 
Protection was also afforded by matters such as entrance to the 
trades concerned and also by factors outside the control of the 
union itself, such as employer preferences and the inferior 
quality of black educational facilities, not to mention the 
question of white occupational mobility. Rate for the job, in 
short, always operated alongside a host of other factors, and it 
is extremely difficult to untangle the forces at work in each 
case. 
Why, if this was indeed so, did trade unionists always lay such 
stress on the unionist strategy of the rate for the job to the 
exclusion of other measures? One reason is perhaps that while 
never attained, the ideal of the rate for the job remained the 
code whereby union leaders could measure the relative success of 
their efforts. Since the only long-run solution to the problem 
of the presence of potential under-cutting competition was to 
make labour homogeneous with regard to standards of living ·and 
wage expectations, the rate for the job provided a guide to the 
extent to which such a situation was attainable. Second, the 
existence of union rates, even if they bore little relation to 
actual rates paid in an industry, remained a safeguard against 
sudden and sharp downward shifts of wages in the event of 
economic adversity. Third, and perhaps most important, the rate 
for the job was the only satisfactory principle on which the 
willing co-operation of black as well as white workers could be 
obtained within the framework of the mixed union. In this sense, 
rate for the job comprised the war cry by which one section of 
the white union leadership indicated its commitment to 
interracial harmony and equality. 
The Separationist Strategy: An early response of white 
unionists, on the Rand in particular, to the possibility of 
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interracial" labour competition was the formation of exclusively 
white unions which resisted the introduction of black workers 
into work-spheres considered the domain of whites. And in one 
case, on the mines, this union stance was buttressed by a legal 
colour bar, first introduced in 1893 and which received final 
legislative sanction in the Mines and Works Act of 1926. Colour 
bars of this sort served both to prevent the displacement of 
white workers from their jobs by blacks, and to create a scarcity 
value for white labour which effectively bid up wage rates for 
the benefit of union members. In itself, the practice was one 
which came, so to speak, naturally, to trade unionists who in 
other countries would have resisted the introduction of female 
and juvenile labour on precisely the same grounds. As one of the 
most percipient of commentators on South African trade unionism 
has remarked: 
Where .... the majority of skilled workers belong to 
a dominant and distinct racial group, they tend to 
apply these conventional safeguards of organised 
labour along racial as well as craft lines. Race 
discrimination is not primarily the aim of their 
policy; it is rather an additional weapon to be used 
in defence of their interests. 22 
The presence of such union colour bars tended to be justified by 
union leaders on the grounds of simple self-interest. Unionists 
from white and from mixed unions were able to co-operate on the 
basis of union autonomy and an agreement not to over-emphasise 
the differences which existed among them concerning racial 
questions. It was thus possible for one national trade union co-
ordinating body, the South African Trades and Labour Council 
(SAT&LC), to represent both mixed and white-only unions. 
In the 1940s this uneasy consensus broke down in the face of 
increasing hos ti 1 i ty between the left and right poles of the 
SAT&LC, and the problems posed by the coming to power of a 
political party in 1948 with a policy of far-reaching 
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segregation in the political, social and industrial fields. 
Prior to 1948 government policy regarding organised labour and 
the racial question had remained ambivalent; after that time 
trade union leaders were confronted with a government with a 
clear policy in this regard. Supported by its assessment that 
the majority of white workers were not opposed to segregatory 
measures, and advised by a section of the white trade union 
leadership, the National Party Government embodied the main 
features of its policy of industrial segregation in the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 (together with other measures 
such as the Native Building Workers Act of 1951 and the Bantu 
Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953). After the passage 
of the revised Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, an increasing 
crystallisation of views took place within organised labour, one 
section adhering to the idea of mixed unions applying the rate 
for the job, the other supporting, with varying degrees of 
conviction the policies embodied in the 1956 legislation. What 
follows is an attempt to sketch the outlines of the separationist 
strategy as it was interpreted by this latter group of trade 
unionists. 
The essence of the separationist strategy was the idea that white 
union exclusionist measures could be generalised across the whole 
system of industrial relations. It adopted a certain perspective 
(which took the existence of sharply distinctive racial groups 
as given), and demanded that the line be drawn. Labour of 
different racial origin was to be taken out of competition by the 
allocation of separate work-spheres - on a territorial, on an 
occupational, or any other basis - to white and black. By such 
means interracial competition could not merely be control led, but 
eliminated altogether. In advocating the means to this end, the 
labour structure of the mines was taken as paradigmatic: racially 
exclusive all-white unions operating with the protection of a 
statutory colour bar which reserved certain well-defined 
categories of work for white workers alone. The strategy implied 
a system of industrial relations where only racially exclusive 
trade unions were permitted, and in which government intervention 
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provided an indispensable adjunct to the power of the union to 
maintain certain work in the hands of the whites, and to maintain 
a certain amount of physical segregation of workers of different 
race. White workers would thus be protected from black 
competition by white unions able to depend in the last resort 
upon government-imposed job reservation, rather than by mixed 
unions applying the rate for the job. The latter principle, 
indeed, was seen as applicable only within racial strata and not 
across them. As one leading trade unionist said: 11 •••• we are 
in favour of equal pay for equal work but believe that job 
reservation must see to it that there is no equal work. 1123 
Should events permit a situation where white and black did the 
same type of work, then differential wage rates should apply on 
a racial basis, in order both to reassure white workers unhappy 
at the equalising implications of equal pay for white and black, 
and also (so the argument ran) to protect the black workers from 
the undesirable consequences of receiving a wage rate which was 
out of line with the established expectations of the racial group 
from which they came. 
Like "rate for the job", the cry of "job reservation" evolved 
into the basic slogan by which some trade unionists indicated 
their broad attitude to the problem of interracial competition. 
But while many trade unionists were agreed on the worth of job 
reservation as a protective device, it was also evident that 
between 1956 and 1979 there were wide differences of emphasis on 
the implications of the policy 1 and it is to these that the 
discussion now turns. 
In its most extreme form and as it was interpreted by some trade 
unionists and some politicians, job reservation was seen as a key 
principle in the engineering of a whole order of occupational 
separation. As such, it provided the means whereby, at some 
future <;late, all work within the "white" areas in South Africa 
wo~ld be allocated on a racial basis. It was thus not only a 
protective device for white workers threatened by interracial 
competition but a separationist measure of the first importance, 
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by which it would ultimately be possible to set a racial seal on 
all work. In particular, it was a measure by which the process 
of economic integration was to be halted. Senator Jan de Klerk 
expressed it as follows in 1955: 
The National Party says that even if we have advanced 
far along the road whereby non-Whites already do work 
being done by Whites, or which should be done by 
Whites in the future, then in those cases we are going 
to regain what has been lost .... it is my policy that 
those areas which were White, to the greatest possible 
extent . . . . are again made White. 24 
The growth of the economy during the 1960s nullified the 
realisation of this hope, and increasingly trade unions which 
were reluctant to allow the advancement of black workers into 
work formerly performed by whites were forced to al low some 
concessions. But in doing 
temporary state of affairs, 
so, they claimed that this was a 
and the line which had shifted 
upwards would have to be moved downwards again when the trend 
reversed itself, and whites became available for posts being 
filled by black workers. Leaders of the right-wing Union 
Federation, Koordinerende Raad, expressed the intention of 
pressing government for widespread job reservation determinations 
when circumstances permitted. 25 Certain trade unionists even 
went so far as to demand that the government take active steps 
to lower the growth rate of the economy, claiming that "The 
nature of the present problem is in fact too high a growth rate 
rather than a labour shortage. The economic growth rate may not 
be put on a pedestal at the cost of White security". 26 
A number of white unionists did not however see the policy of job 
reservation, with its accompanying implications such as the 
disappearance of mixed unions, in quite the same light as that 
outlined above. For these other union leaders job reservation 
remained a more or less pragmatic method to be used in the short-
term interests of workers threatened by under-cutting. For such 
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leaders, job reservation carried with it little of the 
ideological character which it did for others. This point of 
view was perhaps given its clearest expression by J.H. 
Liebenberg, who remarked: 
At the moment we think of job reservation only in 
terms of Whites, but the time will come that we will 
have to apply it to protect the Asian and Coloured 
against the Bantu. It can also happen that it must be 
applied to protect the advanced Bantu against the 
Bantu with the blanket across his shoulders .... 27 
In such a case job reservation lost much of its accompanying 
ideological rationale and was seen simply as a protective measure 
to be called upon in ad hoc fashion to protect established 
workers of any race against "unfair" competition. This view 
would certainly seem to coincide more closely with the actual 
workings of the measure since its inception in 1956, in so far 
as it operated as an unsystematic and unco-ordinated series of 
responses to complaints by (mainly white) workers of interracial 
competition. 
The difficulties of implementing job reservation determinations 
to the satisfaction of some white unionists active in the private 
sector were well-illustrated in the case of the Natal building 
industry. White workers in this industry from 1961 on were 
organised by the all-white Blanke Bouwerkersvakbond (BBV) and the 
racially-mixed Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers. 
Pressure from the former union resulted in a job reservation 
determination which was issued only in 1963, having been 
requested in 1960. The reservation was itself a disappointment 
for the BBV, since 11 those trades that needed protection and 
represented 42% of the industry were not reserved for Whites", 
and "the determination created no machinery· to implement it." 
Even in the reserved trades increasing numbers of blacks were 
employed. By 1968 the BBV claimed that there were 854 blacks in 
jobs reserved for whites, and complained to the Minister of 
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Labour, who replied that he was "determined that the provisions 
of the Determination should be strictly adhered to." In spite 
of this declaration, the BBV noted that in 1969 there were 3 021 
white and 3 034 black artisans employed in the Durban building 
industry, compared to 2 705 whites and 564 blacks respectively 
in 1961. 28 Taken together with exemptions granted to coloured 
artisans to work in the Transvaal building industry in 1970, the 
situation was such as to lead the General Secretary of the BBV 
to write: "Job reservation in the building industry has totally 
failed as a result of its non-application." What had failed of 
course was job reservation as a measure to maintain certain work 
as a white preserve alone, testimony to which was the widespread 
practice of suspending the implementation of existing work 
reservation determinations and granting exemptions to employers 
to use other than the specified (and usually white) labour. What 
remained, and was scarcely quantifiable, was the debatable extent 
to which the whole job reservation machinery did indeed act as 
the "sword of Damocles" over employers' heads which one National 
Party Minister of Labour argued that it would. (See Chapter 4.) 
Organised Labour and the Position of the Black Worker 
The ideal of a united labour movement embracing most, if not all, 
South African trade unions and commanding attention by reason of 
its ability to express a broad consensus among union leaders on 
common problems remained an elusive one in South African labour 
history. The only body which even approximated this ideal was 
the South African Trades and Labour Council as it functioned 
between 1931 and 1947. Even here the SAT&LC's effectiveness was 
limited by sharp internal conflicts, by its failure to gain the 
adherence of important union groupings among both white and black 
workers, and by the continued existence of the Cape Federation 
of Labour Unions. After 1947, with the break-away of five 
conservative unions (later to form the nucleus of the 
Koordinerende Raad van Suid-Afrikaanse Vakverenigings), and 
shortly thereafter of certain mining and craft unions, the SAT&LC 
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was reduced to the position of one among several rival bodies 
claiming to speak for "organised labour". Out of this 
dissension, and largely in response to the National Party 1 s 
programme of labour legislation, emerged the broad groupings of 
organised labour which were to be found in the two decades after 
1956 before the renewed organisation of African workers. Leaving 
out of account the (internally) defunct South African Congress 
of Trade Unions, these groupings could be reduced to three: 
first, the white union affiliated to the Confederation of Labour; 
second, unions not affiliated to either of the major national 
labour councils; and, third, the racially-mixed Trade Union 
Council of South Africa (TUCSA). 
Under the aegis of the Confederation of Labour were grouped a 
number of white unions organising around 200 000 white workers 
on the railways, in local and provincial government service, 
public utilities such as !SCOR, and the mining, motor assembly 
and engineering industry. It is perhaps no accident that unions 
in this group were the strongest advocates of what has been 
termed here the separationist strategy, since most of them 
operated within a system of administrative and legal reservation 
of work on a racial basis. The Confederation of Labour supported 
the National Party's policy of job reservation, and tended to 
consider itself the spokesman of the "white worker". As such, 
the Confederation was frequently regarded as the main bulwark of 
present protectionist policies in favour of whites. 
Unaffiliated unions comprised a heterogeneous grouping which 
included both racially mixed and racially exclusive 
organisations. Included among them are several major artisan-
dominated unions: the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), the 
South African Electrical Workers Association(SAEWA), the Motor 
Industry Employees Union (MIEU) and the major building unions. 
Several of these unions did belong to TUCSA but disaffiliated in 
the 1960s. Whether on account of internal divisions, or because 
of a lack of sympathy with the concept of a national trade union 
movement, or simply on account of apathetic leadership, these 
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unions tended to be reluctant to take sides on matters of general 
labour policy, except when it impinged on their immediate 
interests. 
Third, there was the Trade Union Council of South Africa, 
representing over 200 000 white, coloured and Indian workers 
organised in both mixed and segregated union, almost exclusively 
in the private sector. TUCSA' s official pronouncements were 
strongly in favour of what has here been termed the unionist 
strategy. TUCSA's multi-racial emphasis, and the presence of 
black unionists on its National Executive Committee and at its 
annual conferences, was in sharp contrast to the racial 
exclusiveness of the Confederation of Labour. 
In the early 1970s, roughly a third of registered trade union 
members thus fel 1 into each of these three groupings above. 
While disagreement between the two wings of organised labour 
ranged over quite a wide variety of issues, the main cleavage 
must be considered to have lain in conflicting views over the 
racial question, and particularly over the strategy to be 
followed in confronting the problem of interracial labour 
competition. The Confederation of Labour, for example, refused 
to discuss the problem of labour shortages with TUCSA in 1970 "on 
account of irreconcilable differences of opinion on the use of 
White and non-White labour"; 30 and from the leaders of the 
Koordinerende Raad, 
declarations that 
a Confederation affiliate, came frequent 
"it is clear that it is al together beyond 
question that it could be conceivable for the Koordinerende Raad 
and TUCSA to belong to one federation". 31 Indeed, in some 
industries considerable competition existed between white 
Confederation unions and mixed TUCSA unions over the recruitment 
of white members. For their part, spokesmen of unions belonging 
to TUCSA often considered Confederation unionists as racialist 
spokesmen who meekly follow the lead given by government, instead 
of adhering to "true trade union principles". 
A complete understanding of this trade union division over race 
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would have to go beyond the limits of purely trade union affairs, 
and some reference would be necessary to the divisions within 
white society as a whole. For example, despite a studious 
avoidance of party political links, it is fairly clear on which 
side of the fence the sympathies of the bulk of the white union 
leadership in either camp lay. Further, another obstacle to 
unity arose out of the difference of opinion over the association 
of white and black within the same institutions and on an equal 
social footing, something which was in itself a product of 
broader community attitudes rather than arising from the trade 
union environment as such. These considerations are, however, 
beyond the scope of this chapter. The question may instead be 
posed: given the existence of a divided labour movement, what 
were the consequences of it for black workers? What meaningfully 
different outcomes resulted from the operation of the unionist 
strategy as opposed to the separationist strategy? While on one 
level the answer to these questions may appear fairly easy to 
provide, seeing that the bulk of black union leaders at the time 
supported TUCSA, on another level there was room for doubting 
that overt union differences over race reflected greatly 
differing behaviour in the labour market, or at least, greatly 
differing influence over the racial structures of the labour 
force. It would appear to be this last consideration which led 
one leading white unionist to declare in opposition to prevailing 
opinion, that 11 ••• the differences which do exist between the 
various trade union groups are so insignificant that a specific 
classification is not justified". 32 
In support of this contention, the point can be made that in 
spite of the widely differing implications of the unionist as 
against the separationist strategy, industries organised by 
unions of either persuasion tended to show the same overal 1 
pattern of continued and pervasive racial segmentation, combined 
however with an increasing utilisation of black labour in work 
formerly performed by whites. Exceptions to this rule did of 
course exist, and some white unions in a particularly strategic 
position (such as the Mine Workers Union), were able to maintain 
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a degree of rigidity in the racial pattern of employment which 
would probably not have been the case in the absence of union 
power in such areas. But on the whole, it appears plausible to 
argue that the aggregate advancement of black workers was not 
radically affected by the adoption of the unionist or the 
separationist strategy. What was affected was rather the 
institutional framework - whose importance is of course not to 
be under-rated - within which such black advancement took place. 
Unions such as those affiliated to the Confederation of Labour 
allowed black advancement, albeit with reluctance, and remained 
largely indifferent to the question of organisation or otherwise 
of the black workers involved. Unions such as those affiliated 
to TUCSA on the other hand were more concerned to see that in 
allowing the advancement of black (especially African), workers 
this should fall within the ambit of union organisation, either 
as mixed unions, or as parallel unions with close links to the 
dominant white Union. 
This argument could be amplified by referring to the position of 
white-dominated unions either within TUCSA or sympathetic to the 
policy of the rate for the job (among which latter unions could 
perhaps be numbered the AEU and the SAEWA, or at least, sections 
of their leadership). The first point is that despite the avowed 
intention of the unionist strategy to make labour homogeneous 
irrespective of racial origin, mixed unions were either largely 
white or largely black in their composition. Where this was not 
so, as in the case for example of the South African Typographical 
Union (SATU), where a third of the membership was coloured and 
Indian, it still remained the position that the bulk of the black 
membership was not fully-qualified artisans but semi-skilled 
workers. The mixed unions, on the whole, were not able to 
stabilise the racial composition of the work-force in such a 
manner that occupational categories, protected by the policy of 
the rate for the job, were filled by workers of the required 
competence and irrespective of their racial origin. Racial 
segmentation remained, although it may not necessarily be the 
conscious intention of the union concerned to maintain it. 
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From the point of view of the black worker, the position in the 
early 1970s was especially unsatisfactory in the skilled trades 
organised by mixed unions, since the ratio of white to black 
apprentices entering 
favourable to whites, 
these trades was still overwhelming 
in spite of the great shortage of such 
workers which was alleged to exist, and also in spite of long-
standing rate for the job policies on the part of these unions. 
It was no secret that the mixed unions experienced difficulties 
in carrying their white membership with them over such questions 
as the training of black apprentices by whites. E. van Tonder, 
the then Secretary of the SATU for example, remarked in 1970 
apropos the shortage of skilled labour and the need to advance 
blacks into these positions, that: " ... the crux of this problem 
is member resistance in our unions. 
the artisans at the work-bench". 33 
It is the resistance from 
In order to meet this 
problem, the SATU leadership placed great stress on the need for 
pushing up whites, re-training them if necessary, so that they 
could become the technicians of the future, and so al lowing 
blacks increasingly to fill artisan positions. This policy in 
effect conceded that great difficulty was experienced in treating 
labour as homogeneous through the application of the rate for the 
job. Instead, a form of informal racial compartmentalisation was 
adopted in the hope of reconciling the demand of white artisans 
for protection with the need to bring forward black workers. 
A further point is that although trade unionists often summed up 
prevailing divisions within the trade union world in terms of a 
"rate for the job\job reservation" dichotomy, measures to achieve 
what amounted to a system of job reservation were adopted by 
unions which otherwise declared themselves supporters of the rate 
for the job policy. As Professor Sheila van der Horst remarked: 
I am not sure that when White trade unionists demand 
'the rate for the job' this is really the whole 
demand. A closed shop is also frequently demanded and 
the right to determine who is admitted to trade 
unions, which may contain a colour bar in their 
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constitution or which may, in fact, exclude other non-
Europeans besides the Africans excluded in terms of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act. 34 
One example here was the clause inserted in industrial council 
agreements for the engineering industry, where certain grades of 
work were reserved for members of registered trade unions alone, 
a measure which was termed, by the trade union leader who 
initiated it, " a form of 1 Closed Shop 1 , and also 1 Job 
Reservation' 11 • 35 In another case, that of the resistance of the 
Johannesburg Municipal Transport Workers' Union (JMTWU) to the 
proposal of the Johannesburg City Council to introduce coloured 
drivers on white buses, the Union opposed the move on explicitly 
racial grounds, refusing to accept coloured drivers even though 
the Council undertook to pay the rate for the job. 36 (The JMTWU, · 
paradoxically enough, was one of the few, if not the only, white 
union since 1956 to become a mixed one. Al though it catered only 
for white workers at the time, the JMTWU refused to change its 
constitution after 1956 to restrict membership of the union to 
whites only and in 1969, after the Johannesburg City Council had 
introduced coloured workers into certain grades of depot work, 
the JMTWU organised these workers into the union on the basis of 
the rate for the job. ) 35 > 
Whatever the broad trade union principles of whi ta-dominated 
unions in South Africa in the 1970s (as indicated for example by 
their membership of a particular trade union co-ordinating body), 
these unions remained protectionist organisations whose 
activities had to satisfy the dominant sections within the group 
of workers concerned. As Cliff Crompton of the Iron Moulders 1 
Society put the issue: 
undoubtedly we would not be leaders unless we tried to 
channel the thought and the policy of our 
organisation, but we can only do this to a certain 
extent. One can only go so far and no further. 
What really matters is - What does the membership of 
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our respective unions really want? Are we going to be 
leaders without an army, or are we going to accept 
that we have to back-pedal in order to preserve the 
conditions of the membership? 38 
This then was the di lemma of the leaders of white-dominated 
unions: how to reconcile their sympathy for black advancement 
with the need to satisfy the demands of white members who 
associated the idea of black advance with a threat to their 
existing conditions of work. As the quotation earlier by 
Liebenberg suggests, in this matter the problems encountered by 
unions affiliated to TUCSA and unions affiliated to the 
Confederation of Labour were of the same order, and both in 
response sought some form of protection for the interests of 
their members. 
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Chapter 3: Creating the Institutional Order: the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 1 
For 55 years the single most important piece of legislation with 
regard to the nature of South African industrial relations was 
the Industrial Conciliation Act. First passed in March 1924, in 
the dying days of Smuts' South African Party (SAP) government, 
this Act underwent considerable revision in both 1937 and 1956, 
with numerous Amendment Acts in between. But the underlying 
principles by and large remained intact, though new ones were 
introduced and old ones extended or modified. Among the major 
provisions of the Act, somewhat concealed in the fine print 
however, was the definition of its scope: which workers were, and 
which were not, to be covered by the Act's provisions. Among the 
groups omitted one group above all was notable: "pass-bearing 
natives", as the terminology of the time put it. The revision 
of industrial legislation by the National Party government in the 
1950s extended this exclusion to all African workers. By this 
time three decades of South African trade unionism had elapsed 
during which the separation of the bulk of the African labour 
force from the dominant trade unions of the white, coloured and 
Indian workers had become almost general practice. The politics 
of racial exclusion in the trade unions owed much to practices 
which were not directly the outcome of the law itself. But the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 certainly strengthened 
existing tendencies to racial exclusion, giving legislative and 
political sanction to those forces in the dominant trade unions 
which favoured segregation and white domination. It was indeed 
the repeal of the racially exclusive principles of the Act in 
1979 which marked the end of an attempt to create a modern system 
of industrial relations on the basis of separation and 
inequality. In 1981 the Industrial Conciliation Act was renamed 
the Labour Relations Act. An era had ended. This chapter 
attempts to look at the context within which this crucial piece 
of legislation first came about. 
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Conciliation and Control, 1909-1913 
In 1909 the elected Het Volk government of the Transvaal 
introduced the Transvaal Industrial Disputes Bill. The immediate 
spur to the introduction of the Bill was the 1907 strike of white 
miners on the gold fields, the first major action of its kind 
since the gold mines had re-opened after the Anglo-Boer War. The 
strike had been a watershed for the Het Volk government in 
general and for Smuts, the Colonial Secretary, in particular. 
Before 1907 the growing white labour movement on the Rand had 
looked to Het Volk as a potential ally against the influence of 
the Progressive Party and its supporters, the Rand mine 
management class. Both Botha and Smuts had reciprocated to some 
extent, inveighing against the sinister influence of the Chamber 
of Mines. Het Volk's handling of the 1907 strike shattered the 
potential alliance. Government failed to come down on the side 
of the white miners, and the strike was broken. Smuts, as his 
sympathetic biographer Hancock has written, "soon discovered 
Hoggenheimer to be a fictitious animal", and forged "frank and 
cordial relations" with a leading Rand magnate, Lionel 
Phillips. 2 While it would be overstating the case to say that 
Smuts henceforth was the captive representative of the sectional 
interests of the Chamber of Mines, it is clear that he was 
impressed by the arguments of the mine management regarding the 
difficulties in keeping the mines running at a profit and the 
crucial importance of the earnings from gold exports. Equally 
clearly, Smuts and the Het Volk government were alarmed at the 
potential for unrest contained in the growing militancy of the 
white miners in particular, but also in the industrial action of 
any major group of white workers. 
The first outcome of this concern was the passage in 1908 of the 
Railway Regulation Act, establishing the conditions of service 
of railway workers. The Act contained the first prohibition on 
strikes by whites in South Africa. Railway employees were 
henceforth denied the right to strike, under penalty of criminal 
prosecution. In return, the Act established the principle of 
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compulsory arbitration between the railways administration and 
employees whenever a dispute between the two arose. 3 This 
position was to be extended over the whole of South Africa after 
Union, with the passage of the 1912 Railways and Harbours Service 
Act. Thus began what might be termed the decomposition of white 
labour solidarity by statutory means in South Africa. As later 
events were to prove, the creation of separate statutory 
machinery for differing sections of labour tended to encourage 
the compartmentalisation of white labour's industrial activity 
and outlook. Regulated by a detailed code of management-worker 
relations, the railway workers remained apa:f:t~rom the labour 
movement as a whole, and their approach to matters of mutual 
concern was heavily coloured by their separate institutional 
position. At this early date, thus, white railway workers were 
being placed in a position of neutrality relative to the other 
sections of white labour. There was to be no question of a 
repetition in South Africa of the powerful British "Triple 
Alliance" of miners, railway workers and dockers and transport 
workers. 
By 1909, then, the Het Volk government had indicated that it 
would not necessarily act as the undiscriminating champion of 
white workers as political currents prior to 1907 had suggested 
it might. Smuts's own approach at this time, as later, was to 
seek compromise between the parties to industrial disputes, but 
to come down firmly on threats to law and order contained in any 
major industrial action by workers. It was not, after all, the 
Rand magnates who gathered in the streets threatening violence. 
As later events were to prove, this position tended to the 
advantage of management rather than workers. 
When Smuts rose in the Transvaal Legislative Assembly to 
introduce the Industrial Disputes Bill, he endeavoured to present 
himself as the state referee of contending interests. The major 
provisions of the Bill were relatively straightforward. Based 
on the principles of the Industrial Dispute Investigation Act 
passed in Canada in 1907 4 , the Bill aimed, as Smuts emphasised, 
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to "avoid both the extremes of the option on the one hand, and 
compulsion on the other. 115 The Bill provided that changes in 
working conditions proposed by employers or employees had to be 
preceded by one month's notice. In the event of deadlock, no 
strike or lock-out could take place until a government-appointed 
conciliation board had investigated the dispute and a month had 
elapsed since the publication of its report. Detailed provisions 
regulated the manner of appointment and operat~on of these 
conciliation boards. For example, a dispute involving less than 
ten workers could not be an occasion for the appointment of a 
conci 1 iation board. Further, the findings of a conci 1 iation 
board could only become legally binding if both parties to a 
dispute agreed to it. The Bill explicitly excluded from its 
ambit the public service and any person "who is not a white 
person. 116 
Such then in brief outline were the provisions of the first overt 
measure in South Africa towards a statutorily-defined industrial 
relations system. The thinking behind the Bill was to be of 
tremendous influence with regard to later industrial relations 
legislation. The principle of compromise between compulsory 
arbitration and completely voluntary industrial relations was 
itself a key theme underlying the Industrial Conciliation Act of 
1924. So too was the exclusion of large sections of the work-
force from the ambit of the Act. It is thus worth looking in 
some detail at the parliamentary response to the Industrial 
Disputes Bill, in order to gain some idea of the political and 
ideological context in which the measure was passed. 
The Labour members or sympathisers in the Legislative Assembly 
levelled a number of criticisms against the measure. One major 
objection was the limited scope of the Bill: the exclusion of 
sections of employees such as public servants, railway workers 
and blacks. Doubt too was expressed regarding the usefulness of 
the reports of conciliation boards which would not, barring 
agreement, be binding on parties. But, by and large, the 
criticisms of labour representatives were relatively moderate. 
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Peter Whiteside, for example, member for Siemert and leader of 
the Engine Drivers on the mines, sounded relatively conciliatory 
when he declared that " ... compulsory arbitration, a wages board, 
and compulsory investigation were merely palliatives. So long 
as the workers had to exist under wage-slavery they had to do the 
best they could and accept one or other of the palliatives in the 
meantime. 117 
For the Progressives, both F.D. Chaplin and George Farrar gave 
full support to the Bill in terms which indicated their 
satisfactioi;i with "the progressive Government, because in the 
last twelve months the Government has learnt progress is 
absolutely essential in this country 118 
It was however the confinement of the provisions of the Bill to 
white persons which provoked the most spirited debate in the 
Legislative Assembly. Al 1 three Labour representatives who spoke 
in the debate criticised this measure. In the words of H.W. 
Sampson, member for City and Suburban and the leader of the 
printers' union: "It did not seem to him fair that the coloured 
man should be debarred from the remedies and disabilities which 
the Bill provided." 9 Rather different in tone were the remarks 
of the former Transvaal Commissioner of Mines and staunch 
champion of white labour, W.J. Wybergh, when he declared: 
He maintained that the more they exempted natives from 
Acts of that kind the greater was the direct incentive 
to the employment of natives, because they were being 
made humble slaves not able to speak for themselves, 
and therefore were easier to deal with, and more 
docile and, perhaps, more satisfactory to employers 
than white people. That was his great reason why he 
would like to see natives brought under the scope of 
these Acts in exactly the same way as white men. 10 
Both Smuts for Het Volk, and the spokesmen of the mining interest 
such as Farrar and Chaplin, were quick to put their finger on 
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Labour's equivocation in this matter. "They had got to 
recognise", said Chaplin, "that there is a vast difference 
between the native labour of this country and skilled white· 
labour. I should have thought it to the interests of the Labour 
Party to see that distinction was kept up 1111 Smuts, in 
reply to the Second Reading debate on the Bill declared in a 
statement which gained Progressive Party applause: 
I hope the machinery of this Bill will not apply to 
natives. (Opposition cheers). I hope that the day is 
far distant when natives will be guilty of 
concentrated action, so as to take part in a strike. 
( oq. ! Oh! ) 12 
The precedent of the 1909 Act regarding the exclusion of Africans 
was crucial, for it was, in the climate of the times, not one 
lightly set aside when later industrial legislation was designed. 
The total exclusion of all Africans from the main industrial 
relations legislation in South Africa was only accomplished in 
1956 with the revised Industrial Conciliation Act of that year. 
But it was passed in a spirit which hardly differed from that 
prevailing in 1909. 
The Transvaal Act marked the introduction of some of tbe basic 
principles of the country's later industrial relations system. 
The most effective weapon of the industrial worker, the strike, 
was hedged about with severe restraints. In return, however, 
there was a potentially important quid pro quo: the extension of 
official recognition to (white) trade union activity through the 
apparatus of conciliation boards. But procedural difficulties 
and the opposition of mine managements to trade union activity 
negated the effectiveness of this provision and it failed to 
achieve its goal. Indeed, the new Act seemed to have failed 
almost completely within four years of its passage. But before 
considering that development, it is necessary to consider briefly 
the other leg of what became the Union's industrial relations 
system, namely, the position of black labour which was excluded 
62 
from the system adopted for white workers: the Native Labour 
Regulation Act of 1911. 
The Native Labour Regulation Act, unlike the Transvaal Industrial 
Disputes Act, was of application throughout South Africa, having 
been passed by the Union government in 1911. But, like the 
Transvaal Act, the occasion for the Native Labour Regulation Act 
arose largely from the conditions on the Rand gold mines. This 
time those conditions concerned the recruitment and treatment of 
the mines' vast black labour force. The numerous provisions of 
the Act were intended to recognise and regulate the de facto 
situation of large scale recruitment and employment of blacks by 
South Africc;m industry and in particular the gold mines. Private 
organisations, most notably the Chamber of Mines, but also 
smaller labour contractors, controlled the recruitment, housing 
and feeding of tens of thousands of black workers. A 
parliamentary Select Committee had taken evidence on this 
situation in 1911 and revealed the possibilities for abuse and 
mistreatment. 13 Legislation passed prior to 1902 was sti 11 
operative, most notably the Master and Servants Act of 1880 and 
Act no. 23 of 1895. The 1911 Bill proposed no radical departures 
from this existing situation. Rather it aimed to tidy up a 
situation which had got somewhat out of hand. Briefly, the new 
Bill proposed to standardise the procedure by which black workers 
entered into contracts to work in white industry. As in the 
various Masters and Servants laws still in force in the few 
provinces, criminal sanctions were laid down for breach of 
contract by black workers. In addition, government inspectors 
were given powers to control the treatment and housing of blacks 
under contract, and minimum standards were laid down. The 
operations of recruiting agents were made subject to a standard 
licensing procedure. 14 The Bill, in short, proposed to 
streamline and, if possible, improve the workings of the contract 
labour system. 
The Bill would in effect confirm a separate and unequal status 
for the largest section of the black labour force in South 
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Africa. But this was a situation passed over for the most part 
in silence in parliament. The debates on the measure hardly 
touched on first premises. Clearly, both government and the 
spokesmen of the mining industry were in accord in supporting the 
introduction of the measure. Only the small band of South 
African Labour Party (SALP) MPs attempted to put the measure in 
global perspective. 
declared that: 
The leader of the SALP, F.H.P.Creswell, 
Hij is tegen het ontwerp omdat het een stelsel van 
slavernij bestendigt ... Het ontwerp neemt de ergste 
beginselen van de transvaalse wet over. Kaffers 
worden strafbaar gesteld voor dingen die enkel 
onderwerp moeten zijn voor civiel proces 
The conclusion drawn by Creswell was that 
De blank krijgt hoe !anger hoe minder kans als de 
mi jnen zoveel macht over hun Kaf fers hebben. 15 
The self-interest behind the moral denunciation was plain. But 
however self-interested, it was to the credit of the SALP members 
to have raised issues of first principle: they rightly pointed 
out the hazards of a separate and inferior industrial status for 
a large section of the work-force, a status buttressed by the 
provisions of the Bill. Other MPs were more concerned to 
declare, in the words of Henry Burton, Minister of Native 
Affairs, that the Act "was necessary especially in the interest 
of the native. " 16 The measure was in fact congenial to the 
interests of the dominant groups in parliament at the time: the 
mining industry spokesmen, the rural members eager to reinforce 
the question of penal sanctions for black employees, and the 
leaders of the government, themselves favourable to a measure 
which would both please the mines and improve their control over 
large numbers of transient black miners scattered throughout the 
Rand. 
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By 1912, thus, labour relations on the gold fields had received 
the close attention of two elected governments, and two major 
measures had been enacted. By accepting the force of precedent, 
and by a near ideological unanimity which took for granted the 
separate and subordinate status of the black workers, South 
African politicians had laid the groundwork for two discrete 
systems of industrial relations. Notable among all this had been 
the firm agreement among organised industry, the white 
agricultural interest, and the government. Within the closed 
circle of white politics, the only dissenting voice had been that 
of white labour, but it was opposition that was not strongly 
pressed, and which, in any case, 
pleading of a sectional interest. 
could be dismissed as special 
But the SALP and the spokesmen 
of white labour were quite correct in arguing that industrial 
conciliation for the white man and contract labour under penal 
sanctions for the black man was a situation which deserved deeper 
reflection from the country's politicians than it received. It 
will be seen below how these same labour spokesmen met the 
challenge posed by their accession to power thirteen years later. 
The Failure of Conciliation, 1913-1922 
Sporadic strikes had occurred on the Rand after the passage of 
the 1909 Industrial Disputes Act. But these were no more than 
a prelude to the major outbursts in mid-1913 and at the beginning 
of 1914, involving thousands of white workers, the imposition of 
martial law and the deportation of nine leading strikers. The 
details of these strikes have been recorded elsewhere. 17 For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that these strikes 
pushed the Union government into attempting to carry out its 
promise of 1911 to legislate a Union-wide code of industrial 
conciliation (thereby also revising the unsatisfactory aspects 
of the Transvaal Industrial Disputes Act.) In fact, the strikes 
provoked far more. In early 1914 the government published six 
bills with important implications for labour. Two of these bills 
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directly related to industrial conciliation and trade union 
activity: a third, the Riotous Assemblies bill, made clear the 
government's intention to ensure that conciliation would be 
accompanied by statutory provisions to strengthen the state's 
police power. It is of significance that of these latter three 
bills only one, the Riotous Assemblies bill, was finally enacted 
during the same session. 
In April 1914 the government introduced into parliament a 
combined measure, the Industrial Disputes and Trade Unions Bill. 
The Bill, declared F.S. Malan, the Minister of Mines and 
Industries, "approached the question of the relations of capital 
and labour" from the point of view of "the reformer", and not the 
"revolutionary." The Bill largely followed the existing 
Transvaal Act in its conciliation provisions, but proposed to 
amend certain details of its operation which had hindered the 
appointment, operation and effectiveness of conciliation boards 
in the Transvaal in the past four years. Further, the Bi 11 
contained provisions for the establishment of labour bureaux and 
for the r~gistration of trade unions. The Bill proposed to 
exclude "Government services, natives falling under the Natives 
Regulation Act (sic), and the indentured Indians of Natal. 1118 
In the flush of the militancy produced by the strikes and the 
triumph of Labour in the 1914 Transvaal Provincial elections, the 
SALP displayed considerably more opposition to the Bill than 
their predecessors had done in 1909 in the Transvaal Legislative 
Assembly. Creswell declared that the idea of the Bill: 
was to bring the Trade Unions under the law for 
the purpose of getting them in such a position that 
they could be brought under the grip of the law and 
prevented from expanding. 19 
The SALP member for Roodepoort, C.H. Haggar, went so far as to 
declare that 
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In this country today the class war exists, and the 
class war is going to be waged until one class is 
wiped out. 20 
W.H. Andrews, shortly to be one of the leading figures in the 
left-wing breakaway from the SALP, said that his Party 
"disapproved of the whole spirit of the Bill." 21 It was left to 
J.X. Merriman to puncture the wilder pretensions of the 
representatives of white labour: "When he heard the hon. member 
for Jeppe ... talking some balderdash about shifting the basis 
of society - Good Heavens! a small minority of this country was 
going to shift the basis of society (Laughter) ... The workers 
who the hon member said secured the great resources of this 
country, what were they compared to 200 000 men who did labour 
at the resources in this country and got precious little 
consideration? "22 
The Industrial Disputes and Trade Unions Bill passed the House 
of Assembly, but the government failed to push it through the 
Senate. The advent of the World War, and the patriotic upsurge 
among English-speaking workers, relieved the government of 
immediate pressure on this score. Nine years were to pass before 
a similar measure came again before the South African parliament. 
A considerable amount of less contentious industrial legislation 
did, however, receive enactment in this period. A Factory Act 
was passed in 1918, as was the Regulation of Wages, Apprentices 
and Improvers Act. The latter was a first step along the road 
to a system of wage determination, but its scope was very 
limited. A further wage determination measure was considered by 
the government in 1921, but was not put through parliament. In 
1922 the Apprenticeship Act was passed, providing for the 
standardisation and control by the state, employers and trade 
unions of the conditions of employment of apprentices and the 
scheduling of specific artisan trades. With F.S. Malan in the 
lead, it was clear that the SAP government was giving serious 
attention to the problems of the industrialisation of the urban 
areas and their concomitant social and economic pressures. 
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But while these actions represented progress of a sort in the 
industrial field, the prize of a workable industrial relations 
system, and of industrial stability on the gold mines, remained 
beyond the grasp of the SAP government. Once again it was the 
gold mining industry which proved to be the spur to further, and 
this time relatively effective, measures. The acceptance of the 
Status Quo Agreement on the mines in 1918, after the industrial 
truce of the war years, provided a breathing space of sorts. The 
Agreement gave white miners the job security which they desired. 
But the Agreement soon came to be seen by management as an 
obstacle to the efficient and profitable working of the mines. 
The steps, leading from the abrogation of the Agreement in 
December 1921 by the mines, to the Rand Strike and later 
Rebellion of March 1922, need not be recapitulated here. 23 The 
precipitating cause of the Rand Strike was the declared intention 
of the mine managements to dismiss semi-skilled white miners in 
order to cut the wage bill. These dismissals in turn were linked 
to the functioning of the colour bar on the mines. 
But other issues were also involved. The Mining Industry Board 
(the Brace Commission) which investigated the events leading up 
to the Strike, and produced a Report in 1922 made it clear that 
behind the question of the colour bar lay grievances regarding 
the industrial relations of the mines. The operation of the 
Status Quo Agreement, for example, had been used not only to keep 
jobs "white", but was also interpreted by the white miners in a 
way that posed problems of worker control versus managerial 
prerogative. 24 The Board phrased the matter as one of 
"interference" in the "authority of the Manager" which was 
carried out "to a deplorable extent. 1125 Nevertheless, the Board 
realistically discerned the need for standing conciliation and 
grievance machinery on the mines. A recommendation was 
accordingly made to institutionalise the operation of the 
previously unofficial conciliation boards on the mines, entailing 
among other things amendments to the existing Transvaal 
Industrial Disputes Act. 26 Such amendments had been promised by 
the Union government, should the Mining Industry Board repor~ 
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along those 1 ines. 27 
The road was now open to the introduction of a new industrial 
conci 1 iation bi 11 in the Union parliament. The occasion, a 
pressing one of near civil war, proved sufficient this time to 
spur the central government, and F.S. Malan in particular, to 
energetic action in this regard. And no international 
hostilities arose to divert the interest of General Smuts and his 
Cabinet. 
The Passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1923-1924 
Some eleven months after the Rand strike and the subsequent armed 
unrest had been smashed, F. S. Malan, Minister of Mines and 
Industries, introduced the Industrial Conciliation Bill into the 
House of Assembly. The Bill passed its second reading, was 
referred to a select committee which took evidence on the Bill, 
and returned it to the House for its third reading. Lack of time 
prevented its further progress through Parliament in the same 
year, 1923. A similar fate had overtaken the 1914 Industrial 
Disputes and Trade Unions Bill; but unlike the earlier Bill, the 
present one was not allowed to drop. The Industrial Conciliation 
Bill was re-introduced in 1924, and became law shortly before the 
prorogation of parliament for the general election of that year. 
While maintaining the basic principle behind the 1909 Transvaal 
Act, the new measure went considerably further. In particular, 
in addition to statutory recognition for special ad hoc 
conciliation boards in cases of industrial dispute, the Bill 
allowed for the creation of standing employer-employee councils 
with wide powers of negotiation and wage determination. In a 
provision ultimately embodied in the Act, these boards, or 
industrial councils as they were finally termed, could obtain 
legal enforcement for the agreements reached in the councils. 
And these agreements, once the Minister was satisfied of the 
representative character of the parties to the council, could be 
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made binding on all employers and employees in the specified 
industry, whether or not they were parties to the agreement. 
While the machinery of industrial council agreements or 
conciliation boards was still in operation, no strike of lock-out 
was permitted to take place. Provision was made for the 
registration of trade unions a measure which entitled 
recognised unions full recourse to the conciliation machinery 
laid down by the Bill. Finally, government servants, 
agricultural and domestic workers, contract Africans and 
indentured Indians (but no other Africans, Indians and Coloureds) 
were excluded from the provisions of the Bill by not being 
included in the definition of "employee". 28 It is worth citing 
the relevant part of the final statute on this point, given its 
cardinal importance for our topic: 
any worker whose contract of service or labour is 
regulated by any Native Pass Laws and Regulations, or 
by Act no 15 of 1911 or any amendment thereof or any 
regulations made thereunder, or by Law No 25 of 1891 
of Natal or any amendment thereof, or any regulations 
made thereunder, or by Act no 40 of 1894 of Natal or 
any amendment thereof ... 29 
The 1937 Industrial Conciliation Act broadened this definition 
further to include persons whose labour contract was regulated 
by the above Acts and by section two of the Masters and Servants 
Law (Transvaal and Natal) Amendment Act, 1926, and by the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act, 1923, and amendments to, and regulations 
issued in terms of, these Acts. 30 
Malan' s second reading speech on the measure was mild and 
conciliatory. It was clear that the combined ranks of the NP and 
the SALP, although still smarting from the debacle of 1922, were 
also hard put to it to offer vigorous opposition to the measure. 
Their dilemma was to reconcile their generalised suspicion of and 
hostility to the Smuts government - emotions shortly to give rise 
to the formal Pact agreement, and at this time expressed in an 
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informal, but manifest alliance - with the appeal of the Bill to 
the interests in particular of the most established trade unions. 
Symptomatic of this half-hearted opposition were the arguments 
of H.W. Sampson, MP for Jeppe and spokesman for the South African 
Typographical Union. The SATU had, in 1919, established with 
their employers a most successful joint board, and had refused 
to join the 1922 Strike on the grounds that it would have meant 
a breach of contract. Sampson himself could not but welcome the 
broad direction of the new Bill, and in fact was to co-operate 
whole-heartedly in committee in suggesting useful amendments. 
In reply to Malan' s second reading speech, Sampson moved the 
SALP's amendment that the Bill be referred to a select committee 
before the conclusion of the second reading, thus enabling the 
committee to consider measures of principle as well as detail. 
But this standard parliamentary ploy did not in fact represent 
a deep disagreement over principles, as Sampson's own arguments 
showed. He gave cautious endorsement to the main principles of 
the Bill, while objecting to its "one-sidedness" . 31 Other SALP 
MPs were more vigorous in attacking the measure, but it was left 
to the NP MP for Vredefort, J.H. Munnik, to express in harshest 
language the smouldering resentment of the defeated miners: 
Trade unionism to-day was lying bleeding, and for this 
the government was largely responsible if the 
Minister was under the impression that there was 
industrial peace in South Africa, as far as the mine 
workers were concerned, he was labouring under a 
delusion. 32 
But despite such high generalities, little of substance was 
brought against the Bill. Perhaps the major complaint on which 
opposition members harped was the exclusion of employer bodies 
from the requirements for registration with the government 
proposed for the trade unions. This was eagerly seized upon by 
the SALP as evidence of the government's bias in favour of 
employers. The final Act applied this requirement equally to 
both employer and employee organisations. 
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Matters of detail received a thorough airing (with however a 
significant exception, to be dealt with later) in the select 
committee and the committee stage of the Bill in 1923 in the 
House of Assembly. 33 The evidence before the Select Committee 
is of particular interest in that it revealed cleavages within 
both labour and capital as well as the cleavage between them. 
The cleavage was in both cases a two-fold one: established 
artisan unions versus the semi-skilled white mine unions on the 
one hand; representatives of secondary industry versus the 
Chamber of Mines on the other. These divisions, while perhaps 
not giving due weight to very definite individual differences of 
opinion, seems essential to an understanding of the often blurred 
and confusing empirical evidence. 
In broad outline, the line-up can be summarised as follows: the 
established artisan unions and those representing public sector 
and white-collar employees welcomed the provisions on industrial 
conciliation while objecting to the exclusion of some categories 
(for example, government servants) from the provisions of the 
measure, to the lack of enforceability of agreements 
(subsequently conceded), and to the possibility of state 
interference in internal trade union affairs. Spokesmen for the 
shattered miners' unions (then, as now, basically unions of the 
semi-skilled, with no apprenticeship requirements) were more 
militant in expressing opposition to the potential stifling 
effect of any statutory restraint on union activity. Archie 
Crawford, leader of the previously influential S.A. Industrial 
Federation, declared that: 
I do not approve much of standing conciliation boards. 
I do not think the workers should be compelled to do 
anything. I think the relationship should be very 
free34 ••• There are times when it is desirable that 
the dispute should be fought out, and when nothing 
else will bring about a lasting peace but a fight to 
the finish. 35 
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Central to the arguments in the Select Committee was the frank 
recognition by several employer and union representatives of the 
crucial importance of the "joint monopoly" implications of the 
proposed measure. It is significant that the main employers' 
evidence came from representatives of the building industry, who 
had also supported the proposed wage determination measure in 
1921. Established employers in building, printing and other 
industries were eager to take out wages as a factor in 
competition, and found common cause with their union counterparts 
in this matter. On the other hand, both employers and many 
employees in the gold mining industry were unable to avai 1 
themselves of this possibility. Semi-skilled white workers on 
the mines suffered a double disability compared with their more 
favoured artisan colleagues in industries other than the mines: 
they commanded no great scarcity value in an industry unable to 
pass on a higher wage bill in terms of a higher price for their 
product. As Crawford quite validly put the matter: 
A standing conciliation board may be a menace to the 
community. I do not know but what they are in many 
cases. If standing conciliation boards were created 
the interest of the rest of the public would have to 
be very jealously guarded. You would find a danger of 
conspiracy between employer and employee in the 
interest of higher prices and those would finally land 
on the primary producers, and the farmer and the coal 
and gold producers, etc., would be impoverished. 36 
Completely absent from the proceedings of the Select Committee 
were any spokesmen from the Chamber of Mines. But it is clear 
that Chamber absence did not mean lack of Chamber interest in the 
measure. In fact, as F.S. Malan made clear, he had been kept 
very well informed of the Chambers' feelings about the Bill, and 
may even have accepted Chamber objections to details in the 
measure, as shall be seen later. 37 
Despite the cross-currents of opposition to details of the Bill, 
73 
the underlying consensus over the even-handedness of the measure 
was indicated by a unanimous report of the select committee of 
1923. In his second reading speech on the re-introduction of the 
bill in January 1924, F.S. Malan was able to say, with reasonable 
accuracy, that "perhaps with (the except ion of) a few minor 
details, the parties concerned are satisfied with the provisions 
of this bill. 1138 The major changes in the bill between 1923 and 
1924 included the following. The agreements reached in 
industrial councils judged to be "representative" or the 
agreements of conciliation boards could be extended to the whole 
of a specified industry; workers in "essential" municipal 
services were prohibited from striking; a clause making strike 
ballots mandatory was deleted. Further changes, which were 
opposed by Sampson for the SALP, included: first, the inclusion 
of a provision allowing "any" group of employees (and thus 
possibly non-union workers) to call for a conciliation board; 
second, the dropping of the clause which made illegal any 
stipulation by an employer that his workers should not belong to 
a trade union; third, the inclusion of a provision that no 
conciliation board could be called on behalf of individual 
workers objecting to changes in wages, working conditions, status 
or piece rates, "unless a matter of principle was involved." 39 
It was this last provision, Clause 4, which sparked the most 
heated and prolonged exchanges in the 1924 debates on the 
Industrial Conciliation Bill. Behind this seemingly minor detail 
lay wider issues and wider interests. Rand members of the South 
African Party - representatives of the mining industry and of the 
English-speaking urban middle class - argued strongly that the 
exclusion of such a clause would allow workers to call 
conciliation boards over any petty grievance about wages, 
promotion and working conditions. Sir Abe Bailey, MP for 
Krugersdorp, said that: "If you strike out this proviso where 
these disagreements have to go before a board of conciliation, 
then you strike at the very root of discipline. My hon friend 
must remember that before the strike in 1921, if there was any 
dispute on promotion or salaries or anything else, it was at once 
74 
rushed to a board of reference .... Disputes, differences and so 
forth must be left in the management's hands. " 40 The spectre of 
worker control and the dissipation of managerial authority raised 
by the Brace Commission was alive and walking again. It did not 
require much percipience from SALP members to divine the source 
of inspiration for this particular clause. As R.B. Waterston, 
SALP MP for Brakpan, claimed: 
The position is that the Chamber of Mines is behind 
the proviso. Why are they behind the proviso? It is 
because the Chamber of Mines is top dog in South 
Africa. 41 
Whatever the origin of the Clause - and F.S. Malan admitted later 
in the debate that he had indeed consulted the Chamber of 
Mines42 - other SAP members were able to show that the Clause 
had the backing of other employer organisations such as the 
builders', who were on the whole staunch supporters of the Bill. 
The controversial clause was pushed through by the government on 
a division - one of only five divisions in the committee stage 
of the Bill on which government and opposition confronted one 
another on strict party lines. Otherwise the debates were 
notable for the reservations uttered by a number of South African 
Party backbenchers about various provisions in the measure. 
Some former Unionist MPs in the SAP urged stricter controls over 
strikes, and asked for a prohibition on the use of union funds 
for political parties without the express consent of the majority 
of union members. It was "very half-heartedly" that Malan' s 
back-benchers supported him, claimed W. Rockey, MP for Parktown, 
and "when a Minister wishes to put more power into the hands of 
trade unionists, no matter how good they may be, we believe the 
Minister is doing a wrong thing. " 43 The uneasiness of a number 
of English-speaking SAP MPs found little response in the House. 
And on the left, Walter Madeley, later the parliamentary leader 
of the non-governmental faction of the divided SALP after 1928, 
was very much alone when he stated the standard radical objection 
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to industrial conciliation: 
the more you kick them, the more you oppress them, 
the more determined you make them to organize 
themselves into a strong entity likely to put up a 
strong fight against their employers. 
He supported the Bill, said Madeley, but "I look upon this 
Conciliation Bill as going to have a weakening effect on trade 
unionism ... "44 
The Industrial Conciliation Bill passed the House of Assembly on 
3rd March 1924 after a last barb from Sampson on the iniquity of 
the Chamber of Mines in declining to give evidence to the select 
committee, and then consul ting privately with the Minister. 
Sampson, on behalf of the SALP, declared that they had "not quite 
succeeded" in securing a bill which would "work automatically". 
The Minister, at the behest of the Chamber of Mines, had allowed 
himself too much discretion, especially over the appointment of 
conciliation boards. The Minister would have to be "very 
careful", said Sampson, "or the Bill will be useless. "45 The 
implication - that a careful Minister could make for a useful Act 
- was clear enough. 
The question of the exclusion of African contract workers from 
the ambit of the Bill deserves specific consideration. Since 
this question soon became one of the major trade union issues, 
the importance of the omission is evident. What then was made 
of this highly consequential decision at the time? The short 
answer is: nothing, or at any rate, very little. The issue does 
not seem to have been mentioned, let alone ventilated, in the 
debates over the Bi 11 in the House of Assembly and Senate. 
(Admittedly, the parliamentary records for 1923 are very 
incomplete.) The only record of the issue being raised in 
parliament was in the evidence of the 1923 Select Committee on 
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the Bill. Here it was done twice, first by an artisan trade 
union spokesman, second by the employer representative K.B. 
Quinan of a Somerset West explosives factory. 46 The former 
deplored, in passing, the exclusion of contract Africans, the 
latter dismissed the idea that the inclusion of blacks was 
desirable. The Committee quickly passed on to other matters. 
As shall be seen, it was only in 1928, four years after the 
passing of the Act, that the issue received the attention of 
parliamentarians at any great length. Why was this so? A number 
of reasons suggest themselves. First, there was the precedent 
of the 1909 Transvaal Act. Second, the Native Labour Regulation 
Act had been in force for twelve years. To include all workers 
under the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act would 
have been in effect to have made the former Act null and void, 
to have removed the whole basis of contract labour. And for that 
no white political party - not even, despite its protestations 
against "slave labour", the SALP - was prepared. The SALP itself 
scented electorial victory in the air: it looked forward ·to 
administering the SAP Industrial Conciliation Act along Labour 
lines. Time enough later to get to grips with the problems of 
a docile black labour force and of the factors which kept it so. 
The passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act was a matter which 
involved, in the main, two industrial groups: organised employers 
on the one hand, organised white labour on the other. Neither, 
despite the confrontation of 1922, was completely homogeneous. 
Important special conditions qualified the solidarity of both 
blocs. Each group found its political centre of gravity in two 
opposed political parties, and at this time the conditions were 
relatively ripe for an articulation of pure class interests in 
the political process. Highly important also was a third party 
to the issue: the SAP government. It too was not homogeneous, 
and in addition stood prima facie an accomplice of one of the 
other contending interests, "capital.". But it seems clear that 
the SAP Cabinet, and especially F.S. Malan, did not wholly 
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represent business in politics, while conceding points to that 
influential party within a party, the Chamber of Mines. Malan's 
guiding principle in the establishment of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act had been to do unto employers as he did unto 
employees, and the grudging acceptance of the SALP reflected his 
success. The Industrial Conciliation Act was not to any extent 
an issue in the crucial general election of 1924, as Taft-Hartley 
was in the U.S.A. in 1948, and the Taff Vale Judgement was to 
Labour in Britain in '1906. In the debates over the Industrial 
Conciliation Bill the National Party had remained largely a 
sleeping partner, rousing itself now and again to make the token 
speeches which proved its common opposition to the SAP 
government. As one authoritative work put it: 11 Seldom has a major 
industrial law, conferring wide recognition on unions under state 
supervision, received so cordial and unanimous a response". 47 
Whatever else kept the pot of white politics boiling over at this 
time, it was no fundamental, irreconcilable clash over a workable 
framework of industrial relations. 
The Aftermath 
In passing the Industrial Conciliation Act, the SAP government 
had in a very real sense pre-empted the actions of a NP - SALP 
governing coalition. The Pact government thus came to power with 
part of its industrial programme already in existence. 
Significantly, the new government only attempted to amend the 
Industrial Conciliation Act in 1928, and the provisions of the 
proposed amendment were wholly in 1 ine with the spirit of the Act 
of 1924. Due to the lateness of the session, that amendment 
failed to gain enactment. It was only in 1930 that the 
Industrial Conciliation Act was first amended, along the lines 
of the 1928 proposals, which will be discussed below. 
With Industrial conciliation and wage determination machinery 
already in operation under the Industrial Conciliation Act, the 
SALP pressed ahead with two further measures: a wage 
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determination measure for non-unionised or weakly-organised 
workers, and the legislation of the job colour bar on the mines 
which had been declared ultra vi res in the 1923 court case 
Attorney-General v.G.H. Smith. 48 The latter lies outside the 
scope of this chapter. The former, the Wage Bill, does however 
deserve consideration, for it was clearly seen as the complement 
to the machinery of the Industrial Conciliation Act in the 
determination of wages. The main provision of the Wage Bill was 
the creation of a state Wage Board with powers to investigate 
conditions on particular industries (excluding agriculture and 
domestic service), and to issue minimum wage determinations for 
the job categories involved, no discrimination on ground of race 
being allowed. It was this last part around which major 
political interest in the Bi 11 revolved. Simply stated, the 
issue was: Was it intended that the non-discriminatory wage 
determinations of the Wage Board would act as a wage colour bar 
pricing blacks out of jobs and whites into them? The 
participants in the debates on the Bill were well aware of the 
discriminatory potential inherent in this overtly colour-blind 
provision. For the many labour spokesmen involved, it was after 
all nothing more than the statutory enactment of "equal pay for 
equal work", or the "rate for the job", and all were aware how 
advantageous that could be to white workers in South Africa. It 
was, nevertheless, often politically prudent to obfuscate the 
issue - and for none more so than the SALP, junior partner in the 
Pact. Their official ideology, and those left-wing activists who 
took the ideology seriously, pulled them one way; their 
perception of the self-interest of white workers and voters 
another. Thus even such an experienced veteran of the labour 
movement as W .H. Andrews persisted in trying to square the 
circle: socialist non-discrimination and brotherhood on the one 
hand, measures to promote the interests of white workers on the 
other. 49 By obscuring this dilemma, the "left" and the "right" 
in the SALP were able to support the Bill, each seeing in the 
measure what it wanted. 
More revealing, since the schizophrenia of the SALP had long been 
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public knowledge for those with eyes to see, was the attitude of 
the major capitalists to the measure. Again the division between 
secondary industry and the Chamber of Mines was quite evident. 
In fact more so. For the new government was the Pact with men 
behind it who had lost the industrial battle of 1922 only to win 
the electoral struggle of 1924. There was thus no question of 
a repetition of the events of 1923, when the Chamber of Mines had 
been able to press its point of view directly with the Minister 
in private, without making public possibly embarrassing 
representations through the medium of a parliamentary select 
committee cross-examination. The Chamber of Mines, through its 
Chairman P.M. Anderson, gave extensive evidence before the select 
committee on the Wage Bill in 1925. Before him, the SA Federated 
Chamber of Industries had made it clear that it had no 
fundamental objections to the measure: it was after all merely 
an extension of the principle of joint monopoly by other 
means. 50 The situation of the Chamber of Mines was quite 
different. It had fallen from its privileged position of 
confidante of government Ministers and was now the butt of 
politicians to whom it had, in their public rhetoric, represented 
the epitome of sinister elite manipulation. Was the Pact 
proposing radical intervention into the affairs of an industry 
which had previously managed to accommodate itself relatively 
comfortably to the revenue-seeking propensity of the Union 
government? Were white workers here to find their final victory 
over an oppressive management? The note of something approaching 
panic-stricken uncertainty seems evident from the testimony of 
Anderson. 
Rather ingenuously, since the Bill gave no warrant for it, 
Anderson first argued that the measure would not apply to the 
gold mining industry, since it was highly organised and paid high 
wages, and, Anderson claimed, the Bill was only intended to apply 
to 11 sweated 11 industries. 51 Coldly rebutted by the Minister of 
Labour, F. P. Creswel 1, on this score, Anderson suggested that the 
measure, if applied to the mines, would apply only to whites. 52 
He was told that there was no such provision in the Bill. With 
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some justification, Anderson argued that: 
The Bill puts into the hands of the Minister the 
determination as to which occupations shall be carried 
on by whites, blacks, or coloured men: and it affects 
us seriously in connection with certain of our 
occupations which are on the borderline I think 
that there is that danger that the Board has power to 
change a class of labour in a particular trade .... 53 
Anderson was unable to obtain reassurance from the government 
members of the select committee on this point. It is however of 
interest to note that no wage determination was enacted for mine 
labour under the Pact government. (Although an Award was made 
in 1927 by the Mining Industry Arbitration Board, consisting of 
members of the Wage Board, but appointed under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. The Award in general appears to have accepted 
the Chamber of Mines' argument that white mine wages were 
reasonable, and no large increases were granted). 54 As far as 
white miners were concerned, the new government was able to 
redeem its electoral promises by the passage of the colour bar 
clause of the Mines and Works Act of 1926, reserving a wide range 
of mine jobs for whites and coloureds. Despite pointed remarks 
by otherwise sympathetic members of the select committee such as 
C. Stuttaford, who exposed the bareness of Anderson's claims that 
the industry was "organised" when eighty per cent of the mine 
workers, black Africans, were not. 55 Anderson's basic position 
was to prove not incompatible with that of the most influential 
SALP members of the Pact. A concerted programme of wage 
regulation for the majority of miners, black workers, was simply 
not on the programme of the new government. 
In March 1928 the Minister of Labour, now Thomas Boydel 1, 
introduced a bill to amend the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act. 
The main proposals were as follows. 56 First, industrial council 
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agreements were to remain in force until such time as they 
expired, or that a new agreement was reached by the parties to 
the council. Second, industrial councils were to be competent 
to hear all disputes in the industry concerned, whether or not 
the matter was covered by the relevant industrial agreement. 
What in fact this amounted to was a reversal of the 1924 decision 
to bar an appeal over matters regarding individual grievances 
such as pay, promotion and so forth. Next, conciliation boards 
were to be allowed to include among their members persons not 
employers or employees in the particular industry concerned. 
Fourth, an anomaly concerning strikes was to be amended: strikes 
had previously only been officially recognised as such when the 
parties to it had "declared" it. Fifth, a provision was included 
regarding wages which had been underpaid. Sixth, an industrial 
council agreement could be suspended from operation in "native 
areas". This provision, foreshadowing the major post-Second 
World War dispute over black African housing, was aimed at 
expediting the building of housing in black areas on a lower cost 
basis than prevailed outside black areas. Finally, the operation 
of industrial council agreements was to be extended, with the 
Minister's permission, to Africans who had previously been 
excluded from the operation of the Act, owing to the definition 
of "employee" in the original Act. This was a measure aimed at 
preventing employers from subs ti tu ting lower-paid African workers 
for non-Africans paid at the stipulated industrial council rate. 
To this end, the definition of "employee" in the appropriate 
clause was to be amended to include contract Africans. The 
clause defining "employee" for the purpose of registered trade 
union membership was however to exclude Africans registered under 
the Native Labour Regulation Act and "pass-bearing" Africans. 
It was this last provision which gained the greatest response 
from MPs, and the debate which would have been appropriate in 
1924 only now took place. The occasion was in the same year as, 
but before, the open 1928 split in the SALP between "Creswellite" 
and "National Councillite" labour supporters. It revealed quite 
clearly the essential equivocation and contradiction in the 
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SALP's position. Boydell, a future "Creswellite", argued that 
the operation of the Wage Board took care of the interests of 
African workers, and went to say: 
.... What we are not prepared at the moment to do, is 
to allow the natives to organise and function under 
the Industrial Conciliation Act, the same as 
carpenters, joiners and other organized trades which 
have had many years experience in trade unionism, and 
which can be calculated to hold their own with the 
employers. The time will come, possibly, when the 
natives will reach that stage of advancement, and 
something on these lines will have to be done; but 
that time has not yet arrived. 57 
H.W. Sampson, also a later Creswellite, in an unusually confused 
speech, followed several lines of argument at once, not always 
in harmony with Boydell's statement. The SALP, argued Sampson, 
had never been in favour of excluding Africans from the 
provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act, but it had been 
a SAP condition for the passing of the measure that they should 
be excluded. (The first half of this claim, at any rate, was of 
dubious validity.) Anyway, argued Sampson, there was nothing 
preventing the formation of African trade unions. They were just 
not recognised under the Act. It was true that the Native Labour 
Regulation Act and other measures prohibited many Africans from 
striking. The SALP had always favoured doing away with these 
Acts for this reason. But, said the trade unionist, Sampson: 
We are not going to create problems by admitting to 
our unions a class of people who are backward, people 
who are just emerging from barbarism, and do not 
understand trade unions. They will have to go through 
the mi 11, the same as others have had to do. You 
cannot bring these people all at once into the system 
under which the white people live .... 
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Sampson then evidenced the activities of the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers of Clements Kadalie as proof of the inability 
of Africans to operate trade unions at the present time. 58 
The intellectual disarray of the SALP over this issue was plain. 
But it was equally clear that no one inside parliament at least 
had a consuming interest to take advantage of the fact. Boydell 
received support for his position from both English-speaking 
urban representatives of the white middle class, and from rural 
members horror-stricken at the idea that any tampering with the 
principle of criminal 
could be contemplated . 
sanctions for breach of work contracts 
As O.R. Nel, MP for Newcastle, stated: 
.... If there is one thing we on the platteland must 
fight against, it is the whittling down of the Masters 
and Servants Act. It is the only means we have of 
controlling natives. 59 
It was left to F.D. Chaplin, however, while supporting this 
provision in the Bill, to get in the cruellest cut of all, and 
incidentally to reveal a basic community of interest among the 
parties in the legislature: 
The Government agreed before that the natives must be 
left out, because it is common cause that it is 
impossible to face conditions which would raise to a 
large extent the standard of native wages on the 
mines. The Minister of Defense ( Creswel 1, SALP 
leader) has talked for twenty years or more as to the 
necessity for doing away with what he calls servile 
labour, and for stopping the importation of natives 
from Portuguese East Africa. The Minister, however, 
is sitting in a Cabinet, which is sending one of its 
members to Lisbon to make sure that this labour is 
maintained. I am glad it is so ... ~he Minister does 
not go further by making this applicable to the 
natives, because he knows he dare not do so, for if he 
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did do it, wages would go up to such an extent that a 
large proportion of the gold mines would be unpayable, 
and the country cannot do without the revenue it 
derives from the mines; the only possible remedy would 
be a reduction in European wages .... 60 
Conclusion 
The passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924 involved 
a government-imposed compromise between eventually two groups: 
organised business and organised labour, both of whom could count 
on the support of political representatives to articulate their 
interests. It was, in a very real sense, a conflict between two 
sections of urban English-speaking society in which a largely 
Afrikaner government executive acted as arbitrator and guide. 
On this level the contest was strikingly lacking the kind of 
ethnic polarisation that made for the least soluble of white 
party political issues in South Africa. Instead, the creation 
of the new industrial relations framework was a case-study in 
economic politics; and the solution was largely an economic one: 
the encouragement of joint monopolies of employers and employees 
to regulate wage competition and to institutionalise collective 
bargaining. 
But on another level - one which, as we have seen, was scarcely 
raised in the course of the debates on the proposed measure in 
1923-1924 - the Act rested on a basic ethnic foundation - the 
virtual exclusion of the African worker. The Act thus gave major 
impetus to the tendency towards the separationist or exclusionist 
tendencies in white labour's activities, and must therefore be 
accounted one of the major factors giving rise to South Africa's 
partial labour movement. The causal chain was of course less 
than simple. The Act was influenced by exclusionist practices 
already in existence; in turn, it strengthened and elaborated 
these practices. 
The long-term effect of the Act was however not just to reinforce 
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a trade unionism of differential incorporation: it also 
undermined the distinctiveness, and the potential militancy, of 
the white (and coloured and Indian South African) labour 
movement. By providing a framework for particular categories of 
employees only (basically those in the private sector) the Act 
furthered a continuing "decomposition of Labour 1161 by hiving off 
workers into separate institutional cocoons. Thus while unions 
in the private sector had a major commonality of interest in the 
workings of the Industrial Conciliation Act, workers on the 
state-owned railways in particular were more concerned about 
their status under the separate Railways and Harbours Service 
Act. 
Finally, along with sectionalisation went bureaucratisation. The 
Act gave a powerful thrust to the formation of unions able to 
operate within, and take advantage of the new network of 
regulations and institutions. Increasingly what was needed was 
less the militant union organiser than the adroit negotiator and 
adept off ice manager. The strike weapon was watered down so that 
it became almost obsolete as a weapon in the armoury of many 
unions. 62 The Act, said one unionist two years after its 
passage, "has created confusion in the labour ranks, and has 
destroyed that clarity of thought and action which is essential 
to progress, as one seldom knows where the function of an 
Industrial Council ends and that of the Union begins. 1163 But 
for many other unionists this institutionalisation of the role 
of the union, and its consequent accepta~ce by employees, was 
precisely its advantage. Root-and-branch opposition to the Act 
was in fact confined (then as later) to a small minority of left-
wing activists. Most unionists were keen to see an extension, 
rather than limitation, of the scope of the Act. In particular 
they desired deletion of the clause barring resort to a 
Conciliation Board "unless the matter of principle is involved" -
the issue on which so much time had been spent in debate in 
1924. 64 
Later white participants in the South African industrial 
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relations system, for the most part, praised the structure and 
practices which were a product of the Industrial Conciliation Act 
of 1924. It was widely acclaimed as the source of South Africa's 
relative industrial peace. While this argument can be 
overemphasised (since the Act must be seen in the wider context 
of a generally upward rise in the rate of economic development 
n South Africa), the Act was effective in its own terms. For 
such a complex piece of legislation, that is perhaps to say a 
lot. But in accommodating one set of problems, the Act 
bequeathed another to succeeding industrial actors. Of those, 
the foremost one was the status of the African worker, an issue 
whose resolution required half a century. 
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Chapter 4: The National Party, Trade Unionism 
and the Industrial Order 
By 1938 the leaders of the National Party (the so-called 
"Purified" National Party under Dr D.F. Malan) had sketched the 
broad outlines of the policy that from around 1944 onwards was 
known to the public as "apartheid". In Parliament, in the 
National Party press, at Party meetings and as a specially 
convened conference on racial issues in Bloemfontein in 1938, the 
National Party articulated a programme of racial segregation 
which in its essence was the same policy with which the Party 
came to power in 1948. The single guiding principle which 
underlay the policy's many component parts was the idea that a 
"clear colour di vi ding 1ine 11 (" 'n duidel ike kleurskeidslyn") 
could and should be drawn between whites on the one hand and the 
black ( "non-whi te 11 in the language of the day) groups on the 
other. The survival of the white race, argued the proponents of 
the policy, demanded that "the line be drawn". Failure to do so 
would lead to the fall of white civilisation in South Africa and 
to such axiomatic evils as race-mixture. In these circumstances, 
the politicians of the National Party reiterated throughout the 
country, it was legitimate and imperative that steps be taken to 
bring about the kind of thorough-going segregation which would 
maintain the traditional social order. Whites needed protection 
not just against the superior numbers of Africans ( 11 nati ves 11 ) and 
Indian South Africans (in the climate of the times protection 
against these two groups hardly needed justification to the 
majority of whites), but also against coloured people. In pursuit 
of this protection, the new policy laid down that racial 
differentiation (in addition to that already in existence) needed 
to be introduced in the following spheres: the franchise, with 
the removal of coloured voters from the common role in the Cape 
Province; sexual relations and marriage; residential areas; 
universities; sporting bodies and other private associations; 
and, finally, in the country's industrial and occupational life: 
in its factories, trade unions and its occupational and wage 
structure. In its comprehensiveness, its thoroughgoing 
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application of the colour bar to all social spheres, and in the 
extension of this bar to coloured people, the new policy was a 
radical departure even for segregationist South Africa in the 
1930s. 1 
As the previous Chapters have noted, white protectionism and the 
adoption of segregationist measures were no novelty at this point 
in the country's history. With regatd to labour matters, the 
exclusionary basis of the Industrial Conciliation Act has already 
been discussed at some length. The National Party under General 
J.M.B.Hertzog in coalition with the South African Labour Party 
under Colonel F.H.P. Creswell which came to power in 1924 
promptly extended this protectionism. Numerous measures loosely 
referred to as the "Civilised Labour Policy" were introduced by 
the new Pact government, as well as other steps promised by the 
coalition parties to the electorate in 1924. Notable among the 
latter was the Mines and Works Act of 1926 which amended the 1911 
Act in order to make clear that the legislature's specific 
intention was indeed to reserve jobs on a racial basis on the 
mines, protecting a range of semi-skilled tasks which the mine 
managements would have preferred left unregulated. This work was 
reserved for the performance of white and coloured workers, and 
in so doing brought about the first explicit statutory racial job 
reservation measure in South Africa since Union. This was, 
ironically, also the last job reservation measure to be removed 
from the country's statutes during the reforms of the 1980s. 
The Civilised Labour Policy on which the Pact government prided 
itself was by no means altogether new. In 1913, for example, The 
Railways Administration had reported at length to a parliamentary 
Select Committee on European Employment and Labour Conditions on 
what it termed its "White Labour Policy", whereby white unskilled 
labourers were taken on to perform work at wages ranging from 3/6 
to 5/- a day. In this year some 4,700 white labourers were being 
employed on the railways, doing work which otherwise would have 
been done by black workers at lower wages. 2 The Civilised 
Labour Policy of the Pact government meant in part thus merely 
91 
an extension of previous practices. Much effort was put into 
finding work for whites in all government departments and in 
encouraging municipalities to employ sizeable quotas of 
"ci vi 1 ised labourers". Inevitably the main government outlet for 
unskilled white labour was on the Railways (since it was the most 
important source of employment for manual labour under government 
control) and throughout the 1920s and 1930s politicians were as 
concerned with the employment-providing functions of this public 
utility as with its role as the country's main transportation 
network. Also designed as an integral part of of the attack on 
the Poor White Problem was the Pact's policy of tariff protection 
for South African industries which employed a sufficient number 
of "civilised" workers. As Hancock pointed out 3 , it was never 
very clearly defined by government authorities just who qualified 
for inclusion within the circle of the "civilised" for the 
purposes of the policy; it is however clear that the policy did 
benefit (in terms of jobs) mainly whites. 
The state of labour policy in the country during the party 
political upheavals in 1933 and 1934 thus reflected very strongly 
the dominance of the whites in the polity. White protectionism 
had become the accepted norm for all the major white political 
parties since 1924, although, as Yudelman has argued, this did 
not necessarily mean that such protection was provided at the 
cost of the major employers, the gold mines in particular. 4 The 
country's legislation regarding labour matters combined both 
racial restriction and exclusion with colour-blind principles. 
The effect was to bestow a large measure of preference on white 
workers without completely excluding the idea that black workers 
too could at some time enjoy equal treatment. In it lay both the 
possibility of evolution for all races, and the need for 
compromise with contemporary realities, most notably with the 
political pressure of several hundred thousand unskilled, under-
or unemployed "Poor Whites" fearful of open competition in the 
labour market. The problem was to see which tendency would prove 
itself the dominant one as the pace of South African 
industrialisation quickened and white and black mingled 
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increasingly in the unfamiliar arena of the factory workplace. 
The New Labour Policy of the National Party 
In February 1933 the leaders of the National Party and the South 
African Party agreed to go into coalition, and thereby plunged 
the militant Afrikaner section of the National Party into a 
quandary. They could go along with coalition (and later, as it 
turned out, actual fusion of the two parties into the new United 
Party), which seemed quite in accord with the popular mood at the 
time. But the price would be heavy: it meant the dilution or 
disappearance of aims which had animated this section for years. 
The republican goal would be one casualty; so too would the 
cultural struggle. And what of the economic position of the 
Afrikaner? The dissidents in the National Party harboured grave 
doubts about how warmly the coalition and the new United Party 
would feel towards the poorer classes in white society, classes 
which were overwhelmingly 11 National", or Afrikaans-speaking, in 
composition. Would not the "National labourer, the poor man and 
the farmer" be worse off under a Party in which the "organised 
money power and the capitalist press" played such a prominent 
role? 5 
After months of intrigue and negotiation, and with the Cape 
Congress or the National Party under Dr Malan taking the lead, 
a group of the old National Party MPs refused to go into Fusion. 
The National Party lived on, dubbed the "Purified11 National Party 
by its opponents. Again, as in 1912, South African politics 
witnessed the existence of purely Afrikaner party, untrammelled 
by the responsibilities of power and free of the compromises of 
coalition. National Party supporters who had fretted in private 
before 1933 at General Hertzog's unwillingness to push forward 
with a republican programme and with more enthusiasm for the 
Afrikaner cause, were now able to speak out. As the main 
parliamentary opposition to the United Party which came into 
existence in June 1934, the National Party under D.F.Malan now 
had the opportunity to formulate a policy which could express the 
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deepest aspirations and needs of the growing numbers of Afrikaner 
nationalists. One area where this formulation was needed was in 
the sphere of economic and labour affairs. 
The material out of which the National Party shaped its policy 
in this regard lay, for the most part, near to hand. D.F.Malan 
himself had long taken a deep interest in the problem of white 
poverty, and he had been one of the main speakers in 1923 at the 
Poor White Conference organised by the N.G.Kerk in Bloemfontein. 
The Depression after 1929 had only made more urgent an already 
recognised problem. In 1932 the Report of the Carnegie Commission 
of Investigation into the Poor White Question 6 appeared with a 
long list of recommendations for tackling the problem. Little was 
done to follow up the Report until, in January 1934, Die Burger 
published articles which initiated the activity which led to the 
holding of the National Congress on the Poor White Problem in 
Kimberley in October 1934. This conference brought out its own 
report with a considerable number of specific policy 
recommendations, drawing in part on the Carnegie Commission but 
also adding its own characteristic touch. 1 
It was from the recommendations of this Conference, and more 
especially from the kind of thinking manifest behind them, that 
the National Party drew much of its inspiration for its own 
social and industrial policy. In passing it is worth noting some 
of the personnel at the Conference: its organisers and moving 
spirits were mainly clergymen from the Dutch Reformed Churches, 
and a few Stellenbosch academics, of whom the most important 
(with advantage of hindsight) was H.F.Verwoerd. Major aspects of 
the new labour policy were produced by men in close touch with 
the condition of the largely Afrikaans-speaking "Poor Whites"; 
men who if not formally united in the National Party were in 
unofficial contact through the developing organisations of 
Afrikaner society, such as the Churches and the Afrikaner 
Broederbond. 
The National Party accepted the diagnosis offered by the Carnegie 
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Commission, and which was repeated by Verwoerd himself at the 
1934 Conference. A considerable part of the Poor White problem, 
declared the Carnegie Commission Report, arose from the peculiar 
conditions of South African society, and more especially of its 
labour market: 
[Recommendation no. 63] Since there was an 
insufficient supply of European labour at the time 
when modern economic development suddenly set in in 
South Africa, the economic system came to be organised 
on the basis of cheap native labour. This contributed 
greatly to hindering the poor white from being 
absorbed into the new industrial system. 8 
The Carnegie Report recommended that some protection be offered 
white workers against black competition; the protection it 
pref erred was a system of minimum wage rates at a level 
acceptable to whites. Such a remedy, said the Report, would be 
preferable to the "reservation of un- or semi-skilled work for 
whites"; but should this latter be adopted, it should be only as 
a temporary measure. 
In his paper before the National Conference in 1934, Verwoerd 
declared that "The relationship between white poverty and the 
presence of Coloureds and natives in the country must be openly 
faced. 11 It would be impossible to introduce measures to improve 
the position of whites without affecting the position of blacks. 
The interests of the country as a whole, however, demanded that 
the position of the whites be improved. Verwoerd went on to say: 
"Wanneer dus in seker van die voorstelle 'n diskriminasie 
in belang van die blanke werker te vinde is, dan meet besef 
word dat nie alleen oorweeg is wat voordelig is vir ens 
probleem-groep - die blanke arme - nie, maar vir die land. 
Waar bv. 'n sekere bevoorregting van die blanke arme 'n 
moeilikheid - dog 'n verwyderbare moeilikhied - vir die 
nie-blanke veroorsaak, daar is nie geskroom on dit te kies 
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nie." 
"Temporary discrimination", urged Verwoerd, was necessary in the 
favour of whites in order to reverse the process whereby the 
cheaper black labour had undercut and pushed out the white and 
coloured workers from their work. 9 The "economic proposals" 
here referred to by Verwoerd included the following. First, that 
the Wage Board be empowered to lay down in private industry in 
which it operated that a minimum proportion of "civilised" to 
"uncivilised" labourers be employed, and that legislation be 
passed to create machinery to do the same for government at the 
provincial and local level. It must be noted that the proposal 
to enable minimum ratios of "civilised" and "uncivilised" 
labourers to be laid down was also in effect a proposal to enable 
the Wage Board and the government to lay down differential wage 
rates on ground of race. This is never stated in the 
recommendations of the report, but follows once it is realised 
that the idea of a ratio of "civilised" to "uncivilised" workers 
was not simply in order to reserve jobs for whites but to reserve 
jobs at a rate acceptable to whites - at this time the rate was 
generally around twice that received by the black worker for the 
same work. Second, the Report asked the newly-appointed 
Commission on Industrial Legislation to investigate the working 
of the Apprenticeship system to see to what extent it barred 
"adults (i.e. rural-urban migrant)" from receiving training in 
the skilled trades. Third, it was recommmended that "strict 
supervision be exercised so that Europeans do not work under 
natives or Asiatics". 10 These three matters all became 
standard concerns of National Party spokesmen in the years after 
the Conference. Further matters were raised in the 
recommmendations, such as a proposal for an investigation of the 
possibi 1 i ty of extending white employment in the gold mining 
industry. Verwoerd's argument, as sketched above, can te taken 
as representative of the tone of the Conference, and of the basic 
theme that emerged from it: a carefully worded, fairly specific 
plea for protection for the poorer white worker against the r1ay 
of a multi-racial competitive labour market. The growing con~tn 
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among Afrikaner National is ts with the need for segregation in the 
work-place is reflected in the proposal noted above for the 
prevention of whites working alongside or subordinate to blacks 
and Indian South Africans. 
In his paper Verwoerd had made it plain that the aim of the 
Conference organisers had been to come up with specific practical 
steps in tackling the problem of poor-whiteism; proposals that 
implied a drastic reformation of South African society as a whole 
were deliberately omitted. Here Verwoerd instanced the 
nationalisation of the mining industry. 11 D.F. Malan, who gave 
a short speech to the Conference, was somewhat more free in his 
speculation, and declared that "the capitalist system, which is 
based on self-interest and the right of the strongest" was in his 
opinion doomed. "To co-operate in the attaining of the right new 
adaptation will be also South Africa's task in the future", said 
Malan. 12 These remarks by Malan were of interest in showing 
the increasingly radical bent of the National Party leadership 
now that it had been forced into the political wilderness as a 
small and apparently powerless group within South African 
society. They also foreshadowed the much more open anti-
capi talism of the War years. 
In parliamentary debates in 1936, the National Party MP' s 
revealed that they were incorporating the ideas and proposals of 
the 1934 Conference into their own standpoint. It is noteworthy 
that it was in this year that the National Party first showed its 
strong feelings on the developing pattern of race relations in 
the cities, and especially at the work-place. Concern over the 
status of whites in the cities led the National Party in one 
debate to connect the issue of mixed marriages, employment of 
whites by Asians, Indian land tenure in South Africa, and the 
mixed working conditions in factories as all part of social 
development to which the National Party strongly objected. P.J.H. 
Luttig, National Party MP for Victoria West, remarked as follows 
in a speech in the same debate which was to be repeated in 
essentials time and again by the MPs of the National Party: 
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It is a deplorable spectacle to behold that non-
Europeans in al 1 respects regard themselves as the 
equals of the whites in regard to the work which they 
are doing together. I consider that the principle of 
segregation should be given effect to in relation to 
concerns of what nature, and we should lay it down 
that certain classes of work are definitely to be 
undertaken by Europeans and other classes of work by 
non-Europeans. Lest we do that, an ever-growing 
danger to our white civilisation will develop. None 
of us wish to see our children mixing with non-
Europeans and even less do we desire to see our 
children marry non-Europeans the condition of 
affairs in the towns is most deplorable. The poor 
whites drift to the towns and the whites who are 
better off take no notice of them. The consequence is 
that the coloured section take notice of them and the 
eventual result is that the white girl or the white 
young man marries a coloured person. 13 
The elaboration of the basic apartheid idea within parliament -
in a form whose racist undertones were perhaps spelled out more 
clearly than ever before, or since - thus took place in 1936. The 
application of the apartheid idea (not yet so called) to the 
labour policy of the National Party and its articulation in 
parliament awaited the opportunities which events during 1937 
provided. It was in this year that the various initiatives which 
had been evolving within the trade union sphere by activists 
animated by the Afrikaner nationalist ideal first surfaced 
forcibly to public attention. On the Railways, in a number of 
secondary industries such as the clothing industry, but in 
particular on the gold mines, the established trade union 
movement was faced with challenges to its basic ethos and indeed 
very existence which could not be ignored. 14 The controversies 
were very readily translated into party political matters in 
parliament. In response, the National Party put forward a number 
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of policy positions which were to remain as guiding ideas until 
and beyond the accession to power in 1948. 15 
The fol lowing were the main points argued by the National Party's 
various spokesmen: 
(i) Trade unions should be prohibited from having both white and 
black (i.e. coloured and Indian South African) members, and 
should instead be obliged to organise on a racially segregated 
basis. 
(ii) Wage legislation (the Wage Act) should allow for 
differentiation of wage rates on the basis of race. A two- or 
three-tier system of wage rates could thus be instituted, each 
level to be based on the relevant' s group's "standard of living". 
At this time the National Party began to press for a minimum 
"white" wage of 8/- a day. 
(iii) The reservation of work on a racial basis should be 
introduced; certain trades and occupations to be reserved for a 
particular race alone; and in others a quota or ratio of workers 
of a particular race should be specified. 
(iv) No "natives or Asiatics" should be alllowed to supervise 
white workers. 
(v) "Inudstrial segregation" was to be introduced as far as 
possible; in particular no whites were to be obliged to perform 
the same work as black workers in the same work-place. (This 
demand for what amounted to factory segregation was to receive 
a measure of recognition in the 1941 Factories, Machinery and 
Building Works Act, which empowered the issuing of regulations 
in terms of which separate facilities had to be provided for 
workers of different race. Further factory segregation was 
introduced by the National Party government itself in an 
Amendment to this Act in 1960.) 
(vi) Trade unions should be prohibited from using their funds to 
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support candidates who were standing for public office. 
(vii) Existing barriers on the entry of whites to the skilled 
trades in terms of the Apprenticeship Act should be removed. 
(viii) Action should be taken against the influence of what 
J .G.Strijdom referred to as "Bolshevistic Jews", neatly combining 
a strain of anti-Communism with anti-Semitism which was to be 
found among sections of the National Party's electoral 
support. 16 
It is perhaps worth noting that the National Party in power did 
indeed enact legislation on each and every one of the above 
issues in the direction it had already indicated in 1937. But 
more to the point here is that these proposals by the National 
Party flowed very directly for the most part from the Party's 
newly-found thorough-going segregationist policies, and with an 
emphasis on the improvement of the social and economic position 
of white workers. Thus the National Party openly propounded a 
sectional bias, rather than taking refuge in the ambiguous terms 
"civilised" and "uncivilised" current at the time. These 
proposals elaborated the ideas of the Carnegie Commission and the 
1934 National Conference on the Poor White Problem in language 
which spoke to the everyday racism of white South African society 
rather than the euphemisms of academics and churchmen. They 
marked a break not so much with the actual practice but with the 
ambivalent theory of South African society, where racial 
segregation existed alongside ideas which denied the legitimacy 
of drawing distinctions solely on grounds of race. Racial 
separation on all levels was put forward as the cornerstone of 
social policy, legitimate and desirable in itself. It was in this 
sense a new and ominous voice. 
The challenge to the existing industrial order went further than 
even these early programmatic apartheid proposals. The ideas 
developed by a number of Afrikaner nationalist ideologues in the 
1930s, with their strong "neo-Fichtean" volkische bent, 11 also 
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injected a different perspective into trade unionism which 
clashed strongly with the existing climate of opinion among the 
majority of practicing trade unionists. Such a climate was still 
dominated largely by heritage of the English-speaking immigrants 
who had established the first trade unions in the country. While 
this group was quite heterogenous in ideological terms, spanning 
conservative artisans and Marxist activists, there was a common 
body of trade union discourse which emphasised the everyday 
economic struggle and the need for "working-class" solidarity. 
For these trade unionists the ideal of the trade union was that 
of an autonomous economic organisation which served the interests 
of its membership if need be by industrial militancy or by 
political affiliation with apolitical party dedicated to working 
class interests. The proposals of the National Party, however, 
implied a trade union movement that was racially divided and 
politically neutral, and which operated in a system in which the 
state gave preference to white workers. The new-found Fichtean 
nationalism of elements within the Afrikaner movement denied also 
that society should rightly be viewed as stratified by class, in 
which workers irrespective of background had a common cause as 
workers. The National Party replaced the class-bound, and 
ultimately colour-blind, ideology of the socialist-leaning trade 
unionist with the conception of a society based on race and 
nation, in which ties of ethnicity overrode those of class and 
occupational position. And in direct opposition to the evolving 
"Christian-National" ideology stood the atheism and socialism of 
the trade unionists, many of them condemned out of hand by the 
Nationalist politicians as foreigners and "Communistic Jews". 18 
The discovery of Communism in the trade unions was one further 
outcome of the National Party's reaction to the crisis of 
urbanisation among Afrikaners. Hard on the heels of the 
confrontation between the Mine Workers' Union and the Bond van 
Afrikaner Mynwerkers in 1937 came the decision of the Algemene 
Kerkvergadering of the Nederduits Hervormde Kerk (NHK) to form 
its own commission of enquiry on the influence of Communism among 
South African trade unions. The upshot was the publication of a 
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pamphlet entitled Kommunisme en die Suid-Afrikaanse Vakunies by 
Dr H.P. Wolmarans which in very crude terms assailed Communism 
in South Africa as "Die dodelike vyand van die Christelike geloof 
en die Christel ike Kerk ... die dodel ike vyand van 1 n gesonde 
nasionalisme wat die eie volk en die eie kul tuur wil handhaaf ... 11 19 
Wolmarans• pamphlet contained a representative sample of both 
the rhetoric and the factual material which the Afrikaner 
movement was to use for years to come in their attack on the 
established trade union movement as well as on the left-wing 
unionists such as E. S. ('Solly 1 ) Sachs. Sachs later sued the 
publishers of Wolmarans' pamphlet in the first of a series of 
court cases which he and the Garment Workers' Union conducted 
against his Nationalist opponents, from all of which he gained 
an award of damages for libei. 20 This action taken by the 
N.H.K. and Wolmarans• pamphlet testifies to the impact made in 
Afrikaner nationalist leadership circles by the controversy over 
the Mine Workers• Union and the Bond, and in turn did much to 
give a lead in forming Afrikaner nationalist opinion on what was 
considered to be the menace of Communism. 
It also, it should be noted, raised for the first time in 
parliament the issue of the closed shop, which the Chamber of 
Mines had awarded to the white mining unions in a deal which shut 
out the Bond van Afrikaner Mynwerkers from recruiting among white 
miners. The evils of the closed shop were to figure quite 
prominently later when Afrikaner nationalists clashed with Solly 
Sachs's "mixed" Garment Workers Union with its own closed shop.) 
Both the Dutch Reformed Churches and the National Party adopted 
the viewpoint that Communism was a secular creed totally 
repugnant to the values and world-view of the Afrikaner people. 
In taking up such a stance, the National Party necessarily made 
itself the antagonist of that section of the trade union movement 
dominated by Communists and other left-wing activists, mostly 
Marxist though not by any means all members of the Communist 
Party. No account of the National Party's labour policy can thus 
omit some reference to the issue of Communism, since it was to 
have far-reaching implications for the relationship between the 
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National Party government and the trade unions after 1948. For 
the moment however it is enough to note that early on after 
Fusion the National Party and prominent organisations in 
Afrikaner society had identified Communism as an enemy of the 
volk, although it was not until 1942 that the National Party made 
the banning of the Communist Party and the suppression of 
Communist activities in South Africa officially part of its 
policy. 21 
Waiting for Power: 1940-1948 
By the end of the 1930s, then, the National Party had already 
emerged with a well articulated policy on labour and trade union 
matters, and this policy was, in the main, only part of a broader 
vision of the future structure of South African society. If 
carried through, the proposals envisaged a radical shift in the 
spirit and direction of overall labour policy. The war years were 
to bring further twists and turns under the pressure of intense 
political rivalry and factionalism. In particular, the National 
Party, as well as its more radical fellow spirits such as 
P. J. Meyer and members of the Ossewa Brandwag, found itself pushed 
to call for a fundamental political and economic reform of the 
very basis of South African institutions. It was at this time 
that the anti-capitalism to which D.F .Malan had given brief 
expression in 1934 re-emerged with much greater vigour. Meyer 
22 himself was to call for a brand of "Afrikaner socialism", 
while the National Party in 1942 demanded a "new economic order". 
Ben Schoeman, labour spokeman for the National Party and future 
Minister of Labour in 1948, made public the new thinking in the 
Party on this matter during a debate on an amendment to the Wage 
Act. State control of the economy would be greatly extended under 
a National Party government, stated Schoeman. Wage setting would 
become the preserve of a special state board; the principle of 
industrial self-government through the industrial council system 
would be abandoned, one consequence being the elimination of 
collective bargaining between employer and trade union over 
103 
wages. The state would take on the responsibility of providing 
work for its citizens. Profits accruing to private bodies would 
be limited. The only familiar note was Schoeman's re-iteration 
of National Party demands for work reservation and segregation 
in industry. 23 
In 1943 both D.F.Malan and Schoeman added new touches to this 
line of thinking. Malan in a major speech asked for the 
introduction of "Social Security" in South Africa, and called for 
state control of the mining industry and other "key industries". 
He proposed the ins ti tut ion of a central economic counci 1. 24 
Seconding Malan, Schoeman again set out plans to bring wage 
determination within the ambit of state action on a large scale 
basis. Schoeman said that the proposals meant that the trade 
unions would be forced to convert into "real workers' 
organisations" concerned with domestic employer/employee 
concerns. Liberal capitalism, declared Schoeman, was finished; 
the National Party now wanted not "patchwork" but "drastic 
economic changes". 25 
The implications of this new policy for trade unions were crucial 
indeed. According to Schoeman himself, the old function of trade 
unions, collective bargaining, was now "obsolete"; 26 but 
deprived of this task, what were trade unions to do? Opponents 
of the National Party immediately seized upon these 
pronouncements to assert that the Party now wanted "Nazi trade 
unions", shorn of any real purpose and mere creatures of a 
fascist state. These official National Party statements were to 
return frequently in the years to come in the mouths of their 
opponents, as the new government after 1948 turned its attention 
to industrial and trade union matters. Schoeman and his 
colleagues soon back-pedalled on the more revolutionary 
implications of their 1942/1943 pronouncements, and indeed by the 
post-war years showed every sign of wishing to forget them 
altogether. References were still made in party policy documents 
up to 1948 on the desirability of a labour board concerned with 
the determination of wages; it was emphasised however that this 
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was a tentative proposal and that state control over trade unions 
- besides action against Conununist unionists - was not envisaged. 
Nevertheless, the speeches on economic policy and industrial 
relations of those war years were not forgotten, and did much to 
provide those who looked for it with evidence of the National 
Party's deep-seated antipathy to free trade unions. 
One further labour matter on which the National Party was to take 
action when in government concerned the issue of apprenticeships 
in the skilled trades. The Party made it a standard complaint 
regarding labour matters that the apprenticeship conunittees set 
up in terms of the Apprenticeship Act used their powers to 
exclude many rural, Afrikaans-speaking applicants. 21 Dominated 
by English-speaking employers and trade unionists, the National 
Party alleged, and often including coloured and Indian artisan 
members, the apprenticeship conuni ttees discriminated against 
Afrikaners. Apprenticeship conuni ttees, said Ben Schoeman in 1940, 
should only consist of whites, 28 and moved an amendment to that 
effect. Despite the claims that restrictive indenturing 
. practices were "one of the greatest single causes of poor-
whi teism", 29 it is far from clear that these restrictive 
provisions did indeed prevent large numbers of rural white youths 
from acquiring artisan status. In 1947 for example a United Party 
spokesman stated that multiple applications by individuals were 
frequent, and the total number of applications could not be a 
reliable guide to the number of youths seeking indentures. He 
added that in his opinion, he doubted that more than 500 youths 
had failed to gain entrance in the period concerned ( 1945) . 30 
Reform of the apprenticeship system was to remain a prominent 
part of the National Party's progranune however, and when in power 
the Party amended the Apprenticeship Act and passed the Training 
of Artisans Act in 1951, making provision for the training and 
recognition of older, formally unqualified, workers as artisans. 
Relatively few however availed themselves of this possibility. 
Ironically, it was a National Party government that in the 1970s 
found itself taking steps to facilitate the training of coloured 
and Indian artisans in the face of white trade union 
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recalcitrance. 
The National Party in Power: The First Measures 
After the National Party's victory in the election of 1948, the 
new Minister of Labour, Ben Schoeman, made it clear that 
immediate drastic changes in the country 1 s industrial legislation 
were not envisaged. Instead, a commission of enquiry was 
appointed with terms of reference which covered most aspects of 
the workings of the industrial legislation of the time. Changes 
to legislation would only be brought about after the commission 
had reported. 31 Appointed in 1948, the Commission on Industrial 
Legislation (known as the Botha Commission after its chairman, 
Dr J.H.Botha, a former chairman of the Wage Board) worked for 
three years hearing evidence and writing the report which was 
finally made public at the beginning of 1952. 32 Important 
legislation affecting labour matters did however reach the 
statute book before the appearance of the Botha Commission 
Report. There were the two Acts concerning apprenticeship and 
training (matters omitted from the purview of the Botha 
Commssion) which have already been briefly discussed. More 
contentious however were two other Acts, each of which deserves 
more extended treatment here. Both in their own way were to 
implement important facets of the new government 1 s broader 
apartheid programme, and to provide the trade unions with a 
severe challenge. These Acts were the Suppression of Communism 
Act pf 1950, and the Native Building Workers Act of 1951. 
In passing the Suppression of Communism Act, the government had 
in mind far more than the presence of a number of Communists and 
other left-wingers in leading positions in the trade unions. 
Communism, wherever it was found and whatever form, was to be 
suppressed. Nevertheless, government spokesmen made it quite 
clear that the influence of Communists in the trade union 
movement was a major factor with regard to the introduction of 
this legislation. In the Second Reading debate on the Suppression 
of Communism Bill in the House of Assembly in 1950, several 
1-06 
National Party speakers declared that infiltration and control 
of trade unions was one of the major tactics adopted by 
communists in their attempt to overthrow the existing political 
order. Dr Albert Hertzog for example referred by name to several 
white communists in the unions, and went on to say that greater 
than the danger of communism among the registered unions was the 
threat posed by communist trade unions among black workers, since 
these could furnish the revolutionary mass movements which would 
be directed against the status quo in the country. 33 The 
government also made it clear that it proposed to adopt a 
definition of "Communist" which was not restricted to members of 
the Communist Party of South Africa, but which included whatever 
left-wing activists the government wished to proceed against. 
Hertzog himself spoke of "Trotsky-Communists". The passage of the 
Act, with its sweeping powers bestowed on the Minister of 
Justice, was to remove the most committed and radical of trade 
unionists from off ice, and in so doing to pose the organised 
trade union federations with a great di lemma which they could not 
adequately resolve. The effect of the Act will be discussed at 
greater length in the following Chapter. 
The Native Building Workers Act was in some respects no more than 
an ad hoc response to a problem which had arisen several years 
before the National Party took office. Both the problem itself, 
and the response of the National Party, are illuminating of 
recurring themes in South African labour history. The background 
before the National Party came to office in 1948 can be briefly 
sketched. 34 The origin of the problem lay in the housing 
shortages which were recognised to have arisen by the end of the 
Second World War during a period of intensified urbanisation of 
South Ari cans of al 1 backgrounds, but especially Africans. 
Estimates of the housing needs of the urban black population ran 
to a hundred thousand or more houses. Building work at this time 
was still largely the preserve of white and coloured artisans in 
the several building unions, which had conducted a major strike 
over wages and working conditions in 1947. The use of this 
skilled (and expensive) labour put the cost of housing beyond the 
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reach of the great majority of urban black people. The 
alternative of subsidised housing was not popular with white tax-
payers or their politicians. It was widely felt that the solution 
lay in the training of blacks as building workers. But this 
possibility ran into the opposition of the established building 
trade unions, which looked upon the training of black building 
workers as tantamount to the creation of a pool of cheap labour 
which would pose a threat to the existing wage rates and to the 
jobs of white and coloured artisans. The building unions thus 
demanded "satisfactory" guarantees before they would accept the 
plan to train black building workers. 35 Even the offer by the 
government prior to 1948 that it would guarantee building 
artisans 80% of their present wages for ten years should they 
lose their jobs failed to satisfy the unions, which maintained 
their opposition to the training of blacks. The United Party 
government was forced to establish a training scheme without 
union agreement. It is interesting to note that in this situation 
the old union standby of the "rate for the job" was of no use: 
the payment of the existing rates to black workers was precisely 
the negation of the solution which was aimed at by training such 
workers. 
So matters stood when the National Party came to off ice. Black 
workers were being trained to perform building work, but 
municipalities were not eager to employ them as long as the 
unions were opposed. Unsatisfactory as this situation was, a 
short recession in the building trade in 1949 and the early 
months of 1950 made matters worse. Pressure increased on the 
government from the side of white artisans, who complained that 
black workers were doing skilled work while they themselves 
walked the streets looking for work. At the peak of the recession 
some 2,000 building artisans were said to be unemployed. 36 
The Native Building Workers Act was the response of the National 
Party government to this problem. The clauses of this Act 
provided for the following: 
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(i) power to establish and regulate programmes for the training 
of black building workers; 
(ii) power to grant recognition as a "native building worker" to 
any black worker able to pass the stipulated test; 
(iii) power to regulate the wages and working conditions of black 
building workers trained or registered in terms of the Act; and 
(iv) power to prohibit the use of black building workers in 
skilled jobs in the building industry in any area delimited as 
an "urban area" by the Minister of Labour. 37 
In essence the solution provided by the Act was an "apartheid" 
one: two separate skilled labour markets in the building industry 
were envisaged, one for whites and coloureds, one for blacks. 
Competition between the two groups of workers was to be prevented 
by job reservation: no black building worker was to be allowed 
to do skilled work in areas laid down by the government. This 
reservation of work on a racial basis (only the second Act to 
empower it since Union, after the 1926 Mines and Works Act), was 
the first major feature of the Act. 
The second noteworthy feature of the Act was the institution of 
a differential wage system: the black building workers were to 
be paid wages fixed by the Minister acting on advice, and in the 
event the wages were from a quarter to a half of those paid to 
white or coloured artisans. The government argued that the black 
workers would not attain the level of skill of established 
artisans, since the training period for blacks was less than half 
the equivalent period for artisans. The black workers would thus 
be considered skilled, but not as skilled as existing artisans. 
Further, the standard of living of blacks was asserted to be such 
that they would be satisfied with wages considerably lower than 
those paid to white and coloures artisans. And finally, of 
course, the whole point of the Act was to create a body of 
cheaper labour which could be employed on building housing in the 
black townships of the country. Thus the government could argue 
that it was embodying a major principle of its apartheid policy: 
namely, that each group should be able to develop fully in its 
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own area. However, this principle was not pushed to the extreme 
of providing the same standard of training: thus the conventional 
colour bar was maintained whereby blacks were not admitted to 
apprenticeships, although the Apprenticeship Act was in theory 
colour-blind. The government made it clear that it was not 
proposing to tamper with this arrangement. 38 
The Report of the Botha Commission and Black Workers 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Industrial 
Legislation (the "Botha Commision"), was made public at the 
beginning of 1952. The conclusions and recommendations of this 
Commission formed the basis for five years of political 
controversy before, in t956, a new Industrial Conciliation Act 
was placed on the statute book. For this reason the Report merits 
close attention. Not all of the recommendations of the 
Commission were accepted by the government, nor was the 
government's remodelling of the country's industrial legislation 
after 1951 solely inspired by the ideas contained in the 
Commission's Report. Nevertheless, the Report provided a 
comprehensive review of most aspects of the South African system 
of industrial relations, and much of what it recommended was 
accepted by the government and given legislative force. At the 
beginning of its sitting the Commission had declared itself quite 
open and not committed to any particular point of view. But it 
was of course to be expected from the composition of the 
Commission that the majority of Commissioners would be diposed 
to give very sympathetic consideration to the National Party 
outlook on labour matters. As one of the two trade union 
representatives on the Commission, the Minister of Labour had 
chosen L.J. van den Berg, at this stage a relatively unknown 
figure in the wider trade union movement. Van den Berg, general 
secretary of the Yster en Staal Bedryf svereniging and a leading 
spirit in the formation of the right-wing Ko-ordinerende Raad van 
Suid-Afrikaanse Vakverenigings in 1948, had entered trade union 
affairs from a white collar job only nine years before in 1939. 
But he was, in the words of a later colleague, one of those trade 
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unionists who was also a "klipharde Nasional is". 39 
The greater part of the Botha Commission Report concerned the 
provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act, or could be 
envisaged as falling within the scope of an amended I.C.Act. 
The first part of the Commission's Report to which the government 
gave legislative attention, however, concerned the position of 
the black worker in the South African industrial system. As has 
been discussed in Chapter 3, one of the major political decisions 
in the South African labour history had been the exclusion of 
blacks (for the most part) from the provisions of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. It had been a decision that had settled very 
1 i ttle, and which made for a situation that was regarded as 
unsatisfactory by all parties concerned, including white and 
black trade unionists. In 1942, faced with a mounting incidence 
of strikes by black workers, the Smuts government had issued War 
Measure No. 145 which prohibited strikes by blacks and made 
arbitration of disputes among blacks compulsory. The measure had 
never lapsed and was still in force when the Botha Commission sat 
to hear evidence. The Smuts goverment had published a draft bill 
in 1947 which had proposed to extend a limited form of 
recognition to separate black unions under a special system of 
industrial relations. The victory of the National Party had 
however meant that the bill had never been proceeded with. The 
Botha Commission had thus a more or less clean slate on which it 
could go about suggesting legislation that would provide the 
institutional structure within which matters affecting black 
industrial workers could be tackled. 
The Commission Report itself remarked that broadly three 
approaches to the position of the black worker in South Africa 
existed. 4° First, there were those who proposed that the 
definition of "employee" in the Industrial Conciliation Act 
simply be widened to include all industrial workers, black as 
well as white, instead of excluding blacks, as it did for the 
most part. Black workers would then be placed on the same 
footing as all other workers, and would be free to join trade 
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unions, partake in collective bargaining and otherwise conduct 
themselves as full members of the system of industrial relations. 
The second approach was the polar opposite to the first: taking 
as point of departure the proposition that the blacks were, or 
should be treated as, temporary visitors in the white areas and 
solely there to perform tasks al lotted them by their white 
employer, this approach advocated the denial of any recognition, 
or even suppression, of black workers' organisations. Not being 
a permanent part of the white area's population, black workers 
could here make no claim to rights that they could only exercise 
in their own areas. The third standpoint represented something 
of a compromise between the two extremes: it proposed recognition 
of black trade unions under a separate system of industrial 
relations, with such unions to be carefully control led and 
subject to state supervision and guidance. 
The third "middle-of-the-road" approach, as it was termed in the 
Report, was in effect what the 1947 United Party bill had 
proposed, and it was the approach which the majority of the Botha 
Commission chose. The majority proposed that black unions be 
extended recognition in two stages, which would allow for a 
period of training and supervision by a body of officials to be 
known as inspectors of native trade unions. Such unions would be 
of blacks only, and would exclude, as the Industrial Conciliation 
Act excluded, certain categories of worker such as those in 
government service, in agriculture, in domestic service. 
Further, the ability of these unions to partake in collective 
bargaining was restricted to separate sessions with employers in 
special conciliation boards, and not as a part of the established 
industrial council system. The rights of blacks to strike was 
very heavily restricted, but not entirely prohibited. 41 These 
proposals by the majority bore a strong resemblance to the 
provisions of the 1947 bill introduced by the United Party; 42 
the differences being mainly in detail rather than in broad 
principle. Two members of the Botha Commission, J. Slabbert and 
L.J. van den Berg, submitted a minority recommendation in which 
it was suggested that black unions be given recognition, but that 
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they should be under the control of the Department of Native 
Affairs, not of Labour, and that they should not have the power 
in any circumstances to undertake direct negotiations (or 
collective bargaining) with employers. 43 The term trade union 
seemed altogether a misnomer for such toothless bodies. 
The Botha Commission's majority recommendations on this score met 
with a firm rejection by the government. The spirit, if not the 
letter, of the minority recommendation was instead adopted. In 
1953 the government introduced the Native Labour (Settlement of 
Disputes) Act of 1953, which gave no recognition to black trade 
unions, though not making their mere existence illegal. The only 
form of black workers' organisation which was admitted by the new 
Act was the "works' committee", an elected body through which 
it was hoped black workers on the shop floor would communicate 
with management. Strikes by blacks were placed under an absolute 
prohibition; the settlement of disputes between black workers and 
their employers was to be the business of a central labour board 
consisting of white officials, under whose jurisdiction a number 
of regional labour boards, consisting of both whites and blacks, 
would intervene in order to bring about the settlement of any 
industrial dispute involving black workers. Failure to bring 
about a settlement by the regional board would lead to the 
calling in of the central board. If that in turn failed, the 
machinery of the Wage Act was to be utilised. Compared to the 
legal situation before 1953, the new Act created a clearly 
articulated and comprehensive framework for the settlement of 
industrial disputes involving black workers. But it was at the 
same time the furthest limit to which the exclusionist thinking 
underlying the apartheid doctrine could be pushed. The black 
worker was simultaneously too immature and too dangerous to be 
allowed the rights of industrial organisation in "white" 
areas;
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a paternalist system of official tutelage was to be 
substituted. And where that did not work, lay the coercive power 
of police action and criminal prosecution for those who availed 
themselves, like their white, coloured and Indian colleagues, of 
the strike weapon. 
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The Reconstruction of the Industrial Conciliation Act 
The major portion of the Botha Commission Report dealt with 
possible revisions to the Industrial Conciliation Act. A large 
number of the proposed amendments and additions in the Report 
were not of a contentious nature. Recommendations in three areas 
however drew strong protest from sections of the trade union 
movement. Not all the protests weighed equally heavily with the 
Minister of Labour. In pursuance of his promise in 1948 to 
consult interested parties, the Minister (Ben Schoeman) invited 
comments on the contents of the Report. He then went on to 
establish what became known as the "Ministerial Committee", a 
body of representatives from interested parties, including trade 
unions and employer bodies. The chairman of the Committee was the 
Secretary of Labour. Excluded from participation however were 
representatives from the South African Trades and Labour Council 
(SAT&LC), still the largest trade union federation al though 
reeling from internal disputes which had caused the 
disaffiliation of a number of important unions. The exclusion was 
at the express direction of the Minister of Labour, who had 
objected to the behaviour of the SAT&LC concerning the Botha 
Commission. The Minister claimed that the SAT&LC had first of all 
attacked the integrity of the members of the Ministerial 
Committee, and then declared its outright rejection of the 
Report. There was thus no point in holding discussions with 
delegates from an organisation holding such views, declared 
Schoeman. 45 The Ministerial Committee thus deliberated on the 
Report without the participation of the Report's main critic. 
The sittings of the Ministerial Committee produced a set of 
proposals upon which the Minister of Labour partly based a draft 
Industrial Conciliation Bill. This Bill was presented to 
parliament in 1954, passed its Second Reading and was then 
referred to a parliamentary select committee for comment on 
detail. The Report of the Select Committee 46 appeared only in 
the middle of 1955, too late for the Bill to be proceeded with 
that year. The Bill finally passed parliament in 1956 and as the 
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new Industrial Conciliation Act it became of legal force on 1 
January 1957 - eight and a half years after the National Party 
had taken office committed to bringing about major changes in the 
South African system of industrial relations. 
The new Act introduced new measures to enable the state to 
exercise some control over possible abuses in trade unions, 
forbade union contributions to political parties, made obligatory 
the use of ballots to elect officials, and further restricted the 
strike weapon by making membership ballots mandatory. But even 
though such measures were decried as "uwarranted interference in 
the affairs of trade unions" 47 , the protest was not vehemently 
pushed. The measures hardly amounted to that state control of 
trade unions which the National Party itself had adumbrated in 
the war years, but which it had later quietly dropped as official 
policy. 48 Of more moment were the apartheid measures, 
consideration of which consumed the bulk of parliamentary and 
public time taken in discussion and organised protest. The two 
main areas here were the measures to segregate trade unions, and 
the proposal to introduce statutory work (or "job") reservation 
on a racial basis. 
A majority of the Botha Commission had recommended that the 
government should exert some compulsion to bring about racial 
segregation in trade unions, despite the fact that, as the 
Commissioners noted, "The evidence before the Commission was 
overwhelmingly against the introduction of legislation to make 
the separation of the differing races in separate trade unions 
obligatory .•• " 49 In spite of the evidence, the majority of the 
Commissioners argued that "mixed" trade unions would in the 
future fail to offer protection to their white members as 
coloured and Indian South Africans began to claim their rightful 
position in the unions on the basis of their increasing numbers. 
Further, while mixed unions might be tolerated by white workers 
at a time of economic progress, any recession would bring to the 
surface temporarily hidden racial antagonisms which the 
Commissioners were convinced existed. The Commission, the 
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majority stated, had to bear in mind the "fundamental facts" that 
the racial groups differed in their education, standard of living 
and "traditional background", and that each race had an "inborn 
race-pride" which led to racial prejudice. 50 The majority 
. accordingly recommended that legislation lay down that new trade 
unions could only be registered in terms of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act if they were formed on a racially segregated 
basis. Existing mixed unions should be encouraged to split into 
separate racial unions by faci 1 i tating breakaways by racial 
groups and by providing a procedure for the division of union 
assets in such an eventuality. Those mixed unions which did not 
split should be compelled to segregate their members into 
separate branches for each racial group (i.e. one branch for 
whites, one for "coloured" workers as defined in the Act). No 
mixed meetings of members of the union snould then be permitted. 
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Despite the vigorous opposition of many trade unionists to these 
provisions, they were all accepted in broad outline by the 
government. Under pressure from right-wing trade unions, however, 
one more provision was added to the law as finally adopted: all 
mixed unions remaining would have 
committees. This provision appears 
prompting of L.J. van den Berg 
to have all-white executive 
to have been adopted at the 
and the Yster- en Staal 
Bedryfvereniging's urgings. Van den Berg at the sitting of the 
Select Committee on the I.C.Bill in 1955 had argued that as far 
as the remaining mixed trade unions were concerned, "the 
principle of white leadership" should be introduced, that the 
union's executive should be all-white, that of those white 
executive members two-thirds should represent the white section 
of the membership (no matter what the size of the white 
membership), and that there must be separate racial branches. "If 
that is the position, we feel that there will be no objection to 
future mixed trade unions", said van den Berg. 52 Asked by the 
politicians on the Committee whether coloured and Indian workers 
would be satisfied permanently with such a position, van den Berg 
replied: 
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Ek meen hulle sal tevrede bly solank diskriminasie op 
sosiale en politieke gebied bly voortbestaan. Ek sien nie 
waarom hulle hulle tot die vakvereninggebied moet beperk 
wat hul le ontevredenheid betref nie ... Indien hul le 
ontevrede is, moet ons nie enige notisie daarvan neem nie, 
aangesien hulle net soveel voordeel as die blankes, indien 
nie meer nie, uit die situasie sal trek. 53 
The Act however did not go as far as van den Berg had asked: it 
only laid down that all members of a mixed union's executive must 
be whites. The Act also included a provision allowing the 
Minister to grant exemption from these requirements should he 
consider it impracticable for a mixed union to be segregated on 
account, for example, of the small numbers of whites in the 
union. The exemption provision, like others of a similar nature 
in the country's racially discriminatory legislation, effectively 
defused those criticisms of the law which were based on its 
impracticability as opposed to its inequity. 
One further outcome flowed from the policy of trade union 
segregation. The National Party in the 1930s had become aware of, 
and alarmed at, the potential of the country's closed shop 
practices for forcing white workers into mixed unions against 
their will. As we have seen, this concern arose as early as 1937 
with the dispute with the Bond van Afrikaner Mynwerkers and the 
Chamber. Further events in the 1940s, especially around the 
Garment Workers' Union under Solly Sachs, had only reinforced 
this concern. In particular, a highly publicised incident in 
1944, when two white women workers had objected to the presence 
of coloured workers in the same clothing factory in Germiston, 
and had been disciplined by the Union, had given rise to a most 
intense agitation led by Afrikaner clergy on the Rand, and not 
far behind them the politicians of the National Party. The latter 
had thrown its weight behind the "Hervormers" agitating against 
the leadership of Solly Sachs and the mixed Garment Workers Union 
in the aftermath of the notorious Germiston incident. 54 The 
closed shop issue was placed on the National Party's policy 
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agenda, and came again to the fore with the proposals for trade 
union segregation in the 1950s. A considerable number of the 
established mixed unions enjoyed the protection of a closed shop, 
but the institution as such was not mentioned in the country's 
industrial legislation. Instead, court pronouncements had decreed 
that the closed shop enjoyed some $tanding by virtue of the 
provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act regarding the 
powers of indutrial councils to reach joint employer/trade union 
agreements. 55 A measure of forced inclusion sat very ill with 
a Party which stood for forced exclusion, and the closed shop was 
taken up to be explictly regulated in terms of the new I.C.Act. 
In particular, new provisions of the Act allowed any worker to 
seek exemption from the Minister from enforced membership of a 
closed shop, and permitted the break-up of existing closed shops 
by the registration of new or breakaway uniracial unions. The 
closed shop was thus recognised, except where it might clash with 
the segregationist tastes of white workers. 56 
Such then were the fruits of the 20-year campaign of the National 
Party to bring about racial segregation in the country's trade 
unions. Faced with fierce opposition from some registered unions 
(the opposition of the unregistered unions grouped in SACTU 
hardly counted to the National Party government), the government 
had not gone quite to the limit, but had permitted for instance 
the continued existence of mixed trade unions. Powerful vested 
trade union interests, particularly that of the respected South 
African Typographical Union under Tommy Rutherford, had clearly 
had some influence in holding the government back. Perhaps the 
new Act in operation would itself encourage the splitting of the 
remaining mixed unions within a few years ... such at least was 
the view expressed by the Minister of Labour, Senator Jan de 
Klerk, in 1959. 57 The prediction failed to materialise even in 
the 1960s, the fiercest years for the extension of racial 
separation to every possible social sphere. In 1957, when the new 
I.C.Act came into force, there were 113 unions with a colour-
blind constitution, although of these only some 63 actually had 
white and coloured/Indian membership. 58 The majority of those 
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with uniracial membership did indeed amend their constitutions 
in the direction desired by the government, but this was largely 
a paper change. By the end of 1969 there were still some 45 
unions which were not uniracial with over 160,000 members. 59 
It was to be a similar story of legislative embodiment but 
ultimate practical failure which the provision of the kind of 
work reservation advocated by Verwoerd in 1934 was to encounter. 
As part of its terms of reference the Botha Commission had been 
required to consider whether existing wage determination measures 
offered "sufficient protection for all races", and if not, what 
could be done. 60 The Commission considered that it should 
interpret this instruction in terms of two aspects: exploitation 
of workers by employers, and the "unfair competition" of workers 
of one race against those of another, or in other words the whole 
question of the protection of white workers. With regard to the 
latter, after a somewhat tortuous analysis in which they touched 
upon such matters as race prejudice, the obstacles placed in the 
way of black worker advancement by the conventional colour bar, 
and the almost self-evident "fact" of differing standards of 
living for the differing races, the Commissioners concluded that 
there was indeed a problem of interracial work competition mainly 
in the semi-skilled occupations. 61 But they refused to 
recommend any immediate measures to meet the problem; instead 
they suggested the appointment of an "expert, scientific body 
which would have to make a years-long study of the subject" to 
arrive at sound proposals for protection against interracial 
competition. 62 
The Botha Commission thus diagnosed a problem for which it 
refused to prescribe a remedy, beyond yet further study of the 
situation. For the government however, the situation was more 
pressing. Of all the innovations in labour policy that the 
National Party was committed to introduce, perhaps none was more 
important electorally speaking than that of providing some form 
of protection for the country's white industrial workers against 
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the play of a multi-racial labour market. 
National Party MP for Mayfair put it: 
As Dr H G Luttig, 
... ek wil net hier se dat ons as verteenwoordigers van 
kiesafdel ings aan die Rand, waar ons hoofsaakl ik blanke 
werkers verteenwoordig, weet watter aktuele probleem dit is 
dat daar tot dusver nie afbakening van werk volgens rasse 
in nywerhede was nie. Ons weet hoe ons van dag tot dag en 
van tyd tot tyd deur persone in kennis gestel word dat 
hulle uit diens gesit is en dat nie-blank persone in hul 
werk ingestel is. 63 
Or as Albert Hertzog stated after the 1953 general election, 
claiming that the National Party now represented "no less than 
26 large urban workers' constituencies": 
Ons aan hierdie kant is gedeeltelik 'n party van boere, 
maar grootliks 'n party van werkers. 64 
In fact, the leaders of the National Party had long decided on 
the solution that they saw the most fitting to this problem: 
that solution was the one that was already embodied in the Mines 
and Works Act of 1926 and in the more recent Native Building 
Workers Act. Job reservation on a racial basis was in truth no 
newcomer to the South African labour scene; besides the existence 
of the two Acts just mentioned, there was what might be termed 
a whole "spirit of job reservation" throughout the country's 
complex labour force, and particularly in the largest single 
employer of white manual labour in the country: the South African 
Railways. There, work was explicitly classified on a racial 
basis, jobs being grouped as either "white" or non-white". The 
refusal of the Botha Commission to lend its support without 
qualification to this form of protection still left the 
leadership of the National Party, as it had been before 1948, 
with the conviction that much could be achieved in its basic aim 
of protecting the white worker through the widening of job 
reservation provisions to private industry. The Native Building 
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Workers Act had been a step in this direction, and National Party 
spokesmen at the time had referred to the Bill as it appeared 
before parliament as an important "experimental" measure in one 
sector of private industry. 65 Nothing had happened since then 
to shake the Party's faith in the principle. 
What had changed however were the exact protectionist functions 
which the National Party envisaged the job reservation measure 
would fulfil. In the 1930s job reservation through the quota 
system, on an industrial or occupational basis, had been seen as 
opening up labour opportunities to under- or unemployed whites. 
The great industrial expansion after 1940 had however eliminated 
unemployment as such as a major problem for the white population. 
The threat that black workers were seen as posing now was that 
of the undercutter who threw whites out of the jobs which they 
were already occupying. 
1954: 
As the Minister of Labour put it in 
The situation at the moment is this: there is a continual 
fear on the part of the white worker that he wi 11 be 
undermined, that he will eventually be driven out of his 
sphere of work by the native .... The consequence is that 
when economic progress of the native worker takes place, it 
is fought by the white worker. . . 66 
As the Botha Commission had noted, the crucial locus of this fear 
lay among the country's large class of semi-skilled white 
workers, whom it was feared would be the first casualties of any 
open labour market. In 1957 the Minister of Labour claimed that 
there were around 90,000 white workers whose physical or 
intellectual level was such that they were unfitted for 
unrestrained competition with black workers for jobs. 61 Only 
by reserving some types of work for those people could they be 
prevented from being undercut and finally displaced by 
competition from blacks willing and able to work at far lower 
wages. As Piercy pointed out in her perceptive article on this 
subject, a prominent cause of this situation (leaving aside its 
exact dimensions) must be traced to the changing industrial 
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method, and especially to the increasing practice of job 
dilution, whereby artisan work was divided up, simplified and 
given over to semi-skilled workers to do at lower wages than 
those received by the skilled workers. 68 Just as the 
development of mining had been accompanied by a growing force of 
semi•skilled white workers whose jobs had been under pressure in 
the second and third decades (and ultimately only saved by the 
passing of the 1926 Mines and Works Act), so in the 1950s there 
existed a large and growing class of whites in secondary industry 
who were felt to be under continual pressure from black workers 
for their work. 
Thus by the 1950s the protection of whites already in employment 
was the primary motivation for the establishment of job 
reservation machinery in the Industrial Conciliation Act. In the 
mid-Fifties however a further reason emerged and was strongly 
pressed as another justification for the proposed reservation. 
If trade unions were to be segregated, as the government and its 
own trade union supporters wanted, then such segregated white 
unions could be undercut by segregated coloured/Indian unions, 
since the latter would no longer have any incentive to go along 
with the white leadership that had predominated in the previous 
mixed unions. 69 The argument was not easily brushed aside by a 
government dedicated to the sectional protection of whites. By 
the introduction of the job reservation measure the government 
was able to claim that it would be able to forestal 1 the 
possibility of coloured/Indian trade unions undercutting white 
unions, since should this threat arise the Minister could then 
resort to job reservation. Job reservation, said the Minister 
of Labour, would be 11 the sword of Damocles 11 hanging over the head 
of employers to prevent them from conspiring with coloured/Indian 
trade unions to undercut white workers. 10 At this stage then 
job reservation and trade union segregation emerged as 
complementary and indissoluble partners in the cause of the white 
worker. 
The job reservation measure as actually passed (Clause 77 of the 
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Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956) gave the Minister of Labour 
the power to order an inquiry into any alleged case of 
interracial labour competition, using the machinery of an 
"Industrial Tribunal" which had also been established in terms 
of the 1956 Act. The Tribunal bore only a faint resemblance to 
the ill-fated "national labour board" proposed by the National 
Party in 1942/3. The new body's functions were to investigate and 
advise the Minister on a number of levels: demarcation disputes, 
arbitration, and, of course, job reservation. The findings of the 
Tribunal after an investigation into any alleged interracial work 
competition could be given the force of law should the Minister 
so decide. He could also grant exemptions from any job 
reservation determination, a power which was to become 
increasingly significant in the labour-hungry 1960s. 
The workings of the Industrial Tribunal and its job reservation 
capacity in the event were to please few parties. Despite the 
element of flexibility lent the measure by the exemption 
provision, the job reservation machinery up to the point that a 
determination reserving jobs was made was a fairly cumbersome and 
time-consuming affair. The process was independent of the 
Minister of Labour to the extent that the latter could only 
accept or reject the Tribunal's recommendations, not issue his 
own. For these reasons the reservation process was to run into 
criticism from right-wing labour circles which had hoped to see 
a more rapid and flexible set of powers in the hands of a 
sympathetic National Party Minister of Labour. 11 
The provisions contained in the 1956 Act proved to have 
shortcomings right from the start, and had to be amended in 1959. 
The very first job reservation order, in the clothing industry, 
was declared invalid by the courts after being bitterly opposed 
by the trade unions. In this case the problem was that the Act 
failed to empower the issuing of sufficiently flexible 
reservation determinations making use of ratios and percentages. 
Other obstacles also emerged. Experience soon showed that the 
cooperation of industrial councils, which the Act originally 
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specified as necessary, was not going to be forthcoming. Also the 
mines had not been included within the scope of the measure, and 
not for the first time semi-skilled white workers were calling 
for protection there. Perhaps of most interest, insofar as the 
government's own basic rationale for the Measure was concerned, 
was that the 1956 Act had provided that the Industrial Tribunal's 
investigation was dependent on a case being made out for a threat 
to the "economic welfare" of a particular group. But, as the 
Minister was at pains to point out in 1959 in parliament, it was 
sometimes desirable to reserve jobs not just on economic but also 
on "social" grounds, so as to prevent "undesirable contact" 
between the races taking place. 12 
Conclusion: Labour in the 1960s: The Implications of Growth 
The outcome of the job reservation struggle was entirely anti-
climactic in proportion to the political energy which had been 
expended on it by the National Party and its trade union 
supporters. Only a small number of pockets of semi-skilled jobs 
were ever to be reserved in terms of statutory job reservation, 
and they were as often as not subject to rapid exemption notices. 
As a measure of grand apartheid job reservation was never even 
a starter, and its history from the mid-1960s onwards is one of 
almost universal dislike, with the disgruntled right-wing trade 
unionists prominent in the ranks of the discontented. 
That the job reservation policy would indeed do more than offer 
ad hoc protection to beleaguered groups of white workers 
suffering from status rather than economic apprehensions was 
certainly in the minds of leading members of the National Party 
government. The very passage of the measure, with the concomitant 
political clamour from both unions and employers was testimony 
to this fact. Rather than viewing job reservation as a pragmatic 
expedient to offer protection in a multi-racial labour market, 
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there was also the view that this measure was an integral part 
of a more comprehensive pattern of a fully segregated society, 
in which every job had its appropriate racial label. This latter 
view seems well epitomised in the words of Senator Jan de Klerk, 
after his appointment as the new Minister of Labour in 1955, when 
he attempted to set out his underlying philosophy on labour 
matters to parliament: 
Die Nasionale Party se dat al .is daar al ver op die weg 
gevorder dat die nie-blankes reeds werk doen wat deur 
blankes verrig is of deur blankes in die toekoms verrig 
behoort te word, in daardie gevalle moet ons terug verower 
wat dan verlore is. Ons kan nie maar dat hierdie proses 
aangaan nie, en ons kan nie maar se dat dit verby met ons 
is nie ... di t is my beleid dat daardie gebiede wat blank 
was, tot die grootste mate - en as ek my sin kan kry, met 
alle hulp and middels tot my beskikking - weer blank gemaak 
word. 73 
Implicit in this view was the presumption that the maintenance 
of "white" work-spheres throughout the economy was a practicable 
policy at the time and for the future. But the whole argument 
took little account of the pace and trend of development 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. It took no account of the simple 
fact that with the state of full employment of whites which was 
within sight by the mid-1950s, the previous white predominance 
in the skilled and semi-skilled industrial labour force would 
have to decline if the economy was to continue to grow. True, 
something could be done by bringing in skilled white immigrants, 
and by making better use of al 1 feasible sources of white labour, 
including handicapped people, and de Klerk stressed these 
possibilities in the same speech cited above. But when all was 
said and done the potential from these sources was limited, while 
on the other hand employers could readily recruit and train - at 
wage rates attractive to themselves - from the growing numbers 
of urban black South Africans. 
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With the accession of H.F.Verwoerd to the premiership and the 
unfolding of "Apartheid's Second Phase" 74 , a serious attempt 
was made to reduce the urban African population in the "white" 
areas and to restrict the flow of migrant labour to the cities 
by way of such measures as the Physical Planning Act of 1967. As 
the decade of Grand Apartheid, this was the time in which the 
National Party government had to demonstrate that it could both 
reverse the tide of black urbanisation and make the "white" areas 
more reliant on white labour. While it has been calculated that 
apartheid policies between 1950 and 1970 may well have restricted 
economic growth and moved the country away from the optimal 
growth path 75 , "By 1970, the position of white labour was ... 
very different from what it had been before World War Two. 
Desperately high unemployment had given way to an acute and 
growing shortage of white labour, and to mounting pressures from 
employers to relax the job bar". 16 Grand Apartheid was 
manifestly failing in the way that generations of liberal 
scholars had always said that it would: there was, short of an 
African Armaggedon, no way of unscrambling the complex 
interdependence and physical intermingling of white and black in 
the key industrial areas, not to mention the white farms. Even 
the kind of sub-optimal growth under apartheid still made the 
urban interdependencies more recalcitrant to the segregationist 
policies of the National Party government. The consequence was 
that growth now became indispensable as a route not only to the 
higher standards of living to which the white electorate had 
become accustomed, but also to the accomodation of black economic 
advancement. Growth, as Steenkamp pointed out, was a means of 
buying time while the politicians made up their mind about the 
necessary adjustments to the overall system. 11 
The implications of growth for the labour market thus became ever 
more pressing towards the end of the 1960s, at which time the 
debate over labour shortages had become a major political issue. 
The exact dimensions of this labour shortage were a matter of 
acute controversy. It was generally agreed that the most critical 
shortages were in the area of skilled and semi-skilled labour 
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which in the past had been largely the preserve of whites. But 
it was realised that as a whole the shortage was more complex 
than this, and was spread throughout the occupational structure 
due to a host of factors. Government figures tended to come to 
estimates which differed markedly from those of the private 
sector, which emphasised that not only skilled labour but 
unskilled black labour was not available as needed by employers. 78 
Government reaction to a major Report produced from the depths 
of the bureaucracy reflected these pressures by conceding that 
the government "considers the maintenance of a high, but balanced 
tempo of economic progress, as is envisaged in the economic 
Development Programme, as of great importance for the Republic", 
and added that if "the present division of work between 
population groups should be maintained, there will be a continual 
shortage of white workers. 11 79 
The consequence was the shift in government labour policy which 
de-emphasised its protectionist functions and attempted, al though 
inadequately as the practice soon showed, to face up to the 
demands of growth and black advancement. The full training and 
advancement of coloured and Indian South Africans in skilled work 
was given official sanction, provided the trade unions approved, 
and the training of African workers in the homelands and border 
areas was stressed. There was to be no opening of the flood-
gates, declared the National Party, but "controlled employment" 
of black workers in the "white" metropolitan areas was announced 
to be government policy. Perhaps the most symbolically telling 
example of this shift was the occasion of the speech of the 
Minister of Labour, Marais Viljoen, to the First National 
Congress of the South African Confederation of Labour, the voice 
of organised right-wing labour and an important constituency for 
the National Party government. At this Congress Viljoen declared 
to representatives of white workers that: 
... ons land moet ontwikkel en ... die indiensneming van nie-
Blankes toegelaat word waar voldoende blankes nie 
beskikbaar is nie ... Waar die werkers behoorlik geken is, 
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en geen beswaar opper nie, behoort die indiensneming vam 
nie-Blankes na my mening geen probleme op te !ewer nie. so 
"A drastic reduction of the growth rate, as proposed in some 
quarters, is al together unrealistic", 81 declared Viljoen to an 
audience which included the foremost proponents of such a pol icy. 
The Minister went on to list three provisos which had to be met 
when applying the new policy (no replacement of whites; no mixed 
working on the same job level; no whites to work under black 
supervision), but the important note was the permissive one: 
black labour's role had now come out from the cold. Nine more 
years were to pass before new legislation altogether buried the 
remnants of official white protectionism in the work-place. The 
notice of the funeral had however been given that June day in 
1970 in Pretoria before the assembled ranks of white labour. The 
National Party's labour policy was reversed. 
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Chapter 5: The Failure of a Unified Labour Movement: 
The South African Trades and Labour 
Council 1930-1954 
One common expression world-wide of the unifying, inclusive 
impulse among trade unions has been the creation of trade union 
federations: formal organisations catering for a range of trade 
union affiliates which serve a variety of purposes ranging from 
inter-communication to policy coordination and public 
representation. Such federations, on a national and a local level 
sprang up quite early in the history of British trade unionism -
that pioneer in this as in other industrial matters - and served 
to articulate the current concerns of what became known as the 
"Labour Movement" in industrialising countries. While 
individual trade unions may have seen reason enough for sectional 
division in order to monopolise job opportunities or to exclude 
undercutters, the functional interests of the majority of trade 
unions in the new industrial economies found common cause over 
a wide spectrum of practical issues, and in many cases also in 
the emerging "workerist" ideologies which developed in the 
nineteenth century. The establishment of union federations, 
either of a centralised or loose variety, answered the need for 
a forum and a voice which other interests, in particular the 
state and organised business, would take seriously. Alongside 
this, the "industrial wing" of the labour movement, there 
developed also political parties representative of labour aimed 
specifically at attaining office in the governmental institutions 
of the democratising industrial polities. Thus by the first 
decade of the twentieth century British workers could look both 
to the Trade Union Congress and to the Labour Party to promote 
their interests beyond the immediate sphere of workplace issues. 
South African Trade Union Groupings before 1930 
Given the origins of South African trade unionism in the efforts 
of a largely immigrant British artisan stratum, it is no surprise 
that institutions similar to the British Trade Union Council and 
134 
the local-level Trades and Labour Councils were established in 
this country after the turn of the century, and that the 
political adjunct of these institutions - a labour party seeking 
political representation - followed soon after. 2 By 1910, as 
Ticktin has pointed out, "the industrial wing of organised labour 
[in South Africa] consisted basically of a dozen or more viable 
craft unions, several of which were sections of powerful British 
trade unions ... 11 3 In 1909 various regional labour political 
groupings amalgamated into the South African Labour Party, with 
a leadership drawn largely from immigrant artisans from unions 
catering for printers, builders and the engineering trades. At 
the founding conference of the latter body there was "evidently 
only one Afrikaner delegate among the sixty-odd present 11 • 4 
Building on its artisan base, trade unionism slowly spread in the 
major urban centres, the Witwatersrand and Cape Town in 
particular. Despite stiff employer opposition, unions catering 
for lesser-skilled white miners developed alongside the craft 
unions. A Witwatersrand Trades and Labour Council which had 
originated after the Anglo-Boer War grew into the Transvaal 
Federation of Trades and then, in 1914, into the South African 
Industrial Federation. Open to trade unions throughout the 
country, it was however effectively a Rand-based body, uniting 
artisans and miners in a centrally controlled organisation under 
the leadership of the well-known unionist Archie Crawford. Its 
membership was a "crop of trade unions that sprang up after the 
war [and] combined class militancy with colour bars". 5 
In Cape Town a similar process of union collaboration resulted 
in 1913 in the formation of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions. 
The different conditions in the labour market to those prevailing 
in the Transvaal led however to the formation of trade unions 
without a colour bar. Much competition existed between white and 
coloured workers in the Cape, particularly in such spheres as the 
building industry. But the prior existence of a large number of 
skilled coloured workers in such trades as the building industry 
- albeit usually without the formal apprenticeships of which the 
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immigrant artisans could boast - meant that an exclusory colour 
bar was a practical impossibility in Cape Town, even had the 
white workers desired one. The consequence was the evolution of 
"open" artisan unions, or of open branches of unions which in the 
Transvaal implemented a colour bar, such as the Building Workers' 
Industrial Union. Thus, in the words of one analyst, "The 
Federation in the event became the vehicle for incorporating the 
Coloured artisan class into the trade union movement". 6 Under 
the leadership of an immigrant stonemason, Robert Stuart, who 
became secretary of the body in 1914, the Cape Federation 
established itself as the only rival to the South African 
Industrial Federation as the voice of "organised labour" in the 
country. As Williams has noted, other regions prior to the 1940s 
- Natal, Port Elizabeth and the Free State - failed to produce 
sustained union federations which measured up to the two already 
in existence, and "Consequently, from the beginning, the focus 
of the trade unions movement in South Africa was on the all-
whi te, largely artisan Transvaal group and the multiracial and 
strictly parochial unions, which took their leadership from the 
Cape Federation". 1 
Prior to 1930, attempts to bring together the Transvaal and the 
Cape union federations foundered largely owing to the colour bar 
issue. In 1917 for example a national congress planned for both 
organisations failed at the last minute when the Cape Federation 
refused to attend due to the unwillingness of the Transvaal body 
to accept coloured delegates from the Cape without reservation. 
The subsequent debate on the issue within the ranks of the 
Transvaal unionists indicated just how divided they were over the 
issue of race, and just how implacable was the opposition of many 
white unionists to anything which suggested tampering with the 
colour bar. 8 The South African Industrial Federation itself 
became more or less defunct as a result of the crushing of white 
labour organisation due to the Rand Rebellion of 1922. 
In 1924 the newly-created Department of Labour, under the 
political control of a South African Labour Party Minister, took 
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the lead in organising a conference held in 1925 at which a new 
trade union federation, the South African Association of Employee 
Organisations, was formed. This body adopted the title of the 
South African Trade Union Congress ( SATUC) in 1926. The new 
federation" ... was designed by the right wing to make a clean 
break with the movement's militant past and become a respectable 
body, advising the government on labour relations and securing 
representation on public and international ins ti tut ions". 9 
Unfortunately for the SALP's conservative faction and the leader 
of the Party in the Pact government, Colonel Creswell, the 
founding conference elected two prominent Communists, W.H.Andrews 
and C.F.Glass, to leading office, with Andrews taking the key 
position of general secretary. The event reproduced the long-
standing split in the ranks of organised labour, in which left 
and right faction within the Labour Party itself opposed one 
another and both opposed the left-wingers who had split off from 
the Party in 1915 over the war issue, and later had formed the 
Communist Party of South Africa in 1921. And in addition, the 
Cape Federation had not joined the new body, despite the fact 
that it had not adopted a colour bar constitution: "a sensational 
departure from the Transvaal's tradition". 10 
Under Andrews's management however negotiations were initiated 
with the Cape Federation in 1927 to attempt to bring about a 
unified organisation representative of the country's trade 
unions. Although representatives from both bodies met and agreed 
on the desirability of unification, the old suspicions harboured 
by the Cape Federation about their Transvaal counterparts 
remained: the Federation feared both Transvaal domination in a 
new body, and along with it the colour bar practices of the 
leading northern trade unions. Two highly incompatible blueprints 
for unification were proposed by each side. The SATUC proposed 
a straightforward national federation with no provincial 
divisions; the Cape Federation put forward a rather strange idea 
for a federal body in which each province would have equal 
representation, even including the Free State and Natal where no 
labour federations existed. The latter proposal was clearly an 
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attempt to maintain the Cape Federation's actual autonomy under 
the guise of a national linkage, and as such it was rejected 
outright by the unionists from the north and from the large 
national trade unions. 11 Negotiations proceeded in an on-off 
fashion until 1930, when the Federation capitulated to a threat 
by the SATUC to break off all contacts, and agreed to the holding 
of an All-In Unity Conference in Cape Town in October 1930. 
Despite the greater number of delegates from the Cape than from 
elsewhere, the All-In Conference produced a resounding victory 
for the proponents of a unified central federation rather than 
the Cape Federation's notion of a very loose provincial 
structure. In return, however, the northern union delegates 
agreed to a membership clause which admitted all "bona fide trade 
unions", rather than only unions registered in terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. Thus the new body, the South African 
Trades and Labour Council, (hereafter SAT&LC) came into being on 
what was potentially as broad a basis as could have been hoped 
for by trade unionists of the inclusivist inclination: 11 It was 
a momentous decision. Trade unions in the north had for the first 
time agreed to admit African unions to their fellowship". 12 
The new-found unity was soon undermined by sections of the 
leadership of the Cape Federation, which had not acc~pted the 
verdict of the All-In Conference. A leading Federation figure, 
A.Z.Berman, went to the Cape Town newspapers in early 1931 with 
allegations that the SAT&LC had been founded at the instigation 
of Colonel Creswell and his faction of the now disintegrated SALP 
in order to bolster his position in the Pact by claiming that 
organised labour supported him. 13 Prior to Berman 1 s 
al legations, Robert Stuart had resigned from the committee formed 
to bring about the new federation in the wake of the All-In 
Conference. The result was a split in the Cape Federation, which 
limited the participation of Cape unions at the first annual 
conference of the SAT&LC in 1931 to two. 
The Cape Federation was thus to continue its existence outside 
of the SAT&LC, despite further efforts by unionists from the 
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latter body to bring about unity. Throughout the 1930s the 
relationship of the SAT&LC and the Cape Federation remained a 
troubled one. Unions from the north, affiliated to the SAT&LC, 
assailed the Cape Federation bitterly for what they viewed as 
company unionism and the maintenance of a low-wage structure. 
Both the Garment Workers' Union under Solly Sachs, and the 
Transvaal Furniture Workers' Union, made attempts to break the 
hold of the Cape Town unions and to organise the workers into 
their own ranks. 14 The SAT&LC established its own Cape Districts 
Committee for Cape Town unions affiliated to it, and in 1935 
appointed a full-time union organiser in Cape Town in what was 
seen as a direct challenge to the Federation. Left-wing 
commentators argued that the Federation's boasted opposition to 
racial segregation was only a veneer over a conservative and 
complaisant leadership stance, and that the Federation had never 
challenged the basic institutions of white domination such as the 
pass laws. 15 A new unity proposal was accepted in 1938 after 
protracted negotiations in the previous year, only to have the 
areement break down. The Cape Federation was to linger on in one 
guise or another until 1945, largely, according to one student 
of the Federation, as a result of the personality of Robert 
Stuart himself, rather than any well-founded differences of 
principle. 16 Thus regionalism detracted from the representative 
nature of the SAT&LC for much of its existence; but given the 
presence of unions with Cape Town operations in its ranks, it was 
not a monolithic Cape opposition which it faced. The SAT&LC by 
the mid-1930s was clearly a more substantial organisation than 
the Cape Federation, and recognised by government to be so. 
Race and Politics in the South African Trades and Labour Council 
in the 1930s 
The SAT&LC came into being after perhaps the most tumultuous and 
influential decade in the history of South African trade 
unionism. The Rand Strike of 1922 shook white labour and politics 
to their foundations, changing the configuration of both unions 
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and political parties, and leading to the victory of the Pact in 
1924. Flowing from the strike too came the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, setting the parameters for union activity and 
dictating the conditions of union membership. White, and also 
coloured and Indian South Africans turned increasingly to union 
organisation to better their conditions of employment. Excluded 
from the ambit of the Industrial Cenci 1 iation Act, African 
workers subject to the pervasive web of movement and employment 
controls nevertheless began to engage in organised activity and 
began the decade with a massive, if short-lived, strike on the 
Rand mines. Under the charismatic leadership of Clement Kadalie, 
the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union provided a vehicle 
for the aspirations of hundreds of thousands of African workers 
in both the rural and the urban areas, becoming in the process 
something more than a trade union but unable under the system of 
white supremacy and black subordination to transform itself into 
an accepted mode of black political protest. South Africans of 
all backgrounds, many of them first generation immigrants from 
the industrialised states, met and mingled in the work place and 
strove to build organisations of workers which would improve 
their material circumstances. The meeting of these workers of 
diverse ethnic identity and political status was to result 
however not in a broadly unifying process of the creation of a 
relatively homogeneous industrial working class, but in 
continuing attempts by the dominant white workers in what 
Greenberg has called a "bounded working class" to impose division 
and carve out local monopolies on the basis of racial 
exclusiveness. In conditions of severe labour market competition, 
with wages highly discontinuous according to perceptions of the 
racial status of particular occupational spheres, organised 
workers were continually confronted by the question of membership 
and of boundaries, of exclusion and monopoly versus interracial 
alliance and mass solidarity. 
The expanding nature of the South African economy was creating 
new occupational opportunities while at the same time population 
increase, agricultural instability and the encroachments of white 
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landowning groups was impelling many thousands of indigent rural 
dwellers to seek betterment in the towns. The white-controlled 
polity perceived the widepread poverty and defined it in racial 
terms: it was first and foremost a "Poor White Problem" since the 
anomaly of political equality, racial superiority and material 
deprivation was not to be endured, for reasons of compassion fed 
by strong feelings of ethnic solidarity. 
Trade unions necessarily were confronted with the intense 
struggles of individuals and groups to survive and if possible, 
prosper, in the urban areas. The nature of employment was 
changing, and with it the character of the labour force and the 
kind of trade unions catering for their interests. As Jon Lewis 
has summarised the situation during this period of the 1920s and 
1930s, 
... unions were established on industrial lines in the 
consumer products manufacturing sector, particularly 
in leather, clothing and furniture. Similar unions 
emerged in the laundry, rope and canvas, chemicals and 
confectionery industries. The material condition for 
the emrgence of these unions was the rapid expansion 
of their respective industries from world war 1 and 
the reorganisation of traditional labour processes. 
Rapid mechanisation, job fragmentation and deskilling 
swept away the basis for craft unionism. The new 
division of labour necessitated a predominantly semi-
skilled work-force ... 11 
The development of these new unions catering for semi-skilled 
workers added a new component to the spectrum of South African 
trade unionism. The dominating presence of the artisan unions was 
increasingly di 1 uted by many new bodies catering for semi-skilled 
workers, composed often of a predominantly female membership, as 
in the clothing workers' unions. Women became more and more 
evident, and so did coloured, Indian and African workers, of both 
sexes. Bestowing as it did full trade union rights on coloured 
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and Indian workers, the Industrial Conciliation Act spurred union 
organisation among these workers outside of the established Cape 
Town unions. Indian and coloured workers joined both existing 
unions which had no colour bar in their constitutions, or sought 
to form new ones where an exclusive white union existed and 
applied for registration in terms of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act. 
One consequence was that the registration of unions by the 
Department of Labour in accordance with the provisions of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act soon threw up problems. What was to 
be done if a union catering for coloured and/or Indian workers 
sought registration in a sphere of interests in which a white 
union was already registered? Or, contrariwise, an all-white 
union sought registration with the same scope as a union with a 
colour-blind constitution which was already registered? In 1928 
the Department of Labour passed on the problem to the SATUC and 
the Cape Federation and asked for their opinion. SATUC 
circularised its member unions and replied to the Department with 
the following assessment. 
There were roughly three lines of thought on the issue among its 
member unions, so ran the memorandum drawn up by W.H.Andrews for 
SATUC. First there were the all-white unions with a colour bar 
in their constitutions which favoured the formation of separate 
"parallel" unions for coloured, Indian and eligible African 
workers. A second group of unions, whose constitutions in theory 
permitted open membership were also in practice in favour of 
parallel unions should their white membership not agree to an 
integrated union. A third group accepted the principle of open 
unions in principle and in practice. Thus, concluded the 
memorandum: 
The N.E.C. in the light of these replies, has come to 
the conclusion that, where existing unions in a given 
industry are prepared to admit, and, in fact, do admit 
as members all workers in the industry, who are 
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otherwise qualified irrespective of race or colour, 
the creation of parallel unions for the Non-Europeans 
should not be encouraged and if they are formed they 
should not be registered. On the other hand, where 
existing Unions in a given industry or trade refuse to 
admit qualified members solely on account of race or 
colour, the creation of parallel unions for these 
workers is justified and no opposition should be 
offered to their registration. 18 
This pragmatic line on the issue of race and trade union 
membership was inherited by the SAT&LC. The bulk of the trade 
unionists who attended the annual conferences of the organisation 
had no objections in principle to the ideal of a fully-inclusive 
non-racial trade union. Thus in 1936 for example a resolution was 
unanimously carried at that year's SAT&LC Annual Conference which 
recommended "to all affiliated Unions that the Colour Bar be 
excluded from all [union] Constitutions and that efforts be made 
to get al 1 sections of the workers into the Unions ... 11 19 Yet 
the unanimous adoption of such resolutions was by no means an 
indication of general approval. Rather it is clear from 
conference proceedings that the leaders of the artisan unions and 
a couple of the more important all-white unions traded off 
effective control of the SAT&LC (something which was to become 
a major bone of contention in the 1940s) at the cost of 
tolerating left-wing rhetoric and high-sounding motions. 
Closely related to the issue of open membership was the question 
of the exclusion of the bulk of the African labour-force from 
membership of trade unions registered in terms of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. When white unionists supported the organisation 
of "non-white" workers, were they supporting also the inclusion 
of African workers, or did they draw the line at coloured and 
Indian workers'? In principle at least most delegates at the 
SAT&LC' s annual conferences inclined to the fully inclusive 
position, or at least remained silent when the issue was put to 
the vote. Thus at the 1938 Annual Conference a resolution was 
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agreed to which demanded that the def ini ti on of "employee" in the 
newly revised Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937 be amended to 
include all workers. 20 And as has been noted, the constitution 
of the SAT&LC itself was an open one, permitting the affiliation 
of all "bona fide" trade unions, not just those registered in 
terms of the Industrial Cenci 1 iation Act. In practice, non-
registered in the context of the time meant trade unions catering 
for African workers, such as were increasingly being organised 
after the hard Depression years. (See Chapter 7.) 
However, opinion on the issue within the SAT&LC was obviously 
divided. While the left-wing unionists openly promoted non-racial 
unionism, albeit at times with "pragmatic" concessions such as 
separate segregated branches as in Solly Sachs's Garment Workers' 
Union, the most conservative delegates were of course opposed, 
and a larger number of self-styled "moderate" delegates would 
probably have preferred not to grasp the nettle at all. One 
fairly influential position upheld by such moderates which was 
to gain a hint of support in government quarters during the 
1940s, was that of separate trade unions for African workers. The 
Presidential Address to the SAT&LC in 1939 by Archie Moore of the 
South African Reduction Workers' Union (an all-white body whose 
membership was clearly more conservative than Moore himself) is 
worth citing at some length in order to convey the state of mind 
of many unionists who were steeped in that paradoxical blend of 
Marxist analysis, socialist brotherhood, and practical white 
protectionism which characterised the uneasy mental universe of 
the artisan founding fathers of South African trade unionism: 
I venture to suggest that it is high time that it is 
realised that any segregation policy can be, at most, 
only a partial solution of the problem facing us; and 
that the native in industry has come to stay ... On the 
other hand, the advocates of greater advancement are 
often embarrassing, and in this I blame communism not 
a little ... The supreme need in this country is a 
movement which will place the non-European in his 
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proper economic perspective, establish him as a social 
being, admit and advocate his just claims in 
reformist and not revolutionary language, and make the 
European population understand its permanent mutuality 
of economic interest with him. Since example is better 
than precept, it may be asked to what extent has the 
European trade union movement of this country 
contributed towards the solution of the problem along 
the lines I have indicated. In my opinion it has, with 
certain exceptions, contributed to the advancement of 
non-Europeans only to the extent that the immediate 
interests of its members have been threatened, and 
thereafter has left the problem severely alone. And 
where the European worker does not consider himself to 
be threatened by non-European competition, or where 
the employment is the monopoly of non-Europeans, their 
industrial interests have been mainly disregarded, 
regardless of the ultimate effect of such a policy 
upon Europeans themselves. Such being the position as 
I see it, I am coming to the opinion that it may be 
well worth while to foster and develop the idea of 
parallel or separate native trade unions 
particularly in the Transvaal - and to co-ordinate 
their activities with European trade unions through 
joint consultations and discussion. 21 
Moore's studied realism put him somewhat ahead of his own union, 
which was a staunchly conservative body in the mining industry. 
Other mining leaders did not share Moore's moderation but gave 
notice of a new constituency in labour's ranks which had 
inherited none of the immigrant artisan's theoretical notions of 
worker solidarity. At the same conference at which the SAT&LC 
conference agreed to a resolution calling for the inclusion of 
all workers in the definition of an "employee" in the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, J.A.van den Bergh of the Mine Workers' Union 
(MWU) noted his objection to resolutions "uitsluitlik vir die 
Bantu-bevolking", and went on to say: 
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As ek 'n toekoms moet bou waar my kinders sal meng met 
Bantu, kleurlinge en Asiate, dan wou ek liewer dat my 
geboortedag vervloek was en dat ek doofstom en blind 
in die wereld gekom het ... Vandat die konferensie begin 
het, het ek gesien wat gaande is ... Daar moet op 
sosiale gebied 'n onoorkombare muur gebou word tussen 
wit en kleur, om sulke walglike dinge als wat ons hier 
op die konferensie bespeur het te vermy. 22 Di t is 
die begin van die ondergang van die Af rikaanse volk en 
die geboorte van 'n gebasterde Suid-Afrika. 23 
Objections to mixed conferences continued to come from right-wing 
delegates. In 1939 J. Hagen of the Pretoria and Municipal Tramway 
and Bus Workers' Union moved that separate conferences be held 
for black and for white delegates. 24 This and similar motions 
were defeated, but interracial gatherings were a sitting duck in 
the climate of the times for the vociferous assaults of the 
Hervormers in the union movement. T~JllIWU! which disaffiliated 
from the SAT&LC in 1939, having only affiliated in 1936, gave as 
·-~-------- -----···-·------
one of its reasons for the move the issue of mixed confe~ences 
which were being used by Albert Hertzog and his followers against 
the leadership of the union. The generalisation of racial 
antagonism beyond the conflicts arising in the work-place to the 
highly charged sphere of social and sexual relationships was of 
course no new matter in labour circles. It had been elements 
within the SALP in 1927 which had been among the fiercest 
protagonists of the move to criminalise sexual relationships 
between whites and Africans. For the majority of the leadership 
of the established trade unions in the SAT&LC however, the racism 
which was propounded in the labour circles where the MWU and 
Pretoria unionists were operative was unacceptable and unnerving. 
It was opposed, but it remained a latent reality with which the 
enemies of the SAT&LC were able to threaten the organisation as 
it moved into the hostile waters of the late 1940s. Mixed unions, 
mixed work-places, mixed conferences - all were to come under the 
ban which apartheid at its most virulent was to attempt to erect 
on the basis of already existing practices, and with the approval 
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of the majority of white South Africans. 
The di visions over racial issues within the SAT&LC were mirrored, 
not surprisingly, in the political alignments within the 
organisation. The SAT&LC was established at the same time that 
the political vehicle of the dominant artisan trade unionists -
the South African Labour Party - was being torn asunder by its 
internal divisions. "Creswellites" and "National Councillites" 
battled angrily over the soul of the Party, with the latter 
finally winning the day as far as the party organisation and the 
party name was concerned. Creswell, a soldier who had put himself 
at the head of the struggle for the improvement of the conditions 
of existence of white labour, had never really shared the outlook 
of the artisan stratum which had been the Party's most 
significant activist support. The latter, at their best, were 
self-taught men with considerable intellectual sophistication. 
When their role as the guardians of white worker interests became 
glaringly incongruent with their background in an 
internationalist, quasi-Marxist, ideology, they would often 
frankly admit it. The more consistent broke with the SALP in 1915 
and went on to help form the Communist Party of South Africa in 
1921; the ones who remained, such as Harry Haynes, editor of 
Forward in the 1920s and early 1930s, attempted to articulate the 
anomalous position of white Labourism in South Africa: 
As part of the Labour Movement, a Labour Party cannot 
differentiate between workers merely on account of 
colour. The formula runs: "Irrespective of race, 
colour or creed", and is decidedly definite. The 
clever balancing act upon the slack-wire of political 
expediency does not hide the fact that the SALP has 
refused consistently to face this question from its 
inception ... The SALP has never been a Socialist Party 
in any sense of the term. The only Socialist Party 
this country has seen is the Communist Party which, 
utterly rejected by the white people, turned in 
despair to the blacks who, in their turn, will reject 
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it as vehemently did the whites. 25 
At the very first Annual Conference of the SAT&LC in 1931, 
delegates debated the issue of political alignments and mass 
activity. While some delegates urged that the Council openly 
adopt a policy of collaboration with the SALP, the majority of 
delegates were opposed. 26 The debate was to be repeated in its 
esentials throughout the 1930s as unionists struggled to define 
a viable political role for the trade unions. While many 
delegates stated their personal preference for the SALP, they 
argued at the same time that the increasing numbers of Afrikaner 
workers in their organisations would not go along with an open 
association with a political party which they did not support. 
Solly Sachs, a former communist expelled from the CPSA in 1931 
was himself to urge that the SAT&LC give its support to the SALP 
in the United Front years of the immediate pre-War period. Like 
other left-wingers in the SAT&LC, however, Sachs had earlier 
opposed any cooperation with the SALP and called for militant 
mass street demonstrations in protest against the economic 
conditions of workers. Again, the majority of delegates viewed 
this option as unrealistic. The reality was that the various 
constituencies represented by the member unions of the SAT&LC 
were opposed along lines which ran roughly along the major ethnic 
cleavages of South African politics of the 1930s - Afrikaans-
speaking and English-speaking whites were mutually divided, and 
only a minority of white unionists were prepared to position 
themselves, like Solly Sachs, to the left of the main political 
institutions of white South Africans, and either to support the 
Communist Party or to promote an independent left-wing line. The 
consequence for the SAT&LC was an organisation which remained a 
forum of competing interests rather than the means for the 
articulation of the interests of a reasonably well-defined social 
force. Convinced that they represented the 11 Labour Movement 11 , the 
majority of SAT&LC delegates during the 1930s yet encountered an 
organisation in political stasis. 
******* 
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The SAT&LC was never to achieve the degree of representativeness 
to which it aspired as the "industrial wing" of the "labour 
movment". Many large unions had shown little or no interest in 
the formation of the SAT&LC in 1930 and had never been drawn into 
the organisation. Of these perhaps the most important were the 
white railway unions. Other large unions did not affi 1 iate 
immediately, and when they did were only lukewarm in support of 
the SAT&LC's claim to embody the aspirations of the country's 
labour force. Among these unions could be counted the Mine ' 
Workers' Union and the South African Association of Municipal 
Employees. New unions representing in the main white Afrikaans-
speaking workers either never contemplated joining (like Die 
Spoorbond), or joined only to withdraw shortly afterwards (as in 
the case of the South African Iron and Steel Trades Association). 
Nevertheless, the SAT&LC attained a degree of representativeness 
which in its way was remarkable for the times. By the end of the 
decade over forty unions were affiliated to the SAT&LC. The most 
important artisan unions in the private sector were for the most 
part members. So too were the mining unions. The newly developed 
industrial unions in a variety of industries had also affiliated, 
albeit usually on a much smaller number of members so as to 
reduce affiliation fees. For nearly a decade the SAT&LC held 
together in uneasy partnership a disparate grouping of unions 
with an official policy of non-racial affiliation, and with a 
record of resolutions (however "pious" they in practice might 
have been) which upheld trade union inclusiveness. While it is 
possible to exaggerate the significance of this motley membership 
21
, the fact remains that there was no other organisation in the 
country which regularly brought together South Africans from such 
a diversity of backgrounds on matters of vital interest to each 
other. In this lay its uniqueness, but also its vulnerability 
when sectional interests rose to dominance. 
The Developing Split, 1940-1947 
The outbreak of war in 1939 created new problems for the SAT&LC, 
and heightened the urgency of old ones. The demands of war-time 
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production, together with the enlistment in the armed forces of 
thousands of union members, greatly increased the pressure for 
the entrance of new workers into industry. The craft unions in 
particular were forced to allow the expanded use of semi-skilled 
operative labour - "dilutees" who would perform aspects of an 
artisan's work at lower rates of pay than the artisan received. 
28 The entrance of whites into these new semi-skilled positions 
was perhaps the single most important factor in eliminating the 
"Poor White Problem" as it had existed in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Concurrently with the increased utilisation of semi-skilled white 
labour, the employment of coloured, Indian and African workers 
also reached new levels. The presence of large numbers of African 
workers in particular gave further weight to those who argued 
that the unionisation of such workers was imperative, and thus 
also the recognition in some form of African unions by the 
authorities. 
In the short-term, the immediate need for the SAT&LC was to 
arrive at a satisfactory policy towards the war itself. It was 
apparent that this problem would not be easily resolved. For one 
thing, union leaders were well aware of the views on the war 
issue of many Afrikaner trade union members aligned with the 
National Party. For another, there was the particular situation 
with regard to the war in early 1940. The USSR was not yet a 
belligerent in the alliance against Nazi Germany, and the 
attitude of local Communist Party members and other left-wing 
trade unionists like Solly Sachs was tortuous, to say the least. 
At the 1940 Annual Conference of the SAT&LC Solly Sachs moved an 
anti-war resolution claiming that "the present war is not a war 
for democracy", that the governments of Britain and France were 
themselves reactionary and pro-fascist and were pursuing their 
own "selfish imperialist ends", and called for the cessation of 
hostilities. 29 This was too much for the leaders of the artisan 
unions, who argued that "it would appear that certain delegates 
had turned a complete somersault. They had all voted unanimously 
in favour of the motion at the last Conference to smash the Nazi 
regime, and now they came forward with the ridiculous argument 
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that this war against Nazi Germany was not a war for 
democracy ... " 30 On the other hand, W.G.Ballinger, the former 
adviser to Clement Kadalie's ICU and now a frequent delegate at 
the SAT&LC Conference, was able to expose the glaring weakness 
of the artisan leaders' own democratic pronouncements: 
He asked how they could talk about fighting for 
democracy when in South Africa they knew perfectly 
well that three-quarters of the population were not 
given any rights of democracy. They had entered into 
the war with no declaration as to what they were 
prepared to do for the majority of the people of the 
country. 31 
The pro-war amendment to Sachs's anti-war motion won by 30 votes 
to 23, and re-affirmed the dominance of the SAT&LC by the group 
of artisan leaders and their supporters. The war as an issue for 
the left-wing unionists soon blew over with the entrance of the 
USSR into the hostilities. The arguments put forward during the 
1940 debate were thus only of passing interest in themselves. 
Their importance was to accentuate the growing division between 
the "left" and the "right" in the SAT&LC, fed as it was by other 
concerns. One such matter was the issue of the control of the 
SAT&LC' s National Executive Committee (NEC), or at least the 
question of representation on it. This issue was to drag on right 
through the 1940s until the left-wing finally won their point, 
only to realise that it was altogether a Pyrrhic victory, as will 
be seen later in this Chapter. 
In the 1930s the SAT&LC and its NEC had been controlled by the 
artisan unions and followers by virtue of a greater number of 
their delegates attending the Annual Conferences. The artisan and 
mining unions typically affiliated on a much larger percentage 
of their actual membership, paid accordingly higher affiliation 
fees, and were entitled to more delegates. The NEC was elected 
by majority vote of delegates present. Other motions before 
Conference were decided by vote of delegates present, or, on 
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demand, by a card vote by unions according to their affiliated 
membership. The latter, again, was usually sufficient to gain the 
artisan unions and their allies victory on contentious points 
where the delegate vote might go against them. By 1940, with the 
disaffiliation (albeit only temporary) of the Mine Workers' 
Union, and the growing number of smaller unions inclining to the 
left, the dominance of the artisan and mining unions was in 
peril. At the 1940 Annual Conference the artisan unions pushed 
through a change of the constitution which required that the NEC 
to be elected in future by a card vote, claiming that "the time 
had arrived when the people who paid the money should have their 
rights. About seven large unions out of the whole affiliated 
membership paid for the upkeep of the Council, and it was time 
they had some say in the affairs of that body". 32 
Notwithstanding the heated protests of the left and other 
delegates from smaller unions, the motion was adopted, not 
however on a majority of delegates present, but on a subsequent 
card vote. 33 The right wing had re-asserted control at a time 
when it seemed it might slip from its grasp. The issue however 
was by no means dead but was hauled up at every subsequent Annual 
Conference until 1948, providing a continual impulse to left-
right polarisation among the unionists. 
The squabble over control reflected divisions of principle of 
major significance for South African trade unionism, issues which 
were never satisfactorily resolved and which ultimately wrecked 
the SAT'&LC itself. The fundamental issue was the question of the 
African worker, and the development of open non-racial ("multi-
racial 11' would perhaps be a better term but has fallen casualty 
to unfortunate political connotations in later years, and is 
hence not used here) trade unionism versus white exclusivism and 
protectionist strategies. It should hardly require pointing out 
that the issue found direct reverberation within the encompassing 
sphere of politics, and was ultimately to be resolved at that 
level, rather than by the trade unions themselves, although it 
was not for wont of trying. 
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Connected to the issue of the African worker were a number of 
other questions which all, in one way or another, touched 
fundamentals regarding the trade union movement. One such was a 
matter to which reference has briefly been made: the wartime 
pressure for the dilution of skilled work and the training of 
black workers to undertake more skilled work than in the past, 
and even to be admitted to the skilled trades. A recent major 
work in South African labour history by Jon Lewis had argued that 
this issue was in fact one of the main underlying reasons for the 
breakup of the SAT&LC' s long-standing cooperation between artisan 
and open industrial unions. Lewis's argument in brief runs as 
follows: under pressure from employers and the state to 
mechanise, deskill and admit operative labour on a large scale, 
the artisan unions of the 1940s were forced to adapt to the move 
to mass production and the displacement of the qualified artisan 
from the point of production to supervisory, maintenance and 
other tasks. Increasingly white (and to a lesser extent coloured 
and Indian) operatives took over the production role of artisans, 
and were incorporated into the unions by the artisans who now 
attempted to secure operative interests against the encroachment 
of cheap African labour. The consequence was the emergence of 
what Lewis terms "pseudo-craft" unions employing the closed shop 
and other devices to exclude Africans from competing for 
operative positions, and in this process driving the artisan 
leadership in an increasingly conservative direction. 34 
Lewis's work has made a significant contribution in detailing the 
changing division of labour and trade union reactions during the 
1940s, al though his strong thesis that the labour process changes 
in themselves should be viewed as the real reason for the artisan 
unions' political conservatism and hence the break-up of the 
SAT&LC seems overdrawn. 35 Clearly however the artisan unions 
were for the first time under real pressure to accomodate not 
only to the training of Afrikaans-speaking white workers, but 
also to the rest of the population. Their response was highly 
defensive. In 1942 a motion at the SAT&LC Annual Conference that 
the government-controlled technical training organisation, COTT, 
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should be opened to black South Africans was voted down: "It was 
no good training 40000 mechanics for 1000 jobs" said one artisan 
delegate. 36 A less pointed resolution at the 1943 Conference 
calling for universal education in order to prepare the youth for 
technical education under the Apprenticeship Act was passed, but 
with continued opposition from some artisan unionists, who 
declared that "we will never agree at the present stage that the 
trades should be thrown open to everybody in the country". 37 
It was in the event the issue of African unions which propelled 
the SAT&LC into increasing acrimony and final confrontation, 
exacerbated by the long-standing antipathy of the artisan 
unionists to the communists and the left. The war years were a 
time of great ambivalence and strain, holding out the promise of 
liberalisation and greater democracy to the left while 
maintaining the effective conservative control of most major 
social institutions. At the same time, the organisational efforts 
of those in the camp of Afrikaner national ism kept up the 
pressure from the right for more segregation, more white 
protectionism. Thus it was a SALP Minister of Labour, Walter 
Madeley, who in 1941 much to the disgust of the left had issued 
regulations in terms of the revised Factories Act to enforce 
racial segregation in the workplace, responding in his turn to 
the clamour fron the right. 36 In 1942 he had gone further and 
issued War Proclamations forbidding strikes in essential 
industries, and by African workers. 39 
The African union issue had been on the public agenda at least 
since 1938, when the Minister of Labour had spoken at an 
Institute of Race Relations meeting of the possibility of "non-
statutory" recognition of African unions. 4° For the left and 
1 iberal sections of the union movement and other interested 
parties aligned with them, the solution was clear: full and equal 
trade union rights for African workers by a change in the 
definition of "employee" in the Industrial Conciliation Act. 
Of course there were major opponents; as W.G.Ballinger wrote to 
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S.P.Bunting of the Communist Party in 1941, "The chief obstacle, 
for obvious reasons to recognition are the representations of the 
Chamber of Mines. It is understood that the Chamber fears that 
even if organisation of Africa~ Native workers is confined, as 
has been suggested, to those engaged in Commerce and industry -
secondary industries - other than mining, organisations cannot 
be prevented on the mines". 41 Events on the mines were indeed 
to play a key role during these years: first with the agitation 
surrounding the Lansdown Commission in 1943, and later with the 
African Mine Workers' Strike of 1946. (See Chapter 7). When the 
issue surfaced within the ranks of the SAT&LC, the organisation's 
officials attempted to keep their distance. In 1943 the artisan 
unions on the mines and the SAT&LC secretariat had refused help 
to the efforts of the struggling African Mine Workers' Union to 
promote the interests of its membership at the Lansdown 
Commission. 42 In 1946 the NEC of the SAT&LC were to inform the 
international labour community after enquiries about the putting 
down of the African Mine Workers' Strike of that year that it had 
been a matter of restoring public order rather than industrial 
action. 43 
Throughout the 1930s the SAT&LC had been able to equivocate on 
the issue of African unionisation, since practical politics ruled 
out any resolution of the issue. From the end of the decade 
onwards, however, matters changed, and the government began to 
hint at possible recognition in one form or another. When the 
issue came before the SAT&LC's Annual Conferences in the 1940s, 
the artisan and mining unions came out in opposition to full 
recognition of African unions. A.J.Downes, leader of the South 
African Typographical Union and a future president of the SAT&LC, 
during debate on a motion in 1940 calling for full African trade 
union rights stated that 11 any endeavour in the direction 
indicated, in the face of the present stage of public opinion, 
would do more harm to the native than they realised. He felt it 
was even more necessary at the present time to regard the 
European trade unions as the trustees of the native trade unions, 
and to assist them in the best way the trustees could find of 
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doing so" . 44 Downes' s remarks were echoed by others in the same 
union camp. Although a motion calling for full recognition of 
African unions was again carried at the 1943 Annual Conference, 
the cursory attention paid to it suggests that it was another of 
the SAT&LC' s "pious" resolutions which could not be taken 
seriously. 45 (A similar motion in 1944 which received more 
debating time was defeated). 46 Of much more import were 
A.J.Downes's remarks in his Presidential Address to the 1944 
Annual Conference: 
While it is generally agreed that natives who enter the 
industrial arena and become a permanent part of the 
industrial and commercial fabric of the country should be 
allowed to organise on trade union lines, the question of 
the legal recognition and protection such organisations 
should be granted seems to be the cause of some difficulty 
to the Government. Representatives of the native workers 
have claimed full recognition under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, but the chances of such being granted 
seem rather remote. It is necessary, therefore, that some 
modified form of recognition should be aimed at in the 
interim ... Where circumstances permit, he [African worker] 
should be al lowed direct representation to or on those 
bodies that determine his working conditions. In cases 
where such is not possible, he should be represented 
thereat by a European. 47 
As it turned out, not even such "modified form of recognition" 
was to be allowed the black trade unions. Within three years of 
Downes's moderately worded assessment, the SAT&LC had been 
plunged into a crisis from which it was not to recover - a crisis 
which went hand-in-hand with the changing political scene. 
The challenge to the established trade union movement posed by 
the entry of large numbers of Afrikaans-speaking white workers 
into industry was never adequately resolved by the unions 
affiliated to the SAT&LC. The craft unions for example had looked 
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with apprehension at the demands for easier entrance for 
Afrikaner workers to the skilled trades, and had not reacted 
adequately to the needs of semi-skilled whites in a variety of 
industries. 48 The failure of the Boilermakers and other metal 
unions to cater for the white workers at the expanding !SCOR 
works in the 1930s had led to the formation of the South African 
Iron and Steel Trades Association, soon to become the most 
formidable union adversary of the SAT&LC, after a short spell in 
its ranks. 49 The Mine Workers' Union, notoriously corrupt and 
coopted, was a major target for takeover by Albert Hertzog and 
his Hervormers after 1936, and duly fell to them in 1948. Unions 
in secondary industry catering for all grades of workers fared 
somewhat better. Solly Sachs's own Garment Workers' Union (GWU) 
achieved considerable success in gaining the adherence of a 
generation of Afrikaner women who were to take over the 
leadership of the Union after Sachs's own banning in 1952. But 
even the GWU was not without its turbulence after 1944 in 
particular, and its Germiston branch was generally regarded as 
a stronghold of anti-Sachs and pro-National Party sentiment. As 
Lewis has argued, the white, and often Afrikaans-speaking, 
constituency for which unions like the GWU catered in the 1930s 
and 1940s had dwindled dramatically by the 1950s, becoming a 
smal 1 minority compared to the coloured, Indian and in some cases 
African membership. 50 The urban white working class did not so 
much take over the trade unions in secondary industry after the 
1940s as move out of them into preferred, higher status non-union 
jobs. 
The planned assault on the established trade unions under the 
aegis of Afrikaner nationalist organisations such as the 
Nasionale Raad van Trustees, the Blankewerkersberskermingsbond 
and other less influential bodies was to have only 1 imi ted 
success. Actual takeovers were 1 imi ted to a handful of cases, the 
Mine Workers' Union being the most significant. New unions such 
as Die Spoorbond, and later, the Blanke Bouwerkersvakbond, the 
South African Iron and Steel Trades Association, were more 
successful in establishing a union presence than the machinations 
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of the nationalist intelligentsia such as Hertzog and P.J.Meyer. 
Of the greatest significance, however, was the less dramatic but 
more inexorable influence of demography, as the greater numbers 
of Afrikaans-speaking white workers in al 1 spheres of the economy 
slowly penetrated the citadels of the immigrant trade unionists, 
taking over the leadership of old established unions one after 
the other. However, for the moment, the highly visible and 
publicised activities of the Hervormers and their like presented 
the most urgent problem for the SAT&LC in the 1940s. Again, the 
SAT&LC had frequently debated the issue at its Annual 
Conferences, with little concrete outcome. The outbreak of war 
had temporarily submerged the issue as the pro-war school gained 
ascendancy in the union movement. By 1944 the problem was again 
recognised to be acute. The SAT&LC responded by appointing a 
full-time organiser in Pretoria, and establishing a bilingual 
magazine, Ambag, to propagate "true trade unionism". 51 
In 1944, after fruitless attempts had been made to form a trade 
union federation for white workers alone, 52 the South African 
Iron and Steel Trades Association under L.J. van den Berg decided 
to affiliate to the SAT&LC, "because in all probability a great 
labour crisis is facing this country". 53 The presence of the 
SA Iron and Trades Association in the SAT&LC was to provide the 
right-wing grouping with a focus which it had hitherto lacked. 
The ending of hostilities robbed the left of the impetus which 
had bui 1 t up as the USSR repel led the German invasion and 
guaranteed an Allied victory; the return of large numbers of 
servicemen who could not immediately find jobs presented the 
unions with a discontented constituency. The aftermath of the 
African Mine Workers' Strike of 1946 had left the union movement 
in disarray while heightening fears among whites of Communist 
Party encouragement of black militancy. The gathering of 
unionists for the SAT&LC conference in 1947 took place under the 
published threat of withdrawal by Solly Sachs's Garment Workers' 
Union should "a handful of reactionary officials" succeed, as in 
the past, in retaining the card vote for election to the NEC. His 
union would then go to the workers with "a clear, progressive, 
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mi 1 i tant, national trade union pol icy" . 54 
Sachs's challenge was totally counter-productive. The SAT&LC's 
President, A.J.Downes, led off with an Address which summed up 
no doubt the mood of those unionists who had listened with 
antipathy when Sachs had proposed his anti-war motion at the 
beginning of the decade: 
Unfortunately, the leaders, or spokesmen, of some of our 
unions, a proportion of which appear to be more concerned 
with foreign ideologies, or political attachments of 
various kinds, than with true trade unionism, seem to be 
always impatient at the apparently slow progress we make, 
and are constantly vilifying those of the more responsible 
and practical of our leaders ... The so-called "militant" 
elements are constantly making demands of an extravagant 
and drastic character which most of the responsible leaders 
of the Movement are not prepared to support; demands which 
are not only impossible of realization within our lifetime 
- because of our political and economic structure - but 
which, by their constant iteration and reiteration, 
discourage and disgust those elements of the community 
outside the trade union movement who are genuinely desirous 
of raising the standard of life of our poorer sections ... It 
is with much regret that I make these remarks and thus give 
official publicity to a state of affairs which most of you 
have been aware of for quite a long time the deep 
cleavage of outlook and pol icy between the elements at 
present comprised within the Council. I have done my best, 
as your President, for several years to bring the main 
contending elements together •.. in the real interests of 
the whole working-class movement ... But the task is really 
becoming an impossible one. The one group will have nothing 
less than full social, political and economic equality for 
all, whereas the other group - the more responsible and 
realistic group - are content to continue the policy of 
moderation and gradualness towards a reasonable 
• 
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objective ... 55 
The speech indicated the degree of hostility which had 
accumulated between the left and the established leadership over 
the course of the decade, and its tone helps explain the 
unwillingness of trade unionists such as Downes a few years later 
to come unstintingly to the aid of fellow trade unionists banned 
in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act by the National 
Party government. The breach presaged by the fusillades between 
Sachs and Downes did not however immediately materialise. The 
split instead came from the right, in the shape of van den Berg 
and the Pretoria unions. With George McCormick of the 
conservative mining union, the South African Engine Drivers 
Association, seconding, van den Berg moved that membership of the 
SAT&LC be restricted to unions registered in terms of the 
Industrial Conci 1 iation Act; essentially, a move to bar the 
affiliation of African unions. 11 ••• his union was no longer 
prepared to allow the existing set-up of the Council to remain", 
declared van den Berg. "They had attended Conferences for a few 
years and found each time that a considerable number of 
resolutions adopted were nothing less than communistic 
propaganda. That would not be possible if the Native who were 
accepted by a certain section at present were not allowed to 
affiliate to the Council". 56 On a card vote, the motion was 
defeated heavily by 88, 497 votes to 36, 373. But two major 
artisan-dominated unions, the Building Workers Industrial Union 
and the Boilermakers, voted in favour of the motion, and the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the South African 
Typographical Union abstained. 57 The position of these four 
important unions on the issue showed that the defeat of the 
motion by no means carried with it the support of the SAT&LC's 
key white-dominated affiliates. 
Van den Berg's union and four other predominantly Afrikaner 
unions announced their withdrawal from the SAT&LC after the 
defeat of the motion. They issued a statement declaring that "We 
are convinced that the delegates of trade unions to the annual 
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congress do not truly represent the views of the white workers 11 , 
and stated their intention to consider forming another trade 
union federation. 58 Had it stopped there, this split of the 
five unions from the SAT&LC would not have been unduly momentous. 
But the next three years were to indicate that the old uncertain 
accommodation of left and right in the same trade union 
federation was no longer viable. With that, the hopes of the 
SAT&LC to develop into the one national centre for organised 
labour in South Africa were irrevocably destroyed. 
Division and Dissolution, 1947-1954 59 
Continuing divisions, shifting union allegiances and the 
increasing isolation of the former core of the trade union left 
were to mark the next seven years before the SAT&LC was finally 
laid to rest. The most significant change which was to influence 
the fortunes of the trade unions came however not from within, 
important though the internal dynamics were, but from outside. 
The coming to p9wer of the National Party government was to 
recast in fundamental ways the environment within which trade 
unionism in South Africa functioned. If any single factor must 
be considered as the main candidate for the role of assassin as 
regards the SAT&LC, then it must surely be the policies of the 
new government, as the previous Chapter has attempted to outline. 
For the fact of the matter is that the compromise on which the 
unity of the SAT&LC rested was incompatible with the anti-
communist and radically segregationist character of the National 
Party of the time. In this sense, this account argues, in 
contrast to Jon Lewis, that it was the political factor rather 
than the "material" element of changes in industrial practice 
which was the determining cause of the SAT&LC's downfall. 
The Pyrrhic victory of the SAT&LC left to which reference was 
made earlier in the Chapter occurred in 1948. During the Annual 
Conference of that year, shortly before the general election 
which brought the National Party to power, the industrial unions, 
161 
with the help of a few of the larger conservative unions, the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union in particular, were able to carry 
a motion reconstituting the manner in which the NEC of the 
organisation was elected. 60 The new provisions for the election 
of the NEC resulted for the first time in a roughly equal 
division of strength between the left and the right on the NEC. 
The right's willingness to cooperate, or at least co-exist, with 
the left in previous years had been predicated on the former's 
ability to dominate the NEC at will. The new dispensation 
weakened the basis for such co-operation accordingly. The 
conservative unions were to prove distrustful of association with 
a body whose left-wing element could often dictate the tone. As 
if to seal the left' s victory, the motion introduced by the South 
African Engine Drivers' Association, cal 1 ing again for the 
restriction of the SAT&LC to registered unions, was 
overwhelmingly defeated on a card vote. However, unlike in the 
previous year, the Boilermakers and the Woordworkers were joined 
by the Typographical Union and the Electrical Workers in their 
support of the motion. 61 This shift in the stance of major 
artisan unions boded ill for the future of the SAT&LC. 
Immediately after the Conference, the Mine Workers' Union 
disaffiliated. It was not to return. Further splits were delayed 
by the change of government in May 1948. The new Minister of 
Labour soon made clear his government's policy on trade unionism, 
to the concern of both the left and the major artisan unions in 
the SAT&LC. 62 An interview with the Minister was arranged, at 
which the SAT&LC delegation communicated its opposition to trade 
union segregation and government intervention in trade union 
affairs. The Minister in response was quick to seize on the one 
critical issue on which the SAT&LC could muster no unanimity: 
namely, the question of African unionisation, "and particularly 
those who may have only recently entered the industrial life of 
the country from their respective reserves". The delegation 
floundered in reply, and was informed of the government 1 s 
intention to appoint a commission of enquiry into industrial 
legislation. 63 The government's attitude to the standing of 
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the SAT&LC was neatly summed up in an editorial in Die Transvaler 
shortly after the election victory. Putting the question "On 
whose behalf does it speak?n, the editorial stated: 
Wat die Vak- en Arbeidsraad ook te se mag he, van een feit 
sal hy nie kan wegkom nie. Dit is nl. dat hy nie namens die 
oorgrote meerderheid van die Afrikaanssprekende werkers en 
'n groat deel van die Engelssprekende blanke werkers kan 
praat nie. Sulke vakbondlede het altyd heftig beswaar 
gemaak teen die beskerming wat die Vak- and Arbeidsraad aan 
Kommuniste verleen en teen sy verontagsaming van die 
kleurskeidslyn ... Die vakbondwese in die Unie het 'n 
suiwering nodig wat di t sal bevry van die Kommunistiese 
element ... 64 
The SAT&LC were never able to get around these arguments: it 
could not convince its white worker members that a government 
which so insistently proclaimed its zealousnes on behalf of their 
sectional interests was in fact propounding a policy which was 
against those interests in the long-term, and that inclusiveness 
rather than exclusion was the historical direction which sooner 
or later would force itself upon the country's reluctant white 
population. And the fact that it was the communists who were the 
most vociferous champions of inclusiveness did not recommend it 
to many of those who nevertheless perceived that interracial 
solidarity was desirable in itself. 
The unravelling of the SAT&LC now proceeded rapidly. At the 1949 
Annual Conference of the organisation, McCormick re-introduced 
his motion to restrict membership to registered trade unions; it 
was defeated, but in deference to right-wing arguments the NEC 
was given greater discretionary power to decide whether or not 
a union applying for membership was actually a "bona-fiden one. 
65 In August 1949 the South African Typographical Union gave 
notice of its intention to disaffiliate. A special meeting of the 
the NEC of the SAT&LC was cal led to discuss this blow. Those 
present were unable to agree on precisely why the SATU had given 
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notice to disaffiliate, citing such reasons as the SAT&LC' s 
membership of the communist-inclined World Federation of Trade 
Unions, the acrimony between Solly Sachs and the SAT&LC's former 
secretary, the activities of local committees of the SAT&LC, and 
particularly that in the Western Province, where a Communist 
Party member, a Miss Podbrey, was felt to be overstepping the 
mark. But, as the NEC Chairman, J. D. F. Briggs, remarked, the 
decision of the SATU was "not a whim of a day but was the 
accumulation over a number of years of discontent amongst its 
members". 66 The "native question" was "the crux of the matter", 
argued one NEC member at another special meeting a week later. 
It was "the change in Government" which had precipitated most of 
the SAT&LC's difficulties, argued another. 67 
By the time of the 1950 Annual Conference, a further four unions 
had disaffiliated, including the South African Association of 
Municipal Employees and the Engine Drivers Association. The 
Conference debated the issue of African union affiliation, with 
a motion calling for the formation of a separate consultative 
committee for African unions and appropriate changes to the 
constitution. 68 This motion, a victory of the right, was 
however never implemented, having been referred to a sub-
committee of the NEC and being lost to sight under pressure of 
later events. 69 
The decisive rift in the SAT&LC was finally precipitated by the 
passage of the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. After 
passage of the Act, the NEC of the SAT&LC appointed a sub-
committee which was instructed to arrange support for trade 
unionists who might be affected by the measure. This sub-
committee, consisting of only one member sympathetic to the left, 
J. J. Venter of the Johannesburg Municipal Transport Workers' 
Union, drew up a report on general policy, containing a paragraph 
11 which stated that the sub-committee 
cannot concern itself with matters arising from political 
affiliations, either in the case of a union, officer, or 
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member. In other words, the Committee would not, for 
instance, defend the case of an avowed 'Communist• or who 
admits that he is a supporter of that particular political 
ideology, the legal point of view on this question is that 
such person would have no defense ... 10 
The left-wing members of the NEC, several of whom were facing 
potential action by the government against them in terms of the 
Act, objected vehemently, claiming that the Committee was pre-
judging who was or was not a Communist. For the right, Cliff 
Crompton of the Ironmoulders 1 Society asked " ... why should the 
Movement be called upon and its strength jeopardized by persons 
who openly fostered the ideology of Communism?" After bitter 
argument, the NEC agreed to reconstitute the Committee with three 
left-wing unionists to be included. 11 Operation of paragraph 11 
was suspended. Meanwhile, Solly Sachs, always one of the chief 
targets of the National Party al though not a member of the 
Communist Party for twenty years, had received a letter from the 
Liquidator appointed in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act 
notifying him of the minister 1 s intention to 1 ist him as a 
Communist, a "clear demonstration of the Fascist Police State in 
action", replied Sachs in an extensive defense of his life's work 
in the trade unions. 12 
In October 1950 the SAT&LC's respected President, Jim Calder of 
the South African Electrical Workers• Association, died, to be 
replaced by J.J.Venter, equally respected but known for his left-
wing sympathies. The event precipitated the final break which 
signalled the end of the SAT&LC 1 s effectiveness. By the end of 
1950 sixteen further unions had disaffiliated, including all but 
two (the Motor Industry Employees' Union and the Building 
Workers• Industrial Union) of the larger artisan-dominated 
unions. The left-wing was now in control of a severely truncated 
organisation. Most of the disaffiliated artisan unions later took 
part in a conference which resulted in the formation of the South 
African Federation of Trade Unions in 1951. (The SAFTU was to 
consist of artisan and mining unions. It too however found that 
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the foremost obstacle to the unity of its members was the issue 
of black workers in the unions.) 73 
The disaffiliation of so many of the SAT&LC' s traditional support 
base pushed the left into hasty concessions. Solly Sachs proposed 
at the NEC that the SAT&LC re-negotiate the re-affiliation of 
unions on the following basis: The SAT&LC to restrict itself to 
economic matters; Gontentious resolutions to be withdrawn from 
Conference agendas; and the NEC to be elected from agreed lists 
of candidates. In addition, Sachs said that thought could be 
given to the formation of separate black unions, al though he 
himself was opposed to the idea. 74 Only three small unions 
were to re-join the SAT&LC as a result of these proposals. Four 
special conferences organised by the SAT&LC between 1951 and 1953 
to protest against proposed legislation and to attempt to bring 
unions together again failed to achieve their purpose. Compared 
to its earlier days as the "Parliament of Workers", the SAT&LC 
now appeared as a spent force in practical politics, where an 
organisation's importance was measured by the amount of proven 
support among whites which it could muster. Shorn of its right-
wingers, the SAT&LC's proceedings were dominated by the left-
wing. In 1952 it called on voters to throw their weight behind 
the opposition to the National Party in the forthcoming general 
election. 75 The SAT&LC, confessed its general secretary, 
Dulcie Hartwell in 1953 to a group of visiting British trade 
unionists, was generally ignored by the government. 76 Its 
affiliated membership had sunk to fifty-one unions representing 
82,600 workers, compared to 111 with 184000 workers in 1947. 11 
Although the Garment Workers rallied to demonstrate against the 
final culmination of the bannning process on their leader, Solly 
Sachs, in 1952, there was nothing the SAT&LC could do to prevent 
the "purification" of the trade unions in terms of the Act. 
By 1954 the trade union movement had undergone seven years of re-
alignments and retreats. The Suid-Afrikaanse Ko-ordinerende Raad 
van Suid-Afrikaanse Vakunies, founded in 1948 by L. J. van den Berg 
and his followers in Pretoria, had emerged from small beginnings 
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to constitute the extreme right-wing pole of the union movement, 
which refused to have anything to do with other unions in which 
the principle of "European leadership" was not firmly entrenched. 
It had the ear of government and viewed itself as the only true 
representative of the white workers. The newly-created South 
African Federation of Trade Unions attempted to provide a home 
for a broader spectrum of unions catering mainly for artisans and 
mining workers, but was unable to reach consensus on the issue 
of "mixed" trade unions. For some members, such as the South 
African Typographical Union (SATU), their continued existence on 
an inclusive basis was of the highest importance, but this 
concern was not shared by other organisations in the Federation 
such as the al 1-whi te Artisan Staff Association or the South 
African Engine Drivers' Association. The Federation was thus 
consequently more shaky than its formidable grouping of the 
leading artisan unions suggested at first glance. The left too 
was divided, as it always had been, with the SAT&LC representing 
mostly registered trade unions, and the Council of Non-European 
Trade Unions, much shrunken in strength since the war years, 
representing the unregistered African trade union movement. 78 
Re-forging at least a semblance of the old unity between 
industrial and artisan unions however remained the hope of a 
number of leading white trade unionists. This possibility was 
given impetus in the early months of 1954 when the Department of 
Labour began to circulate drafts of the new Industrial 
Conciliation Bill to the unions. It was not only the rump of the 
SAT&LC which found some of the clauses in the draft Bill 
repugnant. A measure of self-interest combined with the old trade 
union ideology of earlier years propel led men such as Tommy 
Rutherford of the SATU and Tom Murray of the Bai lermakers towards 
attempting to bring together the compatible sections of the trade 
union movement. Convening a Unity Committee, these two, together 
with five other unionists, took the initiative in convening a 
Unity Conference of interested trade unions, just before the 
Second Reading of the Industrial Conciliation Bill in Cape Town. 
79 
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The Unity Committee proposed to create as wide as possible a 
basis of trade union support on an agreed programme of opposition 
to the new Bill. However, in order to do so, calculated the 
Committee, the extreme left and the extreme right of the trade 
unions would have to be excluded. The primary concern of the 
Committee was to attract some of the less dogmatic white unions 
to the proposed conference, even if it meant inviting George 
McCormick, towards whom many SAT&LC unionists felt considerable 
bitterness for his right-wing role in the union movement since 
the late 1940s. Rutherford, in a meeting with the NEC of the 
SAT&LC stated that the Ko-ordinerende Raad would not be invited 
to the conference. As far as McCormick was concerned, "Our only 
interest in having George is to ensure that those unions in the 
Federation come in on our side instead of the other side, led by 
George. The majority of the Federation is not with George. " 80 
With the imminence of the introduction of the Industrial 
Conciliation Bill to parliament, the Unity Committee was able to 
muster an impressive array of delegates for the Unity Conference 
in Cape Town from 3 to 6 May 1954. Some 261 delegates were 
present from 68 unions, representing 221, 526 members. 81 But 
neither African trade unions outside the SAT&LC nor the Ko-
ordinerende Raad had been invited to attend. Signficant figures 
from other right-wing unions were present: Goerge McCormick, Daan 
Ellis of the Mine Workers' Union, and representatives from some 
of the white railway unions. 
The Conference opened with its Chairman, Ben Caddy of the 
Bai lermakers' Society, warning that the passage of the Industrial 
Conciliation Bill would "cause immediate disintegration ... of 
our movement 11 • 82 This rhetorical flourish however could hardly 
conceal the fact that the movement as it had existed in the 1940s 
had already splintered into relatively cohesive components. What 
was possible was that the old unity of the SAT&TLC could perhaps 
be partially salvaged - at a cost. That cost was bluntly stated 
by Cliff Crompton of the Ironmoulders' Society: 
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Speaking frankly he considered that if it became necessary 
to discard the extreme right and the extreme left in the 
interest of the greatest unity ... that would have to be 
done. 83 
With the most prominent right-wing unions either opposing or 
abstaining, the Conference declared its opposition to such 
measures as the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Bill 
with regard to segregated unions, job reservation and further 
restrictions on the right to strike. By the passage of such 
resolutions, the Conference effectively demolished any lingering 
hope that some of the mining and railway unions would consider 
affiliation to the proposed new federation. What remained in this 
regard was the possibility of some formal liaison by way of a co-
ordinating body of federations, a suggestion by George McCormick 
which had been going the rounds of the trade unions since 1952. 
84 This proposal failed to gain much support, although it was 
later to provide the basis for the early years of the South 
African Confederation of Labour. 
The first Unity Conference closed with a call for greater unity 
in the trade union movement, and a resolve to continue the fight 
against the Industrial Conciliation Bill. While the Second 
Reading of the Bill was underway in the House of Assembly, Tommy 
Rutherford, Dulcie Hartwell and A.J.Downes lobbied MPs on behalf 
of the Trade Union Unity Committee. Their representations were 
welcomed by the United and Labour Parties, but predictably not 
by the National Patty. 85 What Rutherford and like-minded 
colleagues now envisaged was the establishment of a new trade 
union federation on the basis which the First Unity Conference 
had suggested was feasible. This step was relatively quickly 
accomplished. A Second Unity Conference was organised for 4 and 
5 October, which met and agreed upon the formation of a new trade 
union federation to be cal led the South African Trade Union 
Council. This conference was followed immediately by the Annual 
Conference of the SAT&LC. Reduced to 53 unions representing 77345 
workers, this, the last SAT&LC gathering, faced only one major 
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question: whether or not to advise its affilates to dissolve the 
organisation and to reconunend to them to join the SATUC. The 
arguments for and against the step were altogether familiar. For 
the left, Mrs C.H. le Grange of the National Union of 
Distributive Workers moved that: 
Having regard to the fact that the African workers 
constitute two-thirds of the South African labour force, it 
is evident that the establishment of a co-ordinating body 
on the lines of the South African Trades Union Council, to 
the exclusion of the African Trade Unions, can only have 
the effect of driving a deep and dangerous wedge between 
the European and Coloured workers, on the one hand, and the 
large mass of African workers on the other side. 86 
In reply, unionists such as L.C.( 11 Steve 11 ) Scheepers of the 
Leather Workers and Benny Weinbren of the Concession Store and 
Allied Assistents' Union pointed to the "cold facts" of the 
situation. In its 24-year existence, relatively 
unions had actually affiliated to the SAT&LC. 
few African 
87 It was, 
declared Weinbren, "Hobson' s choice", and the new federation 
would be accused of selling out African unions. However: 
Those who thought like speaker felt that to bring about a 
unity of 180000 workers, white, coloured, and Indian, will 
mean more to the movement at the present stage than a few 
thousand organised African workers. . . Whatever we wi 11 
benefit through unity, the African workers would also 
benefit in the end. 88 
Debatable as Weinbren's conclusion might have been, the 
underlying sentiments were shared by a majority of delegates. In 
a final card vote, 53,683 for and 23,412 against, the Conference 
resolved to dissolve the SAT&LC and to transfer its assets to the 
SATUC. 89 
Thus ended the life of the most representative of South African 
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trade union federations, a victim of an era of intensified white 
sectionalism and heightened racial segregation. Economic fears 
generated in the labour market were compounded by inextricably 
linked political and social issues. The centre could not hold. 
The two decades after 1954 were to be characterised by deep and 
seemingly unbridgeable rifts among the major groupings of 
organised labour: the white segregationists, the multi-racial 
unionists and the harassed, at times almost defunct, African 
trade union movement. 
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Addendum to Chapter 5: A Cluster Bloc Analysis of Voting at the 
SAT&LC Annual Conferences in the 1940s 
The divisions within the SAT&LC are here given a simple 
quantitative expression in the form of a cluster bloc analysis. 
90 The data used in this analysis are based on all eighteen card 
votes cast at the 1943, 1944 and 1947 Annual Confersnces of the 
SAT&LC. The figures in the Table represent the percentage 
agreement of each union which attended all three Conferences with 
every other union which also likewise attended. (To score, a like 
vote counted l; an unlike vote 0, and an abstention or absent 
paired with for or against 0.5.) The choice of years was limited, 
since records of card votes were only kept from 1940. In 
addition, to have included all card votes for the 1940s (besides 
vastly adding to the computations required) would have thinned 
out the number of unions attending conferences considerably below 
the total of 42 actually incorporated in this analysis. The aim 
was to strike a balance between the regular attenders at the 
Annual Conferences during the 1940s, and the total of unions 
which attended Conference at one time or another during this 
period. 
Several conclusions can be drawn, some of direct, others of more 
tenuous, relationship to the data presented in the Table. First, 
the analysis confirms the existence of two very cohesive voting 
blocs at the Annual Conferences of the SAT&LC. This conclusion 
could of course have been reached impressionistically by scanning 
the records of the card votes. The cluster bloc analysis gives 
more precise and rigorous form to it. In cluster bloc analysis 
an agreement rate of 80% or more has conventionally been taken 
to indicate the presence of underlying voting blocs. On this 
basis, all but eight of the unions included must be considered 
to be members of one or the other voting bloc. A more 
sophisticated statistical criterion, suggested by Willetts, is 
the likelihood that a particular agreement rate could be the 
result of chance. 91 On this basis, only four of the unions 
(numbers 28 to 31) could not be considered members of a voting 
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bloc. 
A second conclusion which can be drawn from the cluster bloc 
analysis rests upon the assumption that the eighteen card votes 
form a reliable sampling of the ideological stance of union 
delegations, which would then enable us to consider the cluster 
bloc analysis as an indicator of the position on a broad 11 left 11 
to "right" spectrum. This assumption seems reasonable, since the 
issues on which the card votes were taken were either the staple 
of ideological differences at the Annual Conferences of the 
SAT&LC (for example, the issue of African workers and their 
unions; trade union militancy) or were themselves the direct 
outcome of the split in the ranks of the SAT&LC unions (for 
example, the method of choosing the NEC; or the choice of 
secretary). And of course the delegates to the Annual Conferences 
themselves spoke of the dominance of the clash between left and 
right. We can thus consider the top bloc of unions (unions from 
1 to 27) to represent the "left" at the Conferences, and unions 
32 to 42 the "right". 
One corollary to this bloc structure as evident in the Table is 
the lack of a numerically strong centre. This point is of come 
interest, given the tendency for many delegates to refer to 
themselves as "moderates", as did for example the artisan 
leadership of the SAT&LC such as A.J .Downes. As a Special 
Correspondent reported in the 21 April 1944 edition of Forward: 
The overwhelming majority of Conference is Centre, with a 
very few real Right-wing Labori tes. If this essential 
characteristic were realised it would be much simpler for 
the Left wing to get their motions carried. 
But if one goes by the cluster bloc analysis, no such centre at 
the level of voting existed: what the correspondent refers to as 
Centre is nothing other than what emerges as the right-wing pole 
in the analysis. Or, to put the matter differently, at the level 
of voting which might imply a commitment to action (for example, 
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African representation on industrial councils, a fund for 
organising African workers), the self-styled "moderates" were not 
distinguishable from the "real" right-wing. 
Finally, consideration can be given to the underlying 
determinants of this apparent left/right division. In broad 
outline, H.J.Simons's generalisation seems to be correct in 
indicating the basic line of cleavage: " ... delegates of 'mixed' 
and non-European unions frequently find themselves in opposition 
to policies supported by representatives of craft and European 
unions". 92 Some refinement of the classification implied here 
is however necessary. The category "mixed" and "craft" overlap, 
as for example in the case of the South African Typographical 
Union, the Boilermakers' Society, and others which, while later 
to become all-white unions, had a "mixed" membership in the 
1940s. "Craft" unions are perhaps best cal led "white artisan-
dominated unions" for this reason, if not "pseudo-craft unions" 
as Lewis argues by reason of their admittance of large numbers 
of operative grade workers. 
With this modification, Simons's classification can be applied 
to the line-up of unions as they appear in the cluster bloc 
\ 
analysis. It is quite clear that the "right" bloc consists 
entirely of unions which can be labelled either white artisan-
dominated or exclusively white unions. The former category 
includes the South African Typographical Union, the Boilermakers, 
the Ironmoulders, while others in this bloc are exclusively white 
unions. What characterises this latter group of unions is that 
they are, for the most part, either in the public sector or in 
mining (the most regulated of private sector industries), and 
that they represent largely semi-skilled white workers. Thus the 
modal union here is the mining production union or the municipal 
transport union. We find foreshadowed here the labour alignments 
of the 1950s, with the all-white unions moving into the ranks of 
the Confederation of Labour, and the white artisan-dominated 
unions joining TUCSA or remaining unaffiliated. 
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Any explanation for the existence, nature and behaviour of the 
right bloc within the SAT&LC must rest on an understanding of the 
position of the white artisan and the white semi-skilled worker 
in South African society at the time. This is to state no more 
than the obvious. What might be worth pursuing are the diverse 
factors which determined the operating milieu of the various 
unions, and which had a strong conditioning influence on the 
behaviour and ideology of the union leaderships. For example, the 
long-standing lack of unity between the oldest white-only or 
white-dominated unions must surely be explained on the basis of 
the division between public and private sector, and their 
respective work practices and institutional arrangements for 
collective bargaining. 
Within the private sector, another influence which seems 
significant on the behaviour of the conservative unions seems to 
be their ability to enforce a strong closed shop. This factor may 
have lain behind the South African Typographical Union's 
resistance to white segregationist policy. Unions with less grip 
on entry to their trade, such as the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union, seemed in later years to have had less interest in 
maintaining their "mixed" registration and split into racial 
sections after 1956. 
Turning now to the left bloc, it is evident that most of the 
unions found there in the cluster bloc analysis conform to 
Simons' s criteria of "mixed and Industrial" unions, or what later 
writers such as Greenberg and Lewis have referred to as the "open 
industrial" or "non-racial industrial" unions. Noticeable however 
is the absence of large numbers of African unions, which despite 
right-wing rhetoric never entered the SAT&LC en masse. Noticeable 
too is the presence in the left bloc of what might be termed 
"deviant" unions" unions whose characteristics would make one 
expect that they would have aligned with the right bloc. The two 
examples here are the Motor Industry Employees' Union, and the 
Johannesburg Transport Workers' Union, the former a white 
artisan-dominated union, the latter a de facto (though not de 
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jure) union of white bus drivers and conductors. The deviance of 
these unions can readily be explained by their leadership - Carl 
Rerun of the MIEU and J.J.Venter of the JMTWU. By the 1960s both 
of these unions had acquired new leaders and predictably lost 
their left-wing patina. 93 Rank-and-file white workers unaware 
for the most part of the proceedings of the SAT&LC (and indeed 
often of their union) left their officials with wide discretion 
in conducting themselves at the SAT&LC's Annual Conferences. The 
modal profile of the left bloc union which emerges from the 
cluster bloc is more or less as follows: an interracial 
industrial union, with a smaller membership than the right bloc 
unions, catering for mainly lesser-skilled workers in 1 ight 
secondary and tertiary sectors. Such unions were most likely to 
provide scope for what one SAT&LC President referred to as the 
group of "Communists and near-Communists". 
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Chapter 6: The Registered Trade Unions 
under Apartheid 
With the dissolution of the SAT&LC in 1954 and the establishment 
of the South African Trades Union Council (TUC), the trade union 
movement seemed set on a path not far removed from the one 
travelled until 1948. One major overarching trade union 
federation returned as the largest single grouping of trade 
unions in South Africa (40 unions with an affiliated membership 
of 147 337 workers, as of early 1955). 1 Its dominant leadership 
element was drawn once again from the "moderates" of the main 
white artisan-dominated trade unions, with Tommy Rutherford of 
the South African Typographical Union as President of the TUC. 
Much in the official policy of the Council ran counter to the 
segregationist thrust of the government and to the outlook of 
probably a majority of white South Africans. The TUC appealed 
to "the fundamental principles of trade unionism", and supported 
the general strategy of racially mixed unions applying the "rate 
for the job". 2 Coloured and Indian (but not now African) 
unionists took their place alongside the white leadership, and 
such things as the Council's racially mixed annual conferences 
remained a relatively unusual feature of public life in the 
country. 
But the problem remained: how would this mixed union federation 
succeed in its goals in an environment which had hardly altered 
in its hostile features (except for the worse)? Could the new 
TUC work constructively in the same fields which had cracked the 
SAT&LC? Or was the TUC, now that the organisation had been 
purged of its most outspoken left-wingers and its small group of 
African unionists, not going to be merely a tamer reflection of 
its predecessor? And what was to be the role of the explicitly 
segregationist trade unions which had broken with the SAT&LC in 
1948 to form their own union federation? 
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The TUC and the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1954-1960 
The first two years of the TUC's existence were dominated by the 
fruitless efforts of the leadership to persuade the government 
to amend its proposed Industrial Conciliation Bill. Much time 
was spent by the Council's President (Rutherford), General 
Secretary (Dulcie Hartwell) and Trustee (Tommy Murray) in 
meetings with ministers and parliamentarians, and in speaking to 
unionists around the country about the measure. A petition was 
twice handed in. to parliament asking for permission to address 
the House of Assembly about the proposed law; predictably it was 
not granted. On 9 and 10 March, 1955, TUC representatives gave 
evidence to the Select Committee on the Industrial Conciliation 
Bill which had been appointed to consider possible amendments 
after the second reading. A first Annual Conference of the 
Council, held in Cape Town in May 1955, recorded its approval of 
these efforts, and confirmed the interim leadership in office. 
As President, Rutherford was the most prominent figure from the 
Council involved in the fight against the bill. He gave the 
opposition by the Council to the proposed Act a distinctive cast. 
A man who mirrored, perhaps more than he was aware, the equivocal 
political attitudes of English-speaking South Africans, 
Rutherford combined strains of mild socialism and non-racialism 
with the sectional protectionist instincts of the craft unionist. 
He was very evidently concerned to counter National Party attacks 
on mixed trade unions as undermining the status and security of 
white workers. Indeed, in his enthusiasm he sometimes produced 
arguments which accorded ill with the moderate non-racialism that 
was the essence of the TUC's outlook on South African society. 
Thus Rutherford attacked job reservation, for example, as a 
danger to the established standards of white workers, and claimed 
that the government was doing little to prevent the increasing 
utilisation of cheap African labour. 
"You cannot have failed to notice", he declared to a conference 
of the Boilermakers' Union in November 1955, "the amount of 
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skilled and operative work which is passing into the hands of 
Native workers". 3 And to the Select Cammi ttee on the Industrial 
Conciliation Bill, to which he gave evidence in March 1955 as a 
TUC spokesman, Rutherford stated that his own mixed union, the 
SATU, had actually succeeded in confining the numbers of Indian 
printing journeymen in Natal to a handful. 4 The TUC President 
was thus apologetic when he addressed the 1956 Annual Conference 
of the organisation: 
You will have noticed that all our representations 
have been confined almost entirely to the economic 
consequences which will flow from the provisions of 
the measure and that the great moral injustice which 
is being inflicted on the non-white workers has been 
soft-pedalled. The reason for that policy was not 
dictated by our lack of sympathy for the moral rights 
of our non-white members but because any other policy 
would have been an utter waste of effort at the 
expense of our other arguments. We knew that any 
contention that the non-white workers were not getting 
a square deal as far as human rights are concerned 
would not impress the Government in the slightest 
degree. 5 
In 1955 Rutherford proposed to his NEC as "a matter of tactics" 6 
that the new Minister of Labour, Jan de Klerk, be asked to drop 
the clause from the Industrial Conciliation Bill permitting the 
splitting of mixed unions on racial lines, and in addition that 
he be requested to introduce the job reservation provisions 
contained in Clause 77 of the Bill in an entirely separate 
measure. This tactical ploy was an ingenious (and expedient) 
attempt to achieve the removal of the Bill's two clauses to which 
the Council had the most objection. It was, in particular, an 
attempt to achieve the dropping of the government's plan to al low 
the splitting up of unions on racial lines. Quite plainly, the 
leadership of the major mixed unions feared for the integrity of 
their organisations if exposed to the statutorily supported 
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"plundering" of their unions (as they viewed it) by racially 
inspired minorities, white or coloured. In return, Rutherford 
proposed that the government should be informed that the Council 
would go along with the provisions in the new Bill requiring that 
mixed unions have separate branches for each racial group, and 
that segregated meetings of members be held. 
However, the intention of the proposal was also transparently 
clear to de Klerk, and he had little difficulty in making some 
political capital out of the TUC's offer, while still retaining 
the contentious clauses in the Bill. 7 Rutherford could only 
utter dire warnings about the effect of the Bill on the white 
worker; his concern was not convincing. The TUC's NEC did make 
desultory efforts to arouse white trade union opinion against the 
Bill 8 but the rank-and-file white workers in the TUC's 
affiliated unions showed no great interest or concern in the 
whole controversy, and the Council's call to militant opposition 
rang very hollow. Of this fact the government was well aware, 
having never considered the unionists in the TUC and its 
predecessor the SAT&LC the most accurate guide to the attitudes 
of the white working class. Again Rutherford and his colleagues 
visited Cape Town on the 1956 parliamentary session, lobbied MPs 
and counselled the opposition MPs during the debates on the Bill 
in the House of Assembly. But with the government intent on 
getting the measure for which it had waited eight years, the Bill 
proceeded through both chambers with the weight of the 
government's majority behind it. The anxious union leaders in 
the TUC could only wait and watch the outcome in terms of 
segregated trade unions and racially reserved occupations. 
In the event, the twin impact of job reservation and union 
segregation was not as severe as some TUC unionists had 
anticipated. One sweeping job reservation determination did 
appear in 1957, reserving most jobs in the clothing industry for 
whites. Given the preponderance of coloured, Indian and African 
workers in the industry, the determination was plainly no more 
than a declaration of the government's intent to provide the 
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white workers with at least symbolic reassurance of its concern 
for their position in the labour force. The Garment Workers' 
Unions, with the support of the TUC carried out a strikingly 
successful stay-at-home campaign among coloured clothing workers 
whose jobs had been officially declared "white" by the 
determination. The resultant paralysis of the industry 
demonstrated the indispensability of the large coloured and 
Indian work-force. A later court decision in a case brought by 
the Garment Workers' Union invalidated the determination on the 
grounds that the Minister in issuing the determination had not 
applied his mind. But the victory was short-lived. In 1959 an 
amending bill to the Industrial Conciliation Act was introduced; 
one of its sections conferred wider powers regarding the drafting 
of determinations reserving work on racial grounds, and further 
challenge to job reservation in the courts was no longer 
effective. 9 
Nevertheless, the subsequent career of job reservation was a more 
1 imi ted one than that suggested by the di re warnings of TUC 
leaders in the mid-1950s. Its operation on a statutory basis was 
largely confined to semi-skilled pockets of employment, and by 
the 1970s most determinations were honoured largely in the 
breach. The cry of "job reservation" remained however an 
important symbol, and a shorthand device which reflected wider 
ideological currents within the trade union movement, as has been 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
The expectation of racial fissures among trade unions after 
passage of the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act was by no means 
unjustified, though the splits which did occur were perhaps fewer 
in number, and slower in coming, than both government and TUC 
unionists had foreseen. There were fairly rapid divisions in 
some of the furniture and building workers unions (although not 
in all of them). Two major white artisan-dominated unions, the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union and the Motor Industry Employees 
Union split - probably the major unions of their kind to do so. 
But around two-thirds of the mixed unions existing before passage 
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of the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act remained intact though 
most of them were forced to comply with the requirement for 
separate racial branches and meetings, and for all-white 
executives. The success of major unions such as the South 
African Typographical Union and the Boilermakers' Union in 
retaining their mixed membership was important in enabling the 
kind of moderate non-racialism typifying the TUC to survive into 
the 1970s, despite agitation against mixed unions from both right 
and left in South Africa. 
The emergence of the TUC in 1954 had been testimony to the 
impulses both toward unity and disunity within the South African 
trade union movement. The TUC' s success had been in encompassing 
the still numerically dominant centre and its attendant 
scattering of mainly English-speaking liberal to moderate 
unionists, to whom the idea of "the Movement" was integral to the 
very existence of trade unions. The fissures ran deep and wide, 
however, both to the right, and to the left. This chapter turns 
now to a consideration of the TUC' s relationships with these 
other trade union elements in the country during the 1950s. 
In the first place, let us consider how the TUC reacted to the 
growth of a new left-wing grouping after the demise of the SAT&LC 
in the 1950s. One of the major resolutions of the TUC's first 
Annual Conference in 1955 had declared the Council's intention 
of establishing a liaison committee for contact with African 
unions now excluded in terms of the TUC's constitution. 10 This 
decision had produced the fissure to the left at the Second Unity 
Conference and resulted in the formation of the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) This body brought together 
several of the left-wing unions which had formerly belonged to 
the SAT&LC and the mainly African unions which had made up the 
Council of Non-European Trade Unions. 
At the first Annual Conference of the TUC Rutherford stated that 
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the Interim NEC had not got anywhere in establishing liaison with 
African trade unions, "due to the attempt to establish the South 
African Congress of Trade Unions". Rutherford went on to say: 
"He was not seriously worried about this because he felt sure 
that the time would come when the African trade unions would 
appeal to this Council to set up that liaison. 1111 
Rutherford's remark reflected the low priority given by the TUC 
leadership at this time to maintaining close contact with African 
trade unions in particular, and with former left-wing colleagues 
in general. In part, it is likely that this was a reaction to 
the suspicion of lingering Communist influence among these left-
wingers. (Piet Beyleveldt, first chairman of the SACTU, was 
indeed a member of the now illegal Communist Party, as were other 
leading figures in the organisation.) 12 SACTU activists 
likewise distrusted their former colleagues who now were gathered 
under the umbrella of the TUC, feeling that they had betrayed the 
cause of non-racial trade unionism. Not surprisingly, the 
relationship between the TUC and SACTU was never warm. The 
former would have preferred to have been completely disassociated 
from SACTU' s disreputable radical ism and suspected Communism, and 
was well aware that the occasional SACTU overtures were largely 
an attempt to share some of the TUC's relative public 
respectability. Both the TUC and SACTU were rivals for the 
allegiance of the small group of African trade unionists. While 
SACTU could in fact count on the support of the majority of these 
unionists - which other body was as militant in support of 
African workers? - a number of black unionists resented the 
Communist influence in SACTU and looked to TUC unionists for 
guidance and support. The outcome was to be the disaffiliation 
of the largest African trade union in South Africa, the National 
Union of Clothing Workers, from SACTU and the formation of the 
Federation of Free African Trade Unions in opposition to 
SACTU. 13 
SACTU itself perceived the vulnerabi 1 i ty of the major mixed 
unions in the TUC to accusations of white dominance of the 
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coloured and Indian membership given the new requirement of all-
whi te executives in terms of the 1956 Industrial Conciliation 
Act. 14 The organisation therefore embarked on a campaign to 
break up the mixed unions by calling on coloured and Indian 
unionists to exercise their rights under the Act to separate from 
the mixed union. The strategy led Rutherford to remark in 1958 
that: "We now have the paradoxical situation of the Government 
and the left-wing elements both sponsoring complete apartheid in 
the trade union movement." 15 But the SACTU had no success, 
since none of the major mixed unions were broken up in response 
to their campaign. Much to the irritation of radicals, most 
coloured and Indian unionists retained an unshaken faith in the 
integrity of their white TUC leadership, or at least found the 
SACTU course of action inexpedient. 
Throughout this early period, the major concern of the TUC's 
leadership was not in fact with closer contact with the now 
excluded African unions and the left-wing, but with the major 
white unions and federations which had remained outside the TUC 
at its formation in 1954. There were three main groups here: the 
white railway unions, members of the Federal Consultative 
Council; the South African Federation of Trade Unions (which 
included the white mining production unions and the South African 
Association of Municipal Employees, together with smaller unions 
in furniture, meat retail and explosives); and the Koordinerende 
Raad, dominated by the large Pretoria-based union, the Iron and 
Steel Trades Association with L. J. van den Berg as general 
secretary. The failure of attempts to unite these unions with 
those in the TUC had led to suggestions that the impossibility 
of close association be recognised, and that a federation of 
federations be formed in order to maintain looser contact and co-
operation. At a meeting in January 1955 representatives of the 
TUC agreed with delegates of these other groups that a need for 
such a body existed, and decided that discussions on its 
formation should be continued. 16 The proposal only bore fruit, 
however, once the passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act had 
removed the major bone of contention from the arena, and in 1957 
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talks on the subject were resumed. The issue provided the 
leadership of the TUC with something of a dilemma. Rutherford 
himself was a strong advocate of closer relations with these 
unions outside the TUC He argued in 1956 that: 
You may well ask what should our future relations be 
with those organisations who showed so little concern 
for the well-being of their fellow-trade unionists in 
the mixed trade unions we must not allow our 
natural feelings of resentment to get the u~per hand. 
Within the ranks of these organisations are to be 
found some stalwart trade unionists who find 
themselves in the minority and have to abide by the 
decisions of the majority, which, in turn, includes 
many members of these hostile organisations who are in 
complete ignorance of the fact that they have been 
parties to undermining the welfare of their fellow 
trade unionists in the mixed trade unions. 11 
In May 1957 the TUC reached tentative agreement that it should 
participate in the proposed body, to be called the South African 
Confederation of Labour, and having as affi 1 iates only trade 
union federations and not trade unions directly. These 
federations were the TUC, the FCC, the KR and SAFTU. The TUC 
envisaged that "on matters on which this Council agrees with the 
other bodies, there shall be a loose co-ordination. 1118 After 
discussions among the four federations had ended in agreement on 
a draft constitution, the NEC of the TUC voted 15 to 7 to approve 
the Council's participation in the Confederation "subject to the 
approval of the next Annual Conference. 1119 This Annual 
Conference approved the NEC's decision in March 1958, but with 
the following reservations: 
(i) that each participating organisation 
had a right of veto on any decision of 
the Confederation; 
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(ii) that the Confederation should not be 
registered in terms of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act; 
(iii) that all statements issued in the 
name of the Confederation should 
be jointly approved; 
(iv) that the TUC should immediately withdraw 
from the Confederation should the above 
conditions not be respected. 20 
On this basis, the TUC proceeded to participate in the affairs 
of the Confederation. It soon became clear, however, that the 
other parties to the Confederation had not seen the role of the 
Confederation in quite the same light as the TUC. Nor had they 
agreed to meet the TUC's reservation regarding the functioning 
of the organisation. A dispute soon arose over the question of 
the registration of the Confederation in terms of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. Such registration would not in fact have made 
any significant difference to the status of the organisation, but 
some delegates appear to have felt that it would set the seal on 
the representative nature of the Confederation in the eyes of the 
government, and would have bestowed upon it the position of 
organised labour's official spokesman on matters of national 
concern. Such a view was anathema to the TUC delegates other 
than Rutnerford, since they felt that the TUC was the main 
candidate for the nation's premier labour body. They had entered 
the Confederation in the hope of winning converts to their own 
point of view, rather than with the intention of establishing a 
new super-body to which the Council would take a back seat. When 
the registration issue was brought up at a meeting of the 
Confederation, the TUC attempted to apply what it understood to 
be its right of veto on the matter. The chairman of the meeting, 
Johan Liebenberg, president of the Artisan Staff Association, 
upheld the use of the veto; a majority vote of delegates resulted 
however in overturning his ruling and affirming the intention of 
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the Confederation to apply for registration. 
This development clearly constituted a breach of the TUC 
Conference resolution on participation in the Confederation. The 
NEC decided to refer the issue to a special conference of the 
Council, which met in Durban in September, 1958. (The Conference 
was called for the further purpose of considering the proposed 
amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act which the Minister 
of Labour had made public.) In a day of debate on the issue, 
delegates to the conference made clear that they were, in the 
great majority of cases, altogether opposed to further 
participation in the Confederation. Delegates advanced a number 
of arguments. One unionist charged the members of the 
Confederation (other than the TUC) with "anti-non-European 
attitudes". Tom Murray of the Boilermakers, moved in part 
perhaps by the long-standing hostility between his union and Van 
den Berg's Iron and Steel Trades Association, stated that in the 
Confederation "certain other elements we have associated with 
were trying to destroy us". One re-iterated theme arose out of 
the differing position of the majority of Confederation unions 
(which operated in the public sector) and TUC affiliates, all of 
whom were in the private sector. Unions belonging to the 
Confederation were in "sheltered employment", claimed one 
delegate. Cliff Crompton of the Ironmoulders based his 
opposition on the refusal of Confederation unions to embrace the 
"rate for the job". 21 
The TUC's president, Rutherford, thus found himself in relative 
isolation when he argued in favour of continued participation in 
the Confederation. With only a couple of delegates supporting 
his stand, Rutherford argued that: 
Among the parties to the Confederation, van den Berg 
and his group were wholly in favour of job reservation 
and the new amendments to the Industrial Conciliation 
Act and opposed to "the rate for the job". Ellis (of 
the Mine Workers Union) was in agreement with van den 
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Berg Liebenberg, while accepting that job 
reservation was necessary in certain circumstances, 
wanted it done by a judicial body, and not by the 
Government It was most essential that contact be 
maintained with these dissenting groups if they were 
to be converted from job reservation .... If the Trade 
Union Council isolated itself from other groups of 
workers, it would open the door to these other people 
holding different views to step in and convert workers 
away from "the rate for the job" to job reservation 
22 
Despite their President's plea, most delegates voted to halt the 
Council's participation in the Confederation. Rutherford 
himself, taking the vote as one of no confidence in his policies 
for the Council, resigned his office. His place as president was 
taken by R.F. Budd of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. The 
TUC's opening to the right had failed. 
In 1959 the Minister of Labour introduced major amendments to the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, aimed, among other things, at 
improving the implementation of job reservation and at 
discouraging the growth of African trade unions. Predictably, 
the protests of the TUC were ignored; the measure was passed. 
In the first five years of its existence, the TUC could look back 
at an almost unbroken run of failure in its resistance to 
government policies. 
The contrast with the unions to the right of TUCSA could not have 
been greater. The Confederation, rid of TUCSA's dissident 
presence, relapsed into public inertia. The policies for which 
this grouping of trade unions stood were also those of 
government. Harmony of purpose prevailed, for the most part. 
While TUCSA underwent the familiar trauma of fission and failure 
over the African union issue, the unions allied to the 
Confederation for the most part had little to decry. The major 
exception, appropriately, given its stormy history, was the Mine 
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Workers' Union, which exploded into life in the mid-1960s when 
the existing MWU leadership agreed to a Chamber of Mines' 
proposal to experiment with changes in traditional labour 
practices in specified gold mines. Opposition among sections of 
the rank-and-file of the MWU to this move turned into open 
rebel 1 ion with the formation of an 11 Action Committee 11 which 
pledged to fight the existing leadership and to demand a return 
to the status quo, including a guarantee of the position of white 
blasting certificate holders. With strike action on the cards, 
the government appointed a commission of enquiry into the 
"experiment" , and agreed to its findings that the changes in 
labour practices should be discontinued. 23 It was a victory 
for the side of reaction, and brought to the fore a new and 
vigorous right-wing labour leader in the shape of P.J."Arrie 11 
Paulus, who from this time took over the position of trend-setter 
in right-wing labour circles. It confirmed too the sensitivity 
of government to anything which seemed possible to undermine its 
political base among white workers. 
The Confederation was to adopt a higher profile only from 1970 
onwards, in response to the divergent currents in right-wing 
circles which had been emerging since 1966, in Pretoria in 
particular. In 1970 the Confederation staged its first-ever 
National Conference, in which constitutional amendments were 
adopted allowing for the affiliation not just of federations but 
also individual trade unions. 24 The Conference was addressed by 
the Minister of Labour, Marais Viljoen, who spelled out, in 
careful language, a shift in government lebour policy which was 
unpalatable to the most fervent supporters of Verwoerdian 
apartheid within the Confederation. (See Chapter 4). The 
Conference was otherwise most notable for a debate on a motion 
by Johann Liebenberg of the Artisan Staff Association calling for 
a discussion on the issue of the labour shortages and the use of 
"available labour". 25 Liebenberg' s cautious plea for an open 
discussion of this critical issue received the response from 
Arrie Paulus that "if we want to suggest something, we must ask 
that all work be reserved for whites and then leave it up to the 
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relevant trade union to make concessions as at the present time". 26 
Liebenberg's motion was referred to the executive committee and 
the Confederation continued to ignore the need for a realistic 
appraisal of white labour's position in a rapidly changing 
environment. 
TUCSA's Return to Grace: African Unions Re-affiliate, 1961-1966 
The TUC had fought, and lost, the fight against the new 
Industrial Conciliation Act, and the amendments to it in 1959. 
The issues on which the Council had lost remained and rankled; 
numerous conference debates and resolutions over the coming 
decade were testimony to that. But from 1961 onwards the main 
focus of the Council's attention was upon a different issue: in 
fact an old issue for the trade union movement, but one now 
returned to prominence. And this was the question of African 
trade unionism. Should the TUC allow the affiliation of African 
unions, amending its constitution in order to do so? And, in 
many ways more important, should the TUC take active steps to 
promote the organisation of African workers, harnessing its own 
resources and putting its name behind such efforts? These were 
the two specific issues into which the African unionism question 
resolved itself in practice. To these the TUC was to be forced 
to give concrete answers in the 1960s. 
The exclusion of unregistered African trade unions from 
membership in the TUC in 1954 had not of course made the problem 
disappear. But under Rutherford the Council had shown no urgency 
in pursuing the issue. Moreover, the establishment of SACTU had 
rather pre-empted the field with regard to African unions 
immediately after 1954. Beginning in 1957, however, came 
external pressures which were to be instrumental in jolting the 
TUC from its rut. First came visits to South Africa by officials 
of the "Western" body, the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions. 27 ICFTU policy was to promote African trade 
unions, and its officials investigated the situation at first 
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hand in South Africa. Having become aware of SACTU's leanings 
towards the "Communist" rival to ICFTU, the World Federation of 
Trade Unions, these officials were unwilling to back the 
Congress, which was, in many ways, the most obvious candidate for 
support. Instead, it was decided that the TUC was the most 
appropriate non-Communist body to promote African unionism. In 
1959 ICFTU observers were present at the TUC Annual Conference 
in Durban; there they were gratified to witness delegates 
approving a resolution favouring the unionisation of African, 
workers. (Although they had been invited, the ICFTU officials\ 
declined a SACTU invitation to attend their national 
conference. ) 28 
The immediate upshot of these manoeuvrings was however the 
formation of a new African trade unions centre, the Federation 
of Free African Trade Unions, in 1959, rather than an 
organisation directly attached to the TUC. The latter does 
however appear to have backed FOFATUSA behind the scenes, 
possibly helping distribute ICFTU money to the new body. 29 
Further pressure on the TUC from overseas came from the 
International Labour Organisation, of which South Africa was a 
member, and to which it sent two South African trade unionists 
every year. International 1 inks such as these were clearly 
cherished by the leadership of the TUC, but their strength was 
being test.ea by mounting attacks from several quarters on South 
African labour practices and trade union restrictions. SACTU 
itself kept its overseas contacts supplied with relevant 
literature on the position in South Africa, and on the lack of 
militancy manifested by the TUC on the question of African trade 
unionism. And the entrance of independent black African nations 
to the councils of the ILO was to increase the number of attacks. 
The TUC made an attempt to grasp the nettle in public at its 1961 
Annual Conference. Here L.C. (Steve) Scheepers of the Transvaal 
Leather Workers Industrial Union (later in the conference to be 
elected president in the place of Budd) proposed the following 
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motion: 
That this Conference urges upon the Government to give 
recognition to African trade unions whose membership 
consists of urbanised Bantu. Such trade unions to 
function under the wing of the sister registered 
union. Where no such registered trade union exists, 
such unions to function under the supervision of the 
South African Trade Union Counci 1. 30 
The studied moderation of the motion suggested that it had been 
cooked up as a compromise to satisfy the more conservative unions 
in the TUC and to dispel notions of TUC radicalism in the eyes 
of the wider white public and the government. In his speech for 
the motion, Scheepers himself "contended that African trade 
unions attempting to operate on their own would not be a 
success. " 31 The general secretary of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, E.H. Mccann, supported the motion, but 
suggested that even it, cautious as it was, went too far. 
Government policy was against it, and "The African was currently 
more interested in overcoming the pass laws than in forming trade 
unions. He was a politician first and foremost ... 1132 For the 
majority of delegates, however, the motion was plainly 
regressive. In the words of J.C. Bolton of the Natal Garment 
Workers Industrial Union, " ... the TUC ... was rapidly following 
in the steps of the Government and failing to realise what was 
going on in South Africa and on the African Continent generally. 
We were out of step with the rest of the world in many ways. "33 
Faced with such delegate opposition, Scheepers withdrew his 
motion, claiming that he had introduced it in the first place 
"through sheer frustration" induced by the failure to persuade 
successive Governments to change their policy on African unions. 
A motion later in the Conference calling for full recognition of 
African trade unions was passed unanimously. 34 
In 1962 the TUC 35 finally took the plunge and voted to admit 
African unions as affiliates of the Council, on the 
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recommendation of the NEC. One reason for the switch to the pre-
1954 position was the pressure from the ILO on South Africa. The 
previous year 1 s delegate to the ILO conference from the TUC 
reported the attacks which had been made upon the South African 
position there. And Tom Murray, sponsor of the motion on behalf 
of the NEC, remarked that "if the Constitution of the Council was 
not amended in terms of the resolution, the credentials of the 
South African delegates would not be accepted at the ILO in 
June. n36 
The motion was opposed by delegates from three major white-
artisan-dominated unions, the AEU, the MIEU and the Ironmoulders 
(and, given its later position, it would appear by the South 
African Electrical Workers Association too.) For the AEU, Mccann 
asked: 
What could they do for their African friends by 
bringing them into the Council as affiliates that they 
could not do by liaison? .... He stood before this 
Conference, not as a member of the National Executive 
Committee, but as a representative of 19000 members, 
the majority of which were Afrikaans-speaking. He 
believed that in time they would convince the 
membership that the workers should all be united, 
irrespective of colour, but he did not think that time 
had arrived as yet. 37 
Crompton of the Ironmmoulders adopted his standard line of 
argument, one that he had used before, one that he was to use in 
a similar debate in 1972: the TUC 1 s policy, to which his union 
adhered, was to have mixed unions applying the rate for the job. 
Under present legislation Africans were not permitted to join 
established mixed unions. How then could the TUC give its 
blessing to separate unions for Africans, unions which might 
undercut the established standards of the unionised whites and 
coloureds? (Crompton himself was to sponsor what he himself 
termed a kind of job reservation at a later date, and his 
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position reflected the ambiguities in the official rate-for-job 
doctrine). 
Notwithstanding the arguments of these admittedly influential 
unionists, the mood of the conference majority was quite clearly 
in favour of approval of the motion. In this, the Conference 
probably did not differ from previous gatherings of the Council; 
perceptions of feasibility and counterpressures now combined to 
change the context of the situation. In the vote of the measure, 
the vote was 83 for the motion, 10 against with 9 abstentions. 38 
For most of the TUCSA delegates the passage of the motion 
signified a return to a position of principle which had only been 
abandoned eight years ago during a howling blizzard of 
expediency. The TUC had come in from the cold. But it remained 
to be seen why the events of 1947-1951 within the SAT&LC should 
not be repeated within TUCSA. 
For the moment, however, TUCSA pressed ahead on the new course. 
An African Affairs section was established (with some overseas 
financial aid that was to become a point of controversy later). 
This section employed several full-time workers under its head, 
Eric Tyacke, and provided a range of services and organisational 
efforts in support of existing small African unions or in order 
to establish new ones. The main thrust of the section was 
educational, providing a valuable organisational support for the 
small but expanding corps of African trade unionists who had no 
association with SACTU. 39 The decision to allow African union 
affiliation resulted in a dilemma for those African unions, 
mainly in FOFATUSA, who were likely to be interested in joining 
TUCSA. These unions were at first unwilling to abandon their own 
federation in favour of membership of TUCSA alone, and in order 
to accommodate them, the TUC had agreed to allow dual affiliation 
for African unions. Notwithstanding this concession, the NEC of 
TUCSA reported in 1964, FOFATUSA "for some obscure reason has not 
seen fit to co-operate as enthusiastically with TUCSA as was 
generally anticipated." 40 The TUC was alarmed by rumours of 
possible "political unionism" among FOFATUSA leaders (which may 
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have reflected the known Pan African Congress sympathies of some ' 
FOFATUSA unionists.) After an investigation, the NEC's mind was 
set to rest, and it concluded that "FOFATUSA was in all respects 
what it claimed to be - an organisation devoted exclusively to 
the economic welfare of members of its affiliated unions. " 41 It 
is in fact doubtful if FOFATUSA was in fact much more than a name 
for a small group of African trade unionists to whom SACTU's 
activities and stance were distasteful. 42 But it represented 
one hope, at least, of establishing a relatively respectable (in 
government eyes) body which could provide a common rallying point 
for African trade union leaders. These leaders were for the most 
part sympathetic to the TUCSA leadership and known to them. 
After this initial period of hesitancy, the FOFATUSA unions 
joined TUCSA and the former body faded quietly from the scene. 
But trouble arising from the African union decision was to be 
forthcoming from a different source, and a more predictable one. 
TUCSA's admission of African unions provided right-wing white 
unionists with a ready-made issue with which to agitate against 
TUCSA affiliates. The challenge, for the most part, appears to 
have come from Afrikaans-speaking unionists who were in 
competition with existing unions for white members, or who wished 
to split the existing unions to form bodies with a more overt 
white racialist stance. The first signs of difficulty came in 
the motor repair trade, where a splinter white union under a 
known right-wing Afrikaner nationalist had been struggling 
against the dominant Motor Industry Employees Union for some 
years. This union, the Blankemotorwerkersvereniging, had gained 
registration for the motor repair trade in the Brits area. (This 
union's efforts were rewarded when an amendment of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act in 1961 provided legal basis for the kind of 
splinter registration it sought) . 43 The Brits union seized upon 
the African union issue to embarrass the MIEU leadership in the 
eyes of its white membership. (The MIEU, formerly a mixed union, 
had been one of the organisations to split along racial lines in 
the late 1950s.) The MIEU leadership, which had voted against 
the 1962 TUCSA conference decision on African affiliation, was 
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understandably worried. At branch meetings throughout the 
country the issue was put to the Union's membership; the branch 
meetings were for retaining the TUCSA tie. 44 This outcome was 
naturally hailed as a major victory for the forces of reason 
within the movement, but the jubilation was premature. For one 
thing, branch meetings were notoriously a poor indication of 
rank-and-file opinion, given the poor attendance at them in most 
unions. There is no reason to think that the MIEU, with its 
scattered membership in garages throughout the urban areas, was 
any different from other unions in this regard, and hence any 
better in touch with grass roots feelings in this issue. And as 
events within a short time were to show, the issue was far from 
dead. But for the moment, TUCSA's leadership was able to 
congratulate itself on having navigated the first major threat 
to the unity of the organisation after the watershed of 1962. 
This leadership from the mid-1960s on was to remain firmly rooted 
in the traditional source of English-speaking trade union 
leadership - the artisan unions. In 1965 the forceful Arthur 
Grobbelaar became General Secretary of TUCSA, and remained so 
until his death in 1983. Grobbelaar was himself a boilermaker who 
had grown up during the Depression years and taken indentures in 
the trade. His personality and his office in the Secretaryship 
gave TUCSA a continuity of administration and - al though the 
twists and turns of the organisation's official line in the 
coming years seemed to belie it - an underlying basic pol icy 
committed to "true trade unionism", that is, open trade unions 
organising (in principle) all workers in a given occupational 
cateogry or industry. Working hand in hand with such TUCSA 
Presidents as Tommy Murray (General Secretary of the 
Boilermakers) and L. C. ( 'Steve' ) Scheepers of the Leatherworkers' 
Union, Grobbelaar became both the voice and the unofficial leader 
of TUCSA in the next decade and a half. 
Tommy Murray, newly elected President in 1965, returned to the 
theme of the growing presence of Africans in the work-force in 
his Address to the Eleventh Annual Conference of TUCSA. He 
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stressed the danger to the established trade unions posed by 
their inability to organise African workers, due to the statutory 
limitations imposed by the Industrial Conciliation Act: 
The registered trade unions are already speaking for 
an ever-decreasing minority. How much longer can we 
expect to be an effective force? Have we not already 
ceased to be an effective power in regulating wages 
except for those few people we are allowed to 
represent? 45 
This concern of Murray reflected the situation of the trade union 
official worried at the actual, or potential, decline of union 
power in the face of a shrinking white, coloured and Indian, 
proportion of the South African labour force. It was part of the 
dilemma of TUCSA's leadership that their offices at the helm of 
many of the nation's leading trade unions gave them an 
uncomfortable insight into the decline of their organisations as 
such, but that their ran~-and-file, more acutely conscious of the 
potential threat posed by the masses of African workers than of 
their union's plight, could hardly be brought to share this 
insight. 
Instead, pressure on TUCSA over its policy regarding African 
unions was to be renewed, with some rank-and-file agitation 
leading some union officials in TUCSA affiliates to re-consider 
their position. Faced with this agitation and public 
denunciation on the issue, TUCSA's house of cards began to creak 
under the winds of reaction. 
Once again, yet again: African Disaffiliation, 1966-1969 
In 1966 the Amalgamated Engineering 
internal agitation against the TUCSA 
co-ordinating body. Three years 
Union, bowing to vociferous 
link, disaffiliated from the 
later, TUCSA barred the 
affiliation of African unions. The connection between the 
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earlier action of the AEU and the later one of TUCSA was 
relatively direct: the AEU' s step precipitated a series of 
agonised debates within the Council whose upshot, though 
prolonged in coming, never really seemed in doubt in the light 
of past history. In a very real sense, it was 1947-1954 all over 
again. 
The withdrawal of the AEU, coupled with that of the MIEU even 
earlier, indicated that the white-artisan dominated unions were 
increasingly uneasy at the trend of events. Leaders in these 
unions were highly sensitive to the reaction of their rank-and-
file, and to the attitude of the authorities. At the Twelfth 
Annual Conference of the TUC at Durban in May 1966, Tom 
Rutherford of SATU took the lead in pressing the issue. He 
raised the question of the AEU's disaffiliation, and prompted a 
debate which he asked be held private. In a long fighting speech 
reminiscent of his period of office as President in the 1950s, 
Rutherford argued that TUCSA's position did not represent that 
of many white workers, who were fearful of the threat of 
competition for jobs from an organised African labour force. The 
disaffiliation of the AEU was a case in point. The TUC's policy 
was "correct in principle, but it has nevertheless proved to be 
most damaging." Among the problems cited by Rutherford: 
At present, representatives from the Typographical 
Union in Johannesburg go to the local Area Division 
Meeting and they find the majority of persons 
attending that Area Division are Africans ... 
In general, argued Rutherford: 
I say that someone has rocked the boat. The boat was 
drifting along quite nicely; it was getting to its 
destination for the benefit of all the workers in the 
country. As I see the position today we have to back-
pedal to some extent ... Do not let us have another 
1947, when the result was that certain people walked 
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out of the Conference, and within a very short period 
a very large number followed their example My 
suggestion is to establish two wings of TUCSA ... The 
one wing wi 11 be the wing of the registered trade 
unions, and the other wing - I would like to call it 
the integrated wing - would be open to any registered 
or unregistered trade union who would prefer to belong 
that particular wing of TUCSA? 46 
Rutherford's argument was supported by Bob Cowley of the South 
African Electrical Workers Association and Cliff Crompton of the 
Ironmoulders' Society. The front of concerned artisan leaders 
was however broken by Tom Murray of the Boilermakers' Union, as 
was so often the case. Murray told delegates: 
... we as the leaders of trade unions, as the elected 
representatives of the working class movement in South 
Africa, have to consider the right thing to do 
Surely as civilised people, we must accept that if 
there is to be this disparity of races in South 
Africa, then the African will rule whether we like it 
or not Our destiny lies with mixed unions, the 
future lies with mixed unions 47 
Murray argued that should TUCSA surrender to present pressures, 
then there would be further pressure to exclude coloured and 
Indian workers as well from the ranks of the Council. It was 
within the ability of TUCSA unions to hold the position; the 
AEU's failure had been not to explain matters to the rank-and-
file, but instead had let "a small noisy minority control them." 
Rather than compromise, said Murray, TUCSA should go out of 
existence. Murray's speech prompted 
Crompton that it "was out of this 
International Trade Unions as such. " 48 
the retort from Cliff 
world in respect of 
But the position in 
South Africa was different; here there was "a peculiar set of 
problems. " 49 
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The debate indicated the depth of unease among major affiliates 
of the TUC; it also showed that many, probably most, union 
delegates were not as yet disposed to follow Rutherford's 
suggestion and bar the affiliation of African unions. A proposal 
to ref er the whole matter to the incoming NEC proved acceptable 
and passed unanimously. 
The NEC did indeed take action. They closed down the African 
Affairs Section of TUCSA, thus ending what was in practical terms 
the Council's most meaningful contribution to the cause of 
African unionisation. But the affiliation of African unions to 
the Council remained, few though there were who actually availed 
themselves to the opportunity. Despite this action, the Council 
was still not beyond the reach of the unsettling criticism of the 
government, and in particular of the Minister of Labour, Marais 
Viljoen. 
Toward the end of 1967 Viljoen, speaking at two political 
meetings in the Transvaal, launched into a scathing attack on 
TUCSA's African union policy, suggesting that the leadership of 
the organisation was being "un-South African", and warned of 
possible steps against the Council to be taken by the 
government. 50 The TUC' s NEC considered the attack serious 
enough to warrant calling a special conference to discuss the 
affair; over and above the Minister's criticism lay the threat 
of further disaffiliations of unions unwilling to continue 
association with a body in such poor standing with the 
authorities. A conference was accordingly arranged, to meet in 
Durban on December 12 and 13, 1967. 
Before the Conference cassembled, however, a TUCSA delegation went 
to see the Minister in Pretoria about his remarks. The meeting, 
"by far and away the most congenial" meeting with the 
Minister, 51 did clear the air somewhat. The Minister re-
affirmed government policy, which was opposed to fostering 
African trade unionism, and declared that any "undermining" of 
the policy would not be tolerated. He was also able to catch the 
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delegation on the wrong footing by producing a memorandum to him 
from a TUCSA affiliate, the (coloured) National Furniture Workers 
Union, in which the Port Elizabeth branch of this Union informed 
the Minister that it was opposed to the Council's support for 
African unions. 52 It was an embarrassing position for the 
delegation, as Grobbelaar later informed conference delegates. 
In response to the Minister's statement of government policy, the 
delegation appears to have adopted a calculated appeal to a 
presumed commonality of white protectionist interest. 
words of Tom Murray: 
In the 
I said that TUCSA does not necessarily believe in 
African trade unions. What we really believe in - and 
when I said this I stuck my head out, and you can chop 
it off if you like - is for registered unions to be 
authorised to organise the Bantu within their own 
particular ambit ... I said that the organisation of 
the Bantu was basically motivated through selfishness 
because the White man is being systematically 
eliminated from the industrial scene ... 53 
It is not known whether Viljoen was moved by this frankness; he 
did not, at any rate, concede anything with regard to government 
pol icy. There was no comfort in the interview for the TUC on its 
position regarding African unions. And it reported in that vein 
to the delegates assembled in Durban at the Special Conference 
in December. 
What then was to be done? Debate at the Conference revealed a 
shift towards caution in the mood of the unionists present over 
previous gatherings. Again, the spokesmen of the South African 
Typographical Union, the South African Electrical Workers' 
Association and the Ironmoulders' Society took the lead in 
pressing for change in order to maintain the unity of TUCSA. 
Rutherford warned that should the Council not bar the affiliation 
of African unions, the existing mixed unions could face 
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legislation compelling segregation. Bob Cowley of the SAEWA, 
blunter than his colleagues, declared: "It appears that I am the 
only speaker dedicated to the cause of the White artisan here 
today. We are a White trade union, and we have had difficulty 
and problems in connection with TUCSA's policy for nearly four 
years ... We are not prepared to go against the policy of the 
Government - and we are prepared to stand by that policy until 
such time as it is changed. " 54 
Clearly the white artisan-dominated unions could not or would not 
live in the glare of government disapprobation; the leadership 
of these unions was used to a comfortable relationship with the 
authorities, or its rank-and-file was exerting pressure - or 
both. Two opposing resolutions, embodying the contrasting 
"right" and "left" positions - were put before the Conference by 
delegates. One was moved by Rutherford; it recommended the 
exclusion of non-registered unions from TUCSA, and subsequent 
consultations with government in order to see whether or not a 
jointly acceptable policy could be found on the issue of African 
unionisation. Ray Altman, general secretary of the National 
Union of Distributive Workers, a formerly mixed union which had 
segregated due to pressure from the coloured membership unhappy 
at the statutory white control, moved the other resolution. It 
urged that the present position be maintained, and that talks 
with the government be held on that basis on the African union 
issue. 55 Some time was spent by delegates in proposing 
refinements to the motions, but a resolution faithful to the 
spirit of Rutherford's original proposal was finally carried at 
the Special Conference by 46 votes in favour, 7 against and 17 
abstentions. This resolution was no more than a recommendation, 
since the meeting did not have the power to make the necessary 
change to the Council's constitution. Only an Annual Conference 
could do that, the next one was in April 1968. 
When the Conference met in Cape Town in April, it was in a very 
different mood from that of the Special Conference of the 
preceding December. It had before it a motion in the name of the 
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South African Electrical Workers Association calling for the 
disbarment of non-registered unions (to its surprise, the SAEWA 
had discovered before the Conference that the recommendation from 
the December gathering was not automatically placed before the 
following Annual Conference. The Association itself thus placed 
the motion on the agenda.) After an extended debate on the 
issue, the motion was rejected by 76 votes to 18, with 2 
abstentions. The Annual Conference did not, after all, endorse 
the verdict of the special meeting of the previous December. 
What lay behind this apparent about-face? There would seem to 
have been a number of factors. One point made at the Conference 
itself was the change in the composition of the delegates: " ... 
there are many more delegates here who were not at the Special 
Conference. "56 Another delegate noted: "A more sensible 
attitude now prevails" than after the panic of late 1967. 57 
Similarly, the respected unionist Tom Alexander, of the South 
Ari can Society of Bank Officials, stated: "I am now quite 
convinced that I personally overestimated the danger of TUCSA 
breaking up over this issue. "58 Ray Altman of the NUDW touched 
on an international consideration: " ... if the Annual Conference 
endorsed the decision that was taken in December, then TUCSA 
would be finished internationally." 59 The tone of the 
Conference majority was perhaps best summed up by the delegate 
who declared: "It is not for three members (a reference in all 
likelihood to the three artisan unions pushing for African 
disaffiliation) of an organisation of 71 to dictate to the 
majority. They cannot say to us: Dance to our tune or we 
disaffiliate. 1160 
However, disaffiliation was precisely the weapon which these 
disgruntled unions in TUCSA had ready to hand. When delegates 
re-assembled ten months later in Johannesburg for the Fifteenth 
Annual Conference, fourteen unions had disaffiliated from TUCSA 
It "must be assumed", stated the NEC Report to the Annual 
Conference, that in all but two cases, "the major factor which 
determined these Unions' decisions to disaffiliate was that of 
the Council's policy of African membership of Trade Unions and 
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African unions being members of the Counci 1. 1161 Among the 
unions which had disaffiliated were the South African Electrical 
Workers' Association, the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, the 
Johannesburg Municipal Transport Workers' Union, the South 
African Typographical Union, the Amalgamated Union of Building 
Trade Workers and the Tramway and Omnibus Workers' Union (Cape) -
all relatively large and influential bodies with a predominantly 
white membership. They included the mainstays of TUCSA's white 
artisan support, with the exception of the Boilermakers and the 
Ironmoulders. 
The consequence for the TUC was a steep decline in both 
affiliated membership and income: " the loss, or potential 
loss, to the Council on this issue, means that the Council lost, 
or was going to lose, virtually half of its total membership, as 
well as virtually half of its total income. 1162 The general 
secretary of TUCSA, Arthur Grobbelaar, told delegates to the 
Annual Conference that "TUCSA's demise is imminent." Services 
and staff had already been cut back, further disaffiliations were 
threatened, and TUCSA' s standing on the national level was 
diminished. And " if there is no TUCSA, then only the 
Confederation of Labour can speak for the workers of South 
Africa", 63 a prospect depressing to most TUCSA delegates, 
averse as they were to the Confederation's white exclusivist 
stance. 
With the influential figures of Murray, Scheepers,and Grobbelaar 
pressing for it, a motion was passed by the delegates which 
excluded African affiliation to the Council. Only Eric Tyacke, 
former Administrative Assistant for the TUCSA African Affairs 
Section, and present in his capacity as a delegate for the 
National Union of Laundry Workers, pleaded that the Council not 
abandon the African connection. 64 He gained no support, though 
perhaps more silent sympathy. With, for TUCSA, little debate, 
the deed was done, and the motion passed. With only two 
delegates opposed, the conference voted to exclude non-
registered, hence African, unions. It was, as it had always 
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been, an action with more symbolic than practical content. Few 
African unions still belonged to the Council; most had either 
failed to keep up payments or withdrawn voluntarily in 1967. It 
was however a sign that TUCSA unionists would not stand whole-
heartedly behind the African unions when opposing forces stepped 
up the pressure. 
In a similar situation in 1950/51, the SAT&LC had held out 
considerably longer before a majority of its constituent unions 
had bowed to what seemed the inevitable step of African exclusion 
in 1954. For the leadership of TUCSA in 1969 the situation, 
while strongly reminiscent of that earlier occasion, was yet not 
completely analogous. For one thing, the organisation lacked the 
more radical elements which had been such a forceful presence at 
SAT&LC conferences unti 1 its dissolution. Of those who had 
escaped the operation of the Suppression of Communism Act, the 
years had made almost establishment figures, leaders of accepted 
economic organisations. For another, the TUCSA leadership, in 
particular its general secretary, president and some NEC members, 
appear to have been confident of regaining lost affiliates should 
the issue of African unions be resolved by preventing their 
affiliation. Perhaps it was in order to re-assure such potential 
re-joinees that the motion to drop African affiliation had 
appended to it further clauses. These clauses specified that 
future changes in the membership criteria for the Council could 
only be brought about by a card vote of 80% in favour of such a 
change at a duly constituted conference of the Council. Second, 
no such change was to take place for two years since the previous 
one. It seems possible that ,the South African Typographical 
Union did press for such guarantees before it would consider re-
affiliation. In any event, this Union did indeed re-join shortly 
after the decision of the 1969 Annual Conference. 
As some sort of sop to its collective conscience, and in order 
to take stock after a period of humiliating reversals, the 1969 
Conference resolved to establish a Policy Committee, which was 
instructed to: 
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devise a policy which will have as its broad aims, the 
protection of the members of the registered trade 
unions, whilst preventing the exploitation of 
unregistered and unrecognised workers of any race 
65 
In a way, it was the African union is~ue back again, in heavily 
disguised form, and safe enough for the most conservative of 
TUCSA potential white support to swallow. Working with 
remarkable rapidity for such a body, the Policy Committee 
produced a document within three months. Presented with some 
skill and sophistication, the Report of the Policy Committee 
contained both diagnosis and prescription. The major argument 
of the Report was that the business of South African trade unions 
was to provide job and income security for their members in a 
situation complicated by technological change, racial antagonisms 
and suspicions, and declining trade union power. 66 The remedy, 
suggested the Report was a "multi-pronged job security 
programme" 67 which would attempt to secure existing employment 
of union members where practicable, but would also encourage 
adaptation and retraining of union members in a changing job 
market. The fear of interracial competition, argued the Report, 
was in part misplaced and arose from the changing nature of many 
industrial jobs under the impact of new technology and managerial 
rationalisation of labour. 
found in the "retention 
The answer in this respect was to be 
of job and occupational values and 
complete opposition to wage downgrading. 1168 One possible 
translation of this is that fragmentation of jobs, with the 
concomitant introduction of African workers to perform the new 
tasks at rates much lower than for the work previously, was to 
be opposed by TUCSA affiliates. At any rate, it was this latter 
process of wage downgrading in a context of re-defined industrial 
tasks which was "the chief means whereby the rate for the job is 
'sabotaged' in present practice. 1169 Complementing this analysis 
was the proposal that registered trade unions be permitted to 
negotiate on behalf of all workers in their respective 
industries, whether members or not - a proposal, that is, that 
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the registered unions should help fix the wages and conditions 
of employment of African workers who were not, by law permitted 
to join these same unions. 10 
These then were some of the major points of the Policy 
Committee's Report, acclaimed by Tom Murray as the "biggest thing 
that has happened in the history of TUCSA." 11 In order to 
underline the importance of the Report, a special conference was 
held to acquaint TUCSA affiliates with the details of the Report, 
and to persuade them of its merits. The Conference, held in 
August 1969 in Durban, was something of a family reunion after 
a period of stress and internal division. The presence of 
delegates from the South African Typographical Union indicated 
the re-affiliation of that body to the Council. The Report's 
contents were given a warm endorsement by delegates, some of whom 
were at pains to point out that they did not run counter to 
TUCSA's declared rate for the job policy. 12 In all, both Report 
and Conference accurately reflected the earnest good will with 
which TUCSA approached its sometimes unwelcoming environment. 
At another time, in another political context, these proposals 
may well have had greater impact than they did. But given the 
persistent nature of South African societal dilemmas, given the 
policy of an unbending government, the Report made far less 
headway than its carefully thought-out arguments deserved. 
TUCSA's 1969 policy statement declared that one of the Council's 
major functions was to serve as a 11 pressure group for the 
democratic process" so as to enable "labour's voice to be 
heard. 1113 And TUCSA itself at this time could usefully be 
viewed as a pressure group one of the many voluntary 
associations in South African society competing for the attention 
and support of the major decision-making elements. Many TUCSA 
unionists clung to notions of the "labour movement" which had 
been such powerful ideological buttresses in earlier years, but 
whose appeal had faded with the suppression of a legitimate 
Marxist party in South Africa. To these unionists to whom an 
older rhetoric was not dead, TUCSA was the legitimate 
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organisational expression of the powerful social formation of the 
working class,. In reality, it was rather as a relatively 
uninfluential pressure group that TUCSA emerged in these years, 
ignored for the most part by government, uncertain of rank-and-
file backing, and deprived of its most important growth potential 
- the African masses - by its inability to engage wholeheartedly 
in a policy of aggressive African unionisation. As such, the 
Council shared in the oppositional impotence of other partly 
politicised institutions whose major social base rested on 
English-speaking white South Africa and their allies among the 
coloured and Indian groups. TUCSA lived and breathed in the same 
ambiguously liberal milieu that fostered English-speaking 
academia, the English-language churches, and the kind of mild 
reformism of elements within the United and Progressive Parties. 
Besides its willingness to issue frequent policy statements to 
sympathetic journal is ts, TUCSA was extremely 1 imi ted in its 
opportunities for fruitful pressure. Its membership of a number 
of public bodies such as the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory 
Council and the Consumer Council enabled its officials to play 
a marginal national role, but TUCSA' s impact through these 
channels does not seem to have been at all marked. Annual 
Conference resolutions of the Council, if they had a bearing on 
government policy (and they usually did) were routinely forwarded 
by letter to the relevant government department of Minister. 
But, as Tom Murray remarked in 1968: 
Have we ever had any consideration from the 
Government? What happens to the dozens of letters 
that go back and forth, and about which you read in 
your Annual Reports. How many of the wonderful 
resolutions that you adopt year after year, ever gets 
the ear of the Government'? 74 
Murray went on to claim that the same governmental neglect was 
true for other "working-class" organisations, and presumably by 
this he meant to refer to the Confederation. Whether or not such 
214 
a view was accurate, the latter organisation appears to have felt 
itself anything but alienated from the inner circles of political 
power, as TUCSA most definitely was. But in referring to the 
inability of "working-class" institutions to influence the 
government Murray was making an important point. Organised 
labour as such simply did not confront the government as a 
relatively cohesive bloc. Not only were the mass of workers 
largely unrepresented, but those who were could barely agree 
among themselves to co-operate on the least controversial issues. 
TUCSA suffered both by virtue of being only a section of a 
divided movement and by being that section at odds with the 
government of the day, if not to the extent to which its left-
wing rival, SACTU was, before becoming largely defunct in 
1963/1964. TUCSA, 1 ike the other institutions of English-
speaking South Africa, seemed structurally defined in a position 
of permanent opposition. 
This opposition also had its di visions and its ambiguities. 
Ideally TUCSA felt itself to furnish the only authentic 
alternative to the white sectional basis of its major rival, the 
Confederation of Labour. But that pretension was hotly 
challenged until the mid-1960s by the activists of SACTU. Even 
on a more limited spectrum of support TUCSA was fragile. Major 
white artisan unions which stuck with the organisation into the 
1960s detached themselves when the controversy over African 
unionism began to intensify. Thus neither radical opposition nor 
a more moderate, but potentially more effective, solid white 
union resistance to government policies was demonstrated by 
TUCSA. Instead, it wavered from mild defiance to near total 
capitulation in the space of seven years, shedding support as it 
went. 
Nowhere was the ambivalence more evident than at the level of 
what can be termed the "official ideology" of the Council - that 
amalgam of multi-racial unionism and white artisan protectionism 
most succinctly embodied in the TUCSA battle-cry of "Rate for the 
Job", and its lesser used variant of "Equal pay for equal work". 
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The deceptive nature of this slogan has been pointed out 
frequently enough: the surface non-racialism and egalitarianism 
often masks a deeply practical exclusionist effect, whether 
deliberately so intended or not is a different matter. White 
trade unionists from Cape to Copperbel t have found that by 
insisting on a relatively high minimum wage rate for jobs done 
by union members, blacks could be excluded form the work without 
any recourse to invidious racialist propaganda. 75 Not that the 
effect of the rate for the job policy was always of such 
uniformly anti-black bias: much depended on the context within 
which the policy was pursued. But the exclusionist possibilities 
of the policy remained as alive as in earlier years when leaders 
such as Dr. Abdurhaman had attacked the policy as leading to the 
disbarment of his fellow brown South Africans from "white" 
jobs. 76 Rate for the job was thus an uncertain prop for a TUCSA 
seeking to prove its good faith to brown and black workers. 
A similar situation could be seen with regard to the issue of 
African unionism. On the one hand TUCSA unionists saw the 
promotion of African unionisation as the obvious path of trade 
union virtue, the necessary step to labour solidarity. But such 
unionisation was to be undertaken "responsibly", and preferably 
under the wing of the registered trade union in the branch of 
industry concerned. If only government policy would allow 
incorporation of Africans into existing registered unions ... 
that was the real desire on many, probably most, of the TUCSA 
leaders. On this count, African unionisation was sheer white 
self-interest, as unionists such as Cliff Crompton, Arthur 
Grobbelaar and Tom Murray made fairly clear from time to time. 
By bringing in Africans into existing unions on the basis of 
limited voting rights - anything else would swamp the unions, 
remarked Cliff Crompton candidly in 1966 - union leaders could 
both maximise the power of their dwindling unions and prevent 
undermining of the jobs and wages of their white, coloured and 
Indian members. Tom Murray himself, probably the most 
influential and eloquent advocate of African unionism within 
TUCSA, used both arguments quite freely. ("Bring them in to keep 
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them down" was one leading Confederation unionist's 
interpretation of this pol icy, not without justification.) 11 
TUCSA leaders themselves saw such matters as 1 imi ted African 
voting rights (and the corollary of continued white and brown 
leadership) in the unions as a reasonable evolutionary move in 
the right direction, and sincerely felt that white self-interest 
and African advancement were not necessarily incompatible. 
The Old Order Fades: The Registered Trade Unions in the 1970s 
The following decade was to demonstrate both the validity of 
TUCSA's general policy stance on inclusive trade unionism, and, 
ironically, its inadequacy as regards the details of it. While 
TUCSA was to be able to congratulate itself at the end of the 
1970s on the vindication of its stand on trade union rights as 
a result of sweeping government reforms on labour, the 
organisation found itself more or less stranded as the waves of 
African unionisation swept around and past it. In this of 
course, TUCSA was not alone. Even further removed from the 
epicentre of change was the Confederation, which fruitlessly 
opposed and grudgingly adapted to a new industrial order as it 
took shape from the late 1970s. Neither TUCSA nor the 
Confederation was able to rally its forces and maintain 
organisational unity as the old order crumbled. 
The decade had begun with the heated debate on labour policy and 
the predicament of white protectionism at a time of economic 
growth. The terms of the debate at the time, as Chapter 2 has 
outlined, were centred around the means by which such white 
protectionism could be best furthered, with or without 
acknowledgement being given to the aspirations of the rest of the 
working population. By 1973 the issue was no longer really rate-
for-the-job versus job reservation (though the slogans were still 
to be heard) but the question of African unionisation. Insofar 
as the protection of established workers was concerned (and 
increasingly the debate included not just white, but also 
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coloured and Indian workers), the problem was also posed as part 
of the overall question of how African industrial representation 
was to be shaped. No grouping of trade unions, left, right or 
unaligned, was able to escape this, the dominant labour issue of 
the decade. 
Within three years of debarring the African unions, TUCSA itself 
had returned to the issue and once again begun the process of 
reversing itself on this crucial item of policy. Delegates to the 
1972 Annual Conference 1 istened to speeches on the issue of 
African unionisation from both Professor P. J. van der Merwe of the 
University of Pretoria and Professor Francis Wilson of the 
University of Cape Town. Van der Merwe's convoluted plan for 
"Bantu trade unions", entailing a linking up with homeland 
representation, was heard with polite scepticism by delegates. 
Wilson's plea for trade unions rights for all on the same basis 
received a warmer welcome. A majority of delegates thereupon 
endorsed a motion calling on 
... all affiliated unions to make every effort to obtain 
from their members an unambiguous and clear mandate in the 
coming year to press government to permit the organising of 
African workers into registered trade unions. 78 
Strikes by dockworkers in Durban, and the organised protests by 
Owambo migrant labourers in South West Africa/Namibia in 1972 had 
suggested that the industrial peace which characterised the 
labour scene at this time was not on the firmest of foundations. 
Confirmation of this fact was to come with the Durban Strikes of 
1973 (see following Chapter). This eruption of worker 
dissatisfaction in the Durban area put paid once and for all to 
any claims by government and the right-wing trade unions that the 
system of labour representation for African workers established 
under the 1953 Settlement of Disputes Act was an adequate 
substitute for trade unions. Government itself continued however 
to insist that it would not extend ra~ognition to African trade 
unions: instead, a clearly inadequate amendment to the 1953 
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Settlement of Disputes Act was rushed through parliament 
extending the powers of the in-house committees established in 
terms of the Act. 
If government was still unwilling to see the writing on the wall, 
most other actors in the labour sphere were either debating just 
how African unionisation should come about, or doing something 
about it. Speaking on behalf of the Confederation of Metal and 
Building Unions - a by no means revolutionary body - E.H.McCann 
of the AEU, who had himself led the opposition to African unions 
in TUCSA a decade ago - declared that ti ••• we believe African 
unions are inevitable ... t1, and stated that the CMBU now supported 
the organisation of parallel African unions in the industries in 
which its affiliates were active. 79 Similarly, at its Annual 
Conference in September 1973, TUCSA delegates approved a 
resolution which recommended to its affiliates that they 11 take 
steps to examine practical ways to establish parallel union 
organisations for African workers". 80 
The Confederation too had been wrestling with the issue of 
African labour organisation. The Artisan Staff Association had 
proposed a resolution at the Confederation's second biennial 
conference in 1972 arguing that the current position was highly 
unsatisfactory, and suggesting the establishment of a l!Bantu 
Labour Council 11 to provide black workers with some form of 
representation. Even this conservative proposal was however too 
much for the majority of Confederation unionists, who voted it 
down. 81 The ASA remained at odds with the leadership of the 
Confederation, and in 1974 the former' s General Secretary, 
C.P.Grobler, a well-known Confederation 11 verligtet1, caused a 
stir in right-wing labour circles with a call for a commission 
of enquiry into the position of African workers. 82 By the mid-
1970s the turmoil within Confederation ranks reached breaking 
point. In 1974 several of the white railway unions disaffiliated 
from the Confederation, largely over the issue of African unions 
and the opening all previously "white" jobs to African workers. 
The Footplate Staff Association was to join with the Amalgamated 
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Engineering Union in 1976 in forming the South African Central 
Labour Organisation, intended to cater for centrist unions unable 
to remain with the Confederation and unwilling to join TUCSA. It 
was almost a re-creation of the South African Federation of Trade 
Unions of the early 1950s, and was to enjoy the same lack of 
viability in an environment where the centre was a vanishing 
point. 
Initiative in the labour field had now passed beyond the reach 
of the traditional organisations of white labour, and their 
coloured and Indian allies. Small but pioneering trade unions 
catering in the first instance for African workers, but in 
principle open to all, began to forge relationships with 
managements of multi-national companies whose governments were 
urging the recognition of African trade unions. New conditions 
on the gold mines, and the period of intense turmoil among the 
migrant labour force, was moving the mining industry to re-
examine old labour practices. 83 Events in other spheres, most 
notably the Soweto uprising of 1976, were putting paid to past 
policies of paternalism and grand apartheid. Despite a rearguard 
action which included such steps as the detention and restriction 
of trade unionists active in the nascent African trade union 
movement, the National Party government was under pressure as 
never before to bring central aspects of South African society 
into line with international norms, especially as espoused by the 
leading Western industrial nations. Freedom of labour 
organisation was an indispensable and inescapable component in 
this regard. The appointment of the Commission of Enquiry into 
Labour Legislation in July 1977 by the new Minister of Labour, 
S.P.Botha, was the definitive recognition of this fact by the 
government. 
By 1979, when the first of the five Reports of the Wiehahn 
Commission was published, it was almost a foregone conclusion 
that some form of African trade unionism would be recommended, 
and that job reservation would be scrapped. The Commission's 
Report was however to go perhaps even further than most observers 
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had expected in urging the adoption of a uniform, and non-
discriminatory system of industrial relations. 84 Seeing that 
two key union figures (Niewoudt of the Confederation and 
Grobbelaar of TUCSA) had been on the Commission, its findings 
cannot have come as a great surprise to the two leading 
federations of registered trade unions. For the Confederation, 
however, it was an unpleasant change to find that its 
representations to government after publication of the Report had 
little effect, and that most of the system of white segregation 
and protectionism for which it had stood for a quarter of a 
century was to be thrown overboard. A protest strike against the 
Wiehahn reforms by the bitterenders in the Mine Workers' Union 
was al together innef f ectual 85 in moving the government. For 
TUCSA the moment was one of vindication: the Wiehahn Commission 
was congratulated on "a job well done" by TUCSA's President, 
Ronny Webb. 86 At the same time, however, the passing of one 
era was also the inception of another, and as it turned out, more 
onerous, period of tension for TUCSA - indeed, a fatal one for 
the organisation. While self-congratulation on the Wiehahn Report 
was in order, delegates were facing a new challenge which the 
very reforms for which they had so long called had brought about. 
During the 1979 Conference delegates defeated a motion asking 
TUCSA affiliates not to organise in industries where an 
"independent" union was already active. 87 The defeat of the 
resolution confirmed what had been apparent for some years now: 
that TUCSA affiliates and the growing "independents" were 
embroiled in a major struggle for the allegiance of hundreds of 
thousands of African industrial workers, with the former in the 
weaker position. Having played a part in the removal of obstacles 
to worker unity, TUCSA was to become itself a victim of its own 
victory. 
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Chapter 7: The Trade Unionism of Legal Exel us ion: 
African Trade Unions and the Politics of 
Domination 
Driven both by law and the practice of the majority of the 
registered trade unions, the continuous attempts to unionise the 
growing black South African proletariat from the 1920s onwards 
took place in relative isolation from the activities of the 
established unions. Where such unions were not averse to 
organising African workers, the Department of Labour was often 
on hand to remind them of the legal position in terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. The racial separation which many 
of these unions would in any case have preferred was thus 
conveniently buttressed by legal sanction. Few unions attempted 
to circumvent the provisions of the law or the prevailing climate 
of opinion among the dominant white groupings. Despite these 
severe constraints, however, trade unionism found a ready 
response among key strata of the black labour force, and this 
tendency could only benefit from the steady urbanisation and 
proletarianisation of the African population during this century. 
Racial exclusion, police suppression and difficult economic 
problems notwithstanding, trade unionism among this section of 
the labour force proved in the long run unstoppable. In this 
chapter, an attempt is made to trace the main stages through 
which an inclusive trade unionism passed en route to an 
industrial relations system in which the legal equality of all 
workers commanded both state and private acceptance. 
Black Industrial Workers - The Early Stirrings, 1900 - 1920 
Trade unions among African workers were to develop only during 
the 1920s, some thirty years after the process of 
industrialisation in South Africa was truly under way. And they 
did so not on the mines, the single largest industrial employer 
of black labour, but elsewhere. However, it is appropriate to 
begin this account, as with many other aspects of our modern 
labour history, with some reference to the mining industry. It 
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was the industry into which black workers made the earliest and 
most dramatic entry. While only 15 000 black workers were 
employed on the mines of the Witwatersrand in 1890, the figure 
rose to 69 000 in 1897 and 189 000 by 1912. 1 Of more 
significance, however, than these numbers (large as they were in 
the context of the times), were the conditions surrounding 
recruitment and the employment of these workers. Except for the 
short interval between 1904 - 1909 (when Chinese labour was 
available), the mines were dependent on the recruitment of large 
numbers of migrant black workers from the territories of southern 
Africa. It is important to note that these were, in F .A. 
Johnstone's term, "politically-unfree 112 workers whose status as 
colonised subjects made differential conditions of employment and 
a high degree of control feasible, as would not have been the 
case with white workers in the region. In addition, a number of 
measures set the black mine worker apart from his white 
counterpart and created that vast pool of "cheap black labour" 
upon which the profitable operation of the gold mines was 
predicated, and of which the immigrant white trade unionists were 
so fearful. The technical and economic difficulties of deep-
level gold mining led to an extreme emphasis on labour cost-
minimisation with major implications for the composition of the 
mining labour-force. Employment opportunities for white manual 
workers were effectively restricted to that fraction of mining 
jobs which could be argued to demand a degree of "skill". The 
remaining ninety percent were filled by low-paid black migrant 
miners. 3 At the very inception of industrialisation, then, 
labour conditions developed which were to exert a powerful 
influence on trade union patterns among all sections of the 
industrial work-force, both within and without the mines, and to 
determine the early course of African trade unions: 
( i) The subordinate position of the African labourer, 
stemming from colonialisation and the expropriation of 
black land, was further reinforced in the quarter of 
a century after the discovery of gold. At the root of 
this position was the development of a coercive 
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migrant labour system, in which freedom of movement 
and rights in the work-place were severely curtailed 
by pass laws, the first initiated in 1895 at the 
prompting of the Chamber of Mines; selective 
implementation of the Masters and Servants Act, making 
breach of employment contract a criminal offence; 
monopsonistic recruiting agencies (the Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association and the Native Recruiting 
Corporation established by the Chamber of Mines); and 
the tight control of accommodation in mine compounds. 
This situation was given firm legal backing with the 
enactment of the Native Labour Regulation Act of 
1911, 4 discussed in Chapter 3. 
(ii) The effect of these and other measures was to 
establish an occupational and wage hierarchy which was 
highly discontinuous. Average black wages were around 
one-eighth to one-tenth of those paid to white 
artisans and miners who had been attracted to the 
Witwatersrand by the lure of the "Golden pound a day." 
Moreover, trade union pressure and legal enactments, 
most notably the Transvaal Labour Importation 
Ordinance of 1904 and Regulations issued in terms of 
the Mines and Works Act of 1911, reserved a range of 
skilled and semi-skilled mining jobs for whites, 
thereby cutting off the possibility of black 
advancement on any significant scale. 
(iii) In all this, the collusion, sometimes uneasy and 
troubled, of the major mining employers and successive 
governmental authorities in the Transvaal, was a 
notable and indispensable factor. What was built up, 
step by step, was a separate and inferior industrial 
relations system for black workers which in the 
climate of these colonial times seemed "normal" to the 
dominant parties involved. 
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Neither black not white labour remained passive and compliant in 
the face of these developments, though neither were able to bring 
about major structural changes in their situation. The largely 
immigrant (British and Australian) white work-force on the mines, 
among whom trade unionism had made headway in the 1890s, adopted 
exclusionary white labour policies which came to characterise 
many other unions outside mining in the subsequent decades. And 
where measures of racial exclusion were only partially successful 
in mi ti gating the harsh and insecure employment conditions on the 
mines, white miners and their trade unions turned to industrial 
action in a series of strikes culminating in the Rand Rebellion 
of 1922. 
Black miners, too, though constrained by the criminal law and 
lack of union organisation, still undertook SUCGessive protests 
against the rigours of mining life and the low wages they 
received. Widespread individual resistance in the form of 
desertion was complemented by a number of strikes and riots in 
the two decades following the Anglo-Boer War. In 1920, 
foreshadowing the white miners' challenge in 1922, a major strike 
erupted in which 71 000 black miners took part at one time or 
another over a period of a week. The magnitude of the event 
moved the President of the Chamber of Mines to state (though with 
dubious historical accuracy), that it was the "first native 
strike in the true sense of the word. 115 The strike was 
essentially over low mine wages exacerbated by the inflation of 
the time6 and came after an extended campaign in the urban areas 
of the Transvaal by the Native National Congress (later ANC) over 
the conditions of the black urban population and the pass system. 
The support enjoyed by the strike pointed to the incapacity of 
migrant workers to maintain their meagre standard of living as 
the rural black areas began their steep decline into agricultural 
stagnation and poverty. The strike was swiftly repressed by 
troops and police, and only minor concessions were subsequently 
made by the Chamber of Mines. But as in the 1940s, and again in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 1920 black miners' strike 
indicated the potential for industrial action, even in the 
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absence of formal union organisation, among migrant workers - a 
recurrent if underestimated feature of our labour history. 
The subordination, harsh working conditions and poverty of the 
black miners were, however, only an extreme example of the 
general lot of the black labour force, both urban and rural, 
migrant and settled. The inflation of World War One and the 
immediately succeeding years was felt throughout the country, 
while the anti-squatting measures consequent upon the 1913 Native 
Land Act produced widespread rural misery. It is against this 
background that the first formal organisations of black workers 
were established. Before considering these, however, one other 
preparatory event deserves notice, though its significance only 
becomes obvious in hindsight. This event concerned the breakaway 
in 1915 of a small group of white socialists from the South 
African Labour Party, then the political home of white immigrant 
artisans and miners, over the war issue. Led by figures such as 
S.P. Bunting, D.I. Jones and W.H. Andrews, this group went on to 
form the International Socialists' League, 1 the forerunner of 
the Communist Party of South Africa, founded in 1921. Small in 
numbers, ineffectual and doctrinaire as the founders of the ISL 
may have seemed, their actions constituted something of a turning 
point in South African labour and political history. Not only 
was an organisational centre independent of the South African 
Labour Party and its associated trade unions in existence, but 
also it marked the beginning of a long, almost unbroken 
collaboration between black and non-black activists in trade 
union affairs. Mostly of a Marxist persuasion, the members of 
the ISL significantly founded the first labour body for black 
workers, the Industrial Workers of Africa. Its impact was 
destined to be short-lived, though for a time it established 
itself not only on the Rand but also in Cape Town. 8 
The ICU (Industrial & Commercial Workers' Union of Africa) 1919-
1930 
It was not, as it happened, the earnest theoreticians of the ISL 
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who were to bring about what is now generally regarded (with 
reservations which will become clear) as the establishment of the 
first important "trade union" for black workers, the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa, known as the ICU. The 
ICU was a product of the same countrywide climate of black 
protest against worsening economic conditions and political 
subordination of blacks which had given rise to the 1920 black 
miners' strike. The inception of the ICU is generally taken to 
be in January 1919, when a young mission-trained Nyasaland 
expatriate of "exceptional talent", 9 Clements Kadalie, became 
unpaid secretary of an organisation of black and "coloured" 
railway and harbour workers in Cape Town, the ICU. However, as 
a historian of the ICU has written, "Hindsight lends spurious 
prominence to the early ICU, "10 In fact, not only in Cape 
Town but elsewhere in the Cape Province, and in Bloemfontein, the 
crisis of the time was giving rise to numerous attempts to 
organize black workers. A "unification" conference of these 
organisations was held in Bloemfontein in July 1920, with 
delegates from the OFS, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Kimberley. 
Only an uneasy unity was forged at this time, and the ICU was 
never successfully to overcome the divisive influences of policy 
differences, personality clashes and the sheer problems of co-
ordinating and control! ing what were essentially local and 
regional initiatives. 11 
The Bloemfontein conference established the ICU12 as "one great 
union of skilled and unskilled workers of South Africa, south of 
the Zambezi .... " Despite this ambitious aim, however, the ICU 
"was essentially a Cape organisation" until 1923. 13 Thereafter, 
as Kadalie emerged as the leading popular figure, the ICU began 
to take on a more national character, and numerous figures in 
black and left-wing circles allied themselves with him. Included 
in these were members of the young Communist Party of South 
Africa, who, like Kadalie himself, were disillusioned with the 
actions of the joint National/Labour Party Pact government to 
whose election both the ICU and the CPSA had lent support. By 
1926/7 the ICU was established in all four provinces, and reached 
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its peak membership of some 100 000 members as rural discontent 
mounted over conditions on white farms and thousands turned to 
the ICU for relief (overburdening its precarious administrative 
and financial resources in the process). 14 The ICU had 
"penetrated for the first time beneath the crust of the 
articulate and educated class and initiated the first genuinely 
popular movement among Blacks in South Africa. 1115 
In this process, however, the ICU had moved far from its origins 
as a coalition of proto-trade unions in various urban centres. 
In the event only three significant strikes were officially 
backed by the ICU, one of which was the Cape Town dock strike of 
1919 by which Kadalie's struggling organisation had first made 
its presence felt. 16 Very little of the purposeful trade union 
activity and hoped-for economic gains envisaged by delegates at 
Bloemfontein in 1920 actually materialised. Despite the urgings 
of Communist, and later white 1 iberal and overseas backers 
(including the imported trade union adviser from Britain, W.G. 
Ballinger), no concerted attempt was made to organise the 
heterogeneous membership into industrial divisions which could 
prepare the way for permanent union organisation. Instead, the 
ICU developed into a rallying point and symbol for "unskilled 
workers in every type of employment", and whose underlying common 
grievances were "largely political: the pass laws, the industrial 
colour bar, the inequitable incidence of taxation and so 
forth. 1117 
The problems facing the ICU were in truth intractable. The 
authorities had never looked with favour on the organisation, 
fearing its potential for mass mobilisation among the black 
population, and took both legislative and police action to curb 
its activities. After 1924 the Union government under Hertzog 
was committed to the promotion of "segregation" and the sectional 
interests of the growing white urban industrial work force by way 
of the euphemistically titled "civilised labour policy." The 
lowly-paid, insecure urban workers and the rural squatters and 
labourers upon which the ICU was based could provide neither the 
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financial nor the organisational sustenance which the ICU 
required. White organised labour itself was indifferent or 
hostile, apart from a small number of sympathisers who felt 
themselves powerless to bridge the gap between white and black 
workers which left-wing theory insisted was only of a temporary 
nature. Within the ICU itself, divided opinions prevailed as to 
the appropriate course of action. "Two schools of thought 
emerged: the left-wing believed in direct action, strikes, the 
burning of passes, refusal to pay taxes, etc.; the right wing was 
all for a policy of hambe kahle (go carefully) ... The left wing 
was led by communists. 1118 
Kadalie himself, swinging between radical .rhetoric and a desire 
for respectability in the eyes of dominant white circles, was 
unable to salvage a coherent core for the ICU. Under proddings 
from white liberal sympathisers and threatened by the radicals' 
own attacks on financial corruption and mal-administration, 
Kadalie organized the expulsion of Communist members of the ICU 
in late 1926. 19 Thereby was lost for the ICU, though not for 
the black trade union movement as a whole, a significant number 
of the most able and committed organisers. The move failed to 
win the ICU any greater acceptance within the country. An 
application to affiliate to the largely white South African Trade 
Union Congress was rejected in 1928. More success was however 
forthcoming from overseas, though to no long-term advantage to 
the ICU. The organisation's application to join the (non-
Communist) International Federation of Trade Unions was accepted. 
Kadalie himself made an extended journey to Europe in 1927, 
amongst other things attending the annual meeting of the 
International Labour Organization and receiving a warm welcome 
from British trade unionis'ts. One outcome was the despatch in 
1928 of a British TUC figure, W.G. Ballinger, to South Africa in 
1928 as adviser to the ICU. Ballinger's conscientious efforts 
to put the ICU administration on a sound basis and to return the 
ICU to its trade union origins were, however, unsuccessful. 
Further splits in the always fractious ranks of the ICU led in 
1928 to Kadalie's own resignation and attempted comeback. By 
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1930 the organisation had crumbled into ineffectual regional 
groupings, with Kadalie himself settling in East London. While 
the ICU's name was still to be heard among leaders of township 
protest as late as 1938, 20 the ICU as a national organisation 
was effectively finished. 
The post-mortem examination on the reasons for the decline and 
fall of the ICU has rendered a far more complex verdict than that 
of Kadalie's white liberal sympathiser, Ethelreda Lewis, who had 
concluded by 1928 that the ICU was "a battered, discredited, 
chaotic association of incompetent natives with a few struggling 
defeated officials who had never been able to handle money. "21 
Did it fall or was it pushed? Could any black mass movement with 
trade union overtones, no matter how well organised, have 
succeeded in the "strange and hostile environment" 22 of an 
industrialising South Africa of the 1920s? The foremost lengthy 
study of the ICU by Wickens concludes that given the internal 
divisions, administrative incapacity and wavering policy 
directions, "The conclusion is inescapable that the ICU was not 
done to death by the assassins of capitalism, but died of its own 
fatal flaws. "23 Whatever the verdict (and a def ini ti ve one 
seems in principle impossible in any rigorous way), the ICU was 
not without a heritage. Numerous future leaders in black trade 
union and allied left-wing circles gained their first experience 
as members of the ICU. Lessons had been learnt from the 
diffuseness and lack of application of its ambitions regarding 
labour organisation. It was a number of Communist Party members, 
severed from the ICU in 1926, who first applied the fruits of 
this experience, to be followed by others. 
Trade Union Organisation and Expansion 1927 - 1947 
The activities of the ICU in the 1920s had taken place at the 
same time as the legal foundations of the present-day industrial 
relations system were being established. It is indicative of the 
separate and subordinate position of black workers that the major 
industrial laws adopted in this decade made little provision for 
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this growing section of the urban workforce. The Apprenticeship 
Act of 1922 contained no overt discriminatory clauses, but its 
formulation, and subsequent operation by joint employer/trade 
union apprenticeship committees, effectively kept Africans out 
of the ranks of the officially certificated artisan stratum for 
over fifty years. Few black workers could meet the educational 
requirements for entrance to apprenticeship laid down in terms 
of the Act; even if they could, almost no facilities for the 
requisite technical education were open to them. 24 Whether 
intentionally or not, a major obstacle to black occupational 
advancement had been created. 
Two years later, as has been discussed in Chapter 3, the Smuts 
government passed the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, 
thereby laying down principles of "industrial self-government" 
through the industrial council system; of dispute procedure and 
settlement; and of registration of trade unions and employer 
organisations which remain the basis of our industrial relations 
system up to the present. 25 Al though it has been argued that 
the Act was biased towards the interest of employers and 
constrained the growth of a mi 1 i tant, class-conscious trade 
unionism, 26 the new law did finally provide unions with the 
legal protection and status which many of them sought. But of 
course black workers were not to benefit, since "pass-bearing 
natives" were specifically excluded from the definition of 
"employee" and hence from eligibility for membership of the now-
to-be registered trade unions. Given the exclusionary policies 
among most unions at this time, except for those in the western 
Cape, where relatively few blacks were employed, this provision 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act may have seemed little more 
than a reflection of existing practice, and of the intention to 
maintain the subordination of the migrant workers, the "pass-
bearing" blacks, on the mines in particular. But as the Act was 
put into operation and began to gain at least tacit support among 
unions and employers, the implications of the exclusion of black 
workers were almost uniformly negative. Neither recognised nor 
prohibited, black trade unions were to 
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exist for half a century in an industrial relations limbo. 
Only the third in the trio of major industrial laws of the 1920s 
proved of any limited assistance to the black trade unions which 
were established from 1927 onwards. This was the Wage Act of 
1925, by virtue of which a state Wage Board was established to 
investigate wages and working conditions in "unorganised" 
industries (in practice those with no industrial council) and to 
recommend mandatory minimum standards. The Wage Act was to 
provide trade unions catering for black workers (and also those 
registered trade unions which were interested) with a three-fold 
opportunity for advancing their members' interests. In the first 
place, appeals for a Wage Board investigation could be directed 
to the Minister of Labour (a possibility, however, which was 
later restricted by further amendments to the Act). Second, 
trade unionists and other interested parties could advance 
evidence and arguments for improvements at hearings of the Wage 
Board. Third, since the Wage Determinations issued in terms of 
the Board's recommendations were given statutory sanction, unions 
now had something which they could attempt to enforce. 
Underpayment of the agreed wages or sub-standard working 
conditions could be brought to the attention of Departmental 
inspectors and (in principle at least) remedied, if need be, by 
prosecution of reluctant employers. 
These tactics were indeed among the main weapons which the black 
trade unions of the 1920s and later had at their disposal. 
Having been barred from the ICU, some members of the South 
African Communist Party, notably the well-known Bennie Weinbren, 
turned in 1927 to the organisation of black workers on the Rand. 
Experienced black employees of some skill in such light 
industries as laundry, bakery, clothing and furniture could not 
be easily replaced by employers. Their relative bargaining 
strength made these workers, rather than the numerically dominant 
but closely controlled mine migrant workers, most amenable to 
union organisation 21 and Weinbren and others were able to 
launch a number of small unions, using the machinery of the Wage 
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Act "which gave Bantu workers for the first time the opportunity 
of bringing their grievances efficiently to the notice of the 
authorities. This, too, contributed to the rapid growth of the 
African unions, so that towards the end of 1928 the new Non-
European Trade Union Federation was able to claim 10 000 workers 
on the Rand. 1128 
This initiative by white Communists on the Rand was of short 
duration. Most of the unions founded after 1927 collapsed when 
both Depression conditions and major divisions within the 
Communist Party ranks after 1930 combined to deprive the movement 
of its impetus. 29 But it illustrates in embryo several of the 
aspects of black trade unionism which were recurrent features 
through much of the century. The original white leadership, 
drawn from the ideological left, became increasingly interracial 
as figures such as Makabeni, Nkosi and Kotane emerged from the 
experience of union organisation. The more focused "trade union" 
orientation evidenced here was predicated on at least some 
limited favourable institutional and legal opportunity, in this 
case the operation of the new Wage Act. Union growth itself was 
also a function of the expansionary years before 1930, with the 
organisations later facing severe stress as the economy moved 
into a downturn. Finally, the formation of a separate Federation 
of Non-European Trade Unions "mirrored the white workers' racial 
exclusiveness, and represented a significant departure from the 
communist ideal of interracial solidarity, but was seen as a step 
towards non-racial unions. 1130 
The lifting of Depression conditions after 1933 created the basis 
for renewed unionisation among black workers, but this time on 
a wider front and over a far more extended time span. Economic 
expansion in the 1930s and after was to affect South African 
society radically on several levels. The continuing urbanisation 
of the poorer sections of the white rural population began to be 
matched by the flow of blacks to the cities. By the end of the 
decade, the urban African work-force had almost doubled, and by 
1946 it was treble its size in 1921. 31 The resultant labour 
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market conditions and urban pressures served to heighten the 
sense of threat and conflict, particularly for those semi- and 
unskilled rural migrant whites whom the National Party aspired 
to represent. A major outcome, as has been discussed in Chapter 
4, was the first public formulation by this party in 1936/1937 
of its programme of apartheid (not yet widely so cal led), 
including sweeping proposals for industrial, occupational and 
trade union segregation. In the nation's factories, the small-
batch and jobbing production typical of secondary industry in the 
1920s began to give way to mass-production techniques. The 
demand for skilled artisan labour on the one hand and unskilled 
labour on the other, was increasingly supplemented by the 
creation of semi-skilled "operative" positions. The relatively 
rapid expansion and transformation of the occupational hierarchy 
drew successively on the different strata of the population -
white women, "coloured" and "Indian" men and women, and African 
men. 32 And simultaneously, the rising gold price pushed the 
mining industry into further expansion, with inevitable demands 
on the supply of the available black unskilled labour, to the 
discomfiture of white commercial agriculture. These trends found 
ready reflection in the country's trade unionism. Among the 
trade unions registered in terms of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act (that is, catering for white, coloured and Indian workers), 
a variety of responses directly concerning the situation of the 
black worker were evident. The dominant trend, among white-only 
or white-dominated unions, was for continued or even reinforced 
protectionism on racial grounds. 
Only a small minority within the registered trade unions from the 
1930s actively promoted the cause of black advancement. Such 
support was to be found among a number of the so-called 
"industrial" unions with an open membership (though still 
restricted by the Industrial Conciliation Act to coloureds and 
Indians as wel 1 as whites) which attempted to organise the 
growing numbers of non-artisans in secondary industries such as 
clothing, textiles and food processing. Here the rapid expansion 
of operations and the drive to hold down labour costs were 
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bringing workers of all races into the same enterprises and often 
into the same work. Unable to rely on scarce skills as a 
bargaining factor, and with union officials themselves committed 
to the long-term goal of interracial labour solidarity, some 
industrial unions such as the Textiles Workers Industrial Union 
had begun to organise blacks by the mid-1930s. 33 By and large 
this incorporation took place by way of separate "parallel 11 
African branches of the registered union. Such an approach, then 
as later, could be defended on pragmatic grounds: 1 inguistic 
differences and/or resistance of white workers made the separate 
branch structure advisable even in the eyes of left-wing union 
leaders. Pragmatism apart, this separation of black and non-
black was also enforced by the Department of Labour, which 
intermittently issued warnings to unions organising Africans that 
they were risking their registered status. A number of later 
unions owed their existence to the early parallel strategy, most 
notably the National Union of Clothing Workers and the African 
Food and Canning Workers' Union (the latter, however, operating 
so closely with the "mother" union as to be virtually the same). 
Overshadowing the contribution of a few registered unions to the 
organisation of the black workers were however the predominantly 
black unions themselves. Again, growth of these unions was 
centred upon the Rand, and owed much to the efforts of white and 
black leftwing activists, though by no means solely members of 
the Communist Party. One such figure was that of Max Gordon, a 
reputed "Trotskyist [who] was nevertheless able to subordinate 
matters of doctrine to the practical necessities and compromises 
involved in organising African workers. 1134 By 1940 Gordon had 
built up unions in laundries, printing, retail outlets and 
bakeries "essentially by enforcing the minimum wages laid down 
by wage determinations and submitting evidence to the Wage Board 
"
35 In this strategy, initiated already in the late 1920s as 
has been seen, Gordon was supported with funds and research by 
sympathisers from the South African Institute of Race Relations, 
themselves engaged in lobbying government for a policy of African 
union recognition. 36 
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Gordon's group of unions was only one of several which had taken 
advantage of the more favourable economic climate of the late 
1930s to establish new or revive old trade unions catering for 
black workers in a number of industries. The Communist Party, 
which in the early 1930s had established an African Federation 
of Trade unions but had shunned conventional trade union activity 
in favour of rallies and demonstrations, again became active in 
the field. Al though plagued by the recurrent problems of 
financial and administrative instabi 1 i ty, factional rivalries and 
personal animosities, the growing numbers of small unions were 
steadily drawing in black workers on the Rand and also in 
Pretoria. 37 
In November 1941 the various union groupings established the 
Council of Non-European Trade Unions, which by 1945 claimed the 
affiliation of 119 unions with a membership of 158 000 African 
workers - some 40% of the black work-force in commerce and 
private sector industry. 38 Al though these figures probably 
over-estimate quite severely the degree of effective black 
unionisation, the CNETU unions were responding to a widely-felt 
current of ebullience and protest among the urban black 
communities. African wages advanced significantly during the war 
years, and the CNETU launched a campaign for a 40 shilling per 
week minimum industrial wage. The strike rate mirrored the 
climate of rising expectation, with a quadrupling of the numbers 
of black workers involved in industrial action between 1940 and 
1945 compared to the whole of the previous decade. 39 Government 
policy itself contributed, although ambiguously, to the advance 
of African labour and a degree of relative optimism. While on 
the one hand reverses were suffered by virtue of the 
discriminatory provisions of the Factories Act, and by the 
prohibition of the African strikes under War Measure No. 145 of 
1942, public pronouncements by the Minister of Labour and others 
held out the prospect of official recognition of African unions, 
albeit in a highly restricted manner. 40 
Perhaps the most significant breakthrough for black unionisation, 
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however, came not in the expanding secondary industries of the 
Rand and Natal but among the ranks of the massive migrant workers 
on the gold mines. Members of the Communist Party had made 
intermittent attempts to penetrate and organise the mine 
compounds in the 1930s, though with no evident success. 41 In 
1941 a more concerted effort was launched with backing from the 
Transvaal African National Congress, the newly-formed CNETU and 
the Communist Party. Support was enlisted from the non-migrant 
African mine clerks, aggrieved by a refusal of the Chamber of 
Mines to extend a statutory cost of living allowance to them. 42 
An African Mine Workers' Union came into existence in 1941, and 
successfully established an organisational core which brought in 
some 25 000 migrant mine-workers by 1944. The AMWU pressed "five 
basic demands: regular wage increases; payment of the cost of 
living allowance; statutory wage minima and a Wage Board enquiry; 
the 'total abolition' of the compound system, the tribal division 
of the work force, and all restrictions on freedom of movement; 
and, finally, recognition of the AMWU. " 43 
However reasonable in trade union terms, demands like these were 
inconceivably radical in the eyes of the Chamber of Mines. 
Tampering with the migrant labour system threatened not only the 
basis of social control of the large black work force, but also 
the labour cost-minimisation strategies which had marked the gold 
mining industry almost from its inception. The first fruits of 
the AMWU' s agitation was the appointment of a government enquiry, 
the Lansdown Commission, into conditions of the black miners. 
The Chamber of Mines had long justified its wage structure on the 
basis of the migrants' access to agricultural production in their 
home areas. The Lansdown Commission, in contrast, provided 
"stark evidence of the decline of productivity and the 
impoverishment, landlessness, severe malnutrition and heal th 
problems in the Reserves ... concluding that for the majority of 
migrants 'Reserve production is but a myth'." 44 In its report, 
the Lansdown Commission made a number of recommendations aimed 
at improving the situation of the lowest paid miners, but 
rejected the possibility of recognising the AMWU. Only partial 
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acceptance was given to these recommendations, and the AMWU 
continued to organise miners in the face of opposition from both 
Chamber and the government. Unrecognised and ignored, the AMWU 
moved towards strike action in the aftermath of the war, and in 
August 1946 called the miners out. The ensuing strike, involving 
tens of thousands of black miners (the estimates of the total 
differ widely) 45 was, as in 1920, repressed by police in a 
highly coercive manner. 
The strike had major repercussions, although it was a complete 
failure in terms of its stated objectives. The Chamber of Mines 
was confirmed in its intransigence towards African Union 
organisation on the mines and any change in the nature of its 
dependence on "cheap" migrant labour. In this sense the gold 
mining industry undercut the growing influence in ruling circles 
of those pressing for a liberalisation of influx control and 
"native pol icy" in general. The Chamber's muted plea for the 
relaxation of the job colour bar on the mines was nullified by 
its own acceptance of the hostility of white miners to any such 
steps. In trade union circles, the polarisation between "right" 
and "left" was accelerated when the artisan-dominated South 
African Trades and Labour Council condemned the strike as a 
threat to law and order. 46 Probably of most significance, the 
strike hardened governmental attitudes towards left-wing and 
communist activity in labour affairs and politics, and 
precipitated the latter towards a closer alliance with the major 
organisation in black politics, the African National Congress 
(itself undergoing rapid radicalisation as the hopes generated 
by the climate of the Second World War were dissipated after 
1945). Under General Smuts the state responded to what it saw 
as the influence of "agitators" and the 1946 strike by the arrest 
and trial of most of the leading figures in the Communist Party. 
The prosecution, however, was unable to show that the Party 
controlled the AMWU or that the Party executive had caused the 
strike. 47 Nevertheless, the very occurrence of the 1946 strike, 
the open involvement of leading Communist activists and the 
contradictory responses to these facts among the country's trade 
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unionists highlighted the volatility and conflict potential of 
the times. The new National Party government of 1948, with a 
declared anti-communist policy, was to take up where its 
predecessor left off, thereby further intensifying the quandaries 
of a deeply divided labour movement. The victims, amongst 
others, were the campaign for the recognition of trade union 
rights for African workers, and the legality of radical trade 
union leadership. 
Repression and Quiescence 1948-1972 
The first twenty-five years of the National Party government's 
experiment in radical social engineering by the implementation 
of its policy of apartheid or separate development were to 
witness two contrasting trends with regard to labour organisation 
among black workers. On the one hand, the politicised, mass 
mobilisation efforts of the dominant grouping among African 
unions and their allies ended in the destruction or 
neutralisation of their organisational base. On the other hand, 
the prolonged attempt by government to restructure the economy 
and the industrial relations system so as to provide workable and 
docile substitutes for black trade unions also met with more or 
less complete failure. Underlying this outcome was the continued 
expansion of the industrial economy around the existing urban 
agglomerations. The quickened pace of economic activity in the 
1960s occurred at a time when unionism among blacks was at its 
lowest point since the ICU. However, the accelerated 
concentration of economic power in the larger corporations; the 
demographic constraints regarding the traditional dependence on 
(largely) white skilled manual labour; and the ongoing 
technological change calling for more and more semi-skilled 
operatives provided new structural opportunities for the 
regeneration of black labour organisation. Coinciding with the 
heightened international pressure for a revision of internal 
policies, this shift was to bring about a marked change in 
prevailing attitudes in those state, management and trade union 
circles most closely concerned with the overall direction of the 
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country's labour resources. By the mid-1970s the state's policy 
toward African unionisation was considered to be untenable by 
most informed observers. The final resolution of the issue by 
the incorporation of African workers with equal rights was, 
nevertheless, not altogether predictable, given the still 
dominant separationist character of government pol icy. With 
hindsight, this reversal of a basic tenet of apartheid ideology 
was an unmistakable portent of its later total collapse at the 
end of the 1980s. 
Prior to the change of government in 1948, the state's labour 
policy, as has been mentioned, contained within itself ambiguous 
emphases. The governments of both Generals Hertzog and Smuts 
had, it is true, formulated policy largely in reaction to the 
pressures generated in their various white constituencies. Both 
the agricultural and mining sectors found much to their taste in 
the more archaic and oppressive aspects of a controlled black 
labour force. The Chamber of Mines, in particular, was a 
formidable opponent of the subversion of the migrant labour 
system and of black union organisation. Caught in the middle, 
the majority of white labour leaders sought protection for their 
membership against the potential for displacement by the cheaper 
black worker. Where white union organisation was weak, the 
possession of the franchise made the white industrial labour 
force still a factor to be appeased, where possible, by 
government favour. Pressures for liberalisation of state labour 
pol icy were thus at best tangential to the major entrenched 
political forces. 
Secondary industry in the urban areas provided, however, a 
potentially discordant voice, with allies in the numerically 
insignificant but intellectually more influential white liberal 
circles. Leaders in manufacturing and commerce, as Greenberg, 
for example, has argued, accommodated to, rather than positively 
encouraged, the system's bias towards white protectionism and 
black subordination. 48 It was precisely in this sector of the 
economy that trade unionism had made the most advances, and that 
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the system of industrial relations envisaged by the Industrial 
Conciliation Act took firmest root. Statutory minimum wages and 
working conditions on an industry-wide basis enabled employers 
to some extent to discount labour cost competition and gave trade 
unions a standard to uphold. The industrial council system 
promoted management/union consul tat ion and an acceptance of 
institutional constraints while undercutting labour militancy. 
And as has been seen, it was also among urban secondary industry 
that black unions first came to establish themselves and gain a 
measure of acceptance. Under these conditions, there existed at 
least a limited possibility of the gradual incorporation of black 
workers into the framework of the industrial relations system, 
if only because co-optation of organised labour had had a measure 
of success. And for nine years, government did indeed toy with 
the idea of bringing African trade unions in. Between 1939 and 
1948 a number of different official proposals were aired for 
recognising black unions, al though the desire for control usually 
was more evident than the wi 11 ingness to extend meaningful 
industrial rights. 49 Leading figures in the black labour 
movement took heart from these indications of a breach in 
official negativism on the issue, while standing firm on the 
principle that only equal trade union rights were acceptable in 
the long run. 
The events of 1946-8 (the African mine workers' strike and its 
aftermath), together with the change in government in the latter 
year, drastically reversed expectations of reform on this front, 
though the actual direction of government policy vis-a-vis black 
trade unions did not immediately become clear. Shortly after 
entering office the new National Party government appointed a 
Commission of Enquiry into the country's major industrial 
legislation (the Botha Commission), whose Report only appeared 
in 1951. Before the publication of the Report, however, the 
government had already passed the Suppression of Communism Act 
of 1950, with far-reaching consequences for the nation's trade 
unions. The short-run effect of the operation of the Act was to 
remove many of the leading trade unionists in both registered and 
246 
unregistered unions from office on the grounds of their past or 
present association with the Communist Party of South Africa. 
The crisis which this provoked in union ranks (the registered 
unions in particular) served to intensify the existing divisions 
and to move the registered union movement as a whole to the 
right, as even sympathetic unionists found themselves under 
pressure to prove their non-communist bona fides. The country's 
largest trade union federation, the South African Trades and 
Labour Council, underwent yet a further period of turmoil which 
finally wrecked its precarious unity and led to its dissolution 
in 1954. The long-term effects have been more incalculable, but 
the proscription not only of Marxist activism but also of the 
principles of Marxist socialism (and its many variants) deprived 
the trade union movement of one of the established poles in the 
ideological debate which animated trade union discourse, here as 
in other industrialised countries. 
At the time of the passage of the Suppression of Communism Act, 
government spokesmen had made it quite clear that African trade 
unionism with non-racial left-wing backing was viewed as a major 
threat to the kind of society envisaged by the National Party. 
The other side of the coin was that the logic of the early 
apartheid programme demanded the drawing of a "clear colour-
di viding line" between black and white in all spheres where 
practicable, the industrial included (though in the event the 
least practicable sphere of al 1). As far as possible black 
advancement was only to be fostered in the black areas 
themselves. Outside of them, a tutelary paternal ism and vigorous 
police action were to maintain societal stability. Thus the 
ensuing legislative programme in the years succeeding 1950 
offered little encouragement to black unionism in particular and 
the cause of black industrial advancement in general. The 1951 
Native Building Workers' Act provided for the training of blacks 
in construction work (though not to full artisan status); their 
employment was, however, to be restricted to the black townships 
where the housing crisis was acute. Then in 1953 came the Native 
Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act. 
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The Report of the Botha Commission in 1951 had explored various 
possibilities with regard to black unionism and had suggested 
that a highly restricted form of recognition for these unions be 
considered. 50 Instead, however, the 1953 Act proceeded on the 
assumption that consultation with black workers and dispute 
settlement could function without black trade union organisation. 
The Act confirmed the prohibition on strikes by black workers 
which the War Measure No. 145 had introduced (and which had never 
been lifted). Disputes were to be settled by the intervention 
of a network of Labour Boards headed by officials of the 
Department of Labour. Finally, the Act provided for the 
establishment of in-house works committees (either elected by 
workers or composed of joint management/worker representatives) 
which would allow for institutionalised communications between 
management and their black employees. 51 These mechanisms, it 
was hoped, would ensure industrial peace and management/employee 
communication without the intermediation of troublesome trade 
unions. Further amendments to legislation in the 1950s aimed to 
discourage black unions by restricting access to the Wage Board 
and by prohibiting employer provision of stop-order facilities 
to black unions. Together with further revisions to the 
Industrial Conci 1 iation Act in 1956 (in particular the job 
reservation clause; the prohibition on new "mixed" unions and on 
party political involvement), these laws attempted to fix the 
parameters of black (and non-black) involvement in the South 
African industrial relations system conclusively. The high-point 
in the radical dualism of the whole system had now been reached. 
The drastic nature of the restructuring of South African society 
under the National Party's programme was met by an equally 
vehement mass political challenge in which the black trade union 
movement was integrally bound up. In the late 1940s and after 
the black unions in the CNETU had undergone a marked decline as 
state action assailed the unions' leadership and as the economy's 
relative stagnation diminished the optimism of the war years. 
Re-alignments on left-wing and black politics contributed to this 
state of affairs by placing increasing emphasis on mass political 
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1 . African Sweet Workers Union 
2. Food, Canning and Allied Workers Industrial Union 
3. Jewellers and Goldsmiths' Society 
4. National Union of Distributive Workers 
S. S.A. Hardressers Employees Union 
6. Sweet Workers Union 
7. Tobacco Workers Union 
8. Transvaal Leather & Allied Workers I. Union 
9. National Union of Corronercial Travellers 
10. Twin~ & Bag Workers Union 
11. Witwatersrand Liquor & Catering Trades Fmp. Union 
12. S.A. Tin Workers Union 
13. African Cormnercial and Distributive Workers Union 
14. Textile Workers Industrial Union 
lS. Tailoring Workers Industrial Union 
16. Gannent Workers Union 
17. Natal Sugar Industry Employees Union 
18. Johannesburg Municipal Transport Workers Union 
19. Motor Industry Employees Union 
20. Port Elizabeth t>runicipal Tram & Bus Workers Union 
21. Brewery Employees Union (Cape) 
22. Durban Indian Municipal Employees Society 
23. Furniture Workers Industrial Union (Tvl) 
24. National Baking Industrial Union 
2S. Witwatersrand Baking Fmployees Association 
26. Concession Stores and Allied Trades Assistants Union 
27. S.A. Canvas and Rope Workers Union 
28. Building Workers Industrial Union 
29 • .Amalgamated Engineering Union 
30. Durban Municipal Transport Employees Union 
31. Ironmoulders Society 
32 • .Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers 
33. Transvaal Explosives and Chemical l~orkers Union 
34. S .A. Typographical Union 
3S. S.A. Association of M..lnicipal Employees 
36. S.A. Electrical Workers Association 
37. Mine Workers Union 
38. Pretoria Municipal Tram & Bus Workers Union 
39. Tvl. Retail Meat Trade Employees Union 
40. S.A. Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association 
41. S.A. Reduction Workers Association 
42. S.A. Boilennakers Society 
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campaigns. Matching the turbulence of the political scene, both 
registered and unregistered trade unions broke with old 
structures and attempted to come to terms with the prevailing 
state of affairs by forging new organisational fronts. Among the 
registered unions the de facto split between the white-only 
public sector, mining, and engineering unions and the private 
sector artisan and industrial unions crystallised into the 
formation of two competing trade union federations - the South 
African Confederation of Labour on the "right", and the Trade 
Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) (though calling itself the 
South African Trade Union Council until 1961) ambiguously to the 
Confederation's "left". Formed in order to bring together the 
unions which were opposed to the proposed amendment to the 
Industrial Conciliation Act mentioned earlier, TUCSA was forced 
to accommodate to the new political realities by allowing only 
the affiliation of registered unions. The African unions were 
dropped (the few that had ever aligned with the old SAT&LC). The 
TUCSA leadership, caught between both the government onslaught 
and its own inclination to white protectionism on the one hand, 
and the conviction of the impractibility (even undesirability) 
of industrial segregation on the other, argued that exclusion of 
blacks was an expedient to preserve minimal trade union unity. 52 
A handful of the registered unions rejected this step by TUCSA, 
and three of them (the Food and Canning Workers Union, the 
Textile Workers Industrial Union and the Laundry Workers) aligned 
themselves with the black unions of the CNETU, leading to the 
establishment of the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) in 1955. In the same year SACTU became one of the 
members of the Congress Alliance, and as such signatory to the 
Freedom Charter drawn up at Kliptown. It was a step to be 
expected given the intertwined and overlapping nature of the 
leadership of the SACTU unions and the other arms of Congress in 
a situation of polarisation both political and industrial. 
Equally, it was also to be expected that SACTU was set upon a 
hazardous course of confrontation with the authorities for which 
the farmer's organisational resources were ill-prepared. 
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SACTU in essence represented the distillation of the committed 
Marxist-inclined left in South Africa after nearly forty years 
of organised opposition to the racial order of the country. The 
Marxism of much of the leadership was tempered by the need for 
relative discretion under a fiercely anti-communist regime and 
due to the dictates of compromise with the nationalist thrust 
of ANC aspirations. Nevertheless, its programme was recognisably 
centred on the classic postulates of working-class politics: non-
racial working-class unity; a broad but undefined commitment to 
socialism; and the rejection of the compartmentalization of 
economic and political activity. 53 Its attempt to carry 
through this programme led SACTU from a close connection to a 
complete identification and submersion in the affairs of Congress 
as a whole, in the process suffering the same fate of state 
repression. 
This was not, however, immediately the case. For the first two 
years of its existence, SACTU and its affiliated unions were able 
to pursue their more accustomed union activities while casting 
around for ways to penetrate the large bulk of unorganised bl·ack 
workers. This was not easy. "The light industrial unions were 
the mainstay - such as it was - of SACTU. " 54 In particular, the 
three registered unions provided the essential organisational 
infrastructure for SACTU's expansion, but had no ready entree to 
the country's heavy industry where organisation was a clear 
priority. With the passage of the revised Industrial 
Conciliation Act in 1956, a major debate was engaged within SACTU 
over the issue of registration and related organisational 
tactics. 55 De-registration and the formation of inclusive 
unions with (hence) African participation was one option urged 
by some. The registered unions were, however, reluctant to lose 
the benefits offered by registration. Instead, in an attempt to 
undercut the support of coloured and Indian workers enjoyed by 
TUCSA unions, the registration of the relevant SACTU unions was 
changed to exclude whites, and others were urged to do likewise. 
The tempting prospect of a white labour movement isolated from 
coloured and Indian allies failed, however, to materialise. 
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From 1957 onwards a shift of strategy occurred as SACTU turned 
to ways and means of stimulating mass black support in 
conjunction with the Congress Al 1 iance. National Organising 
Committees were formed to attempt to organise workers in 
engineering, transport and harbours. Mining and agriculture were 
later included. 56 Only limited gains were made and no lasting 
union organisation emerged from these efforts. Of more 
significance was the campaign for a national minimum wage of £1 
a day in the 1950s. By its nature, however, this campaign, like 
others in which SACTU participated in conjunction with the rest 
of the Congress Alliance, implied an appeal over the heads of 
unions to black communities as a whole. The weapon was not 
industrial action as such, but the mass stay-away, an idea which 
was "not altogether new, and is a syndicalist current running 
through the ideology of African nationalism ... 1157 As events 
during 1984 suggest, the significance of the "stay-away" should 
not be underestimated; indeed it may more or less be forced upon 
trade unions in situations of widespread mass discontent. 
SACTU's £1 a day campaign predictably never approached realising 
its objectives, and it is doubtful if the leadership itself ever 
expected such an outcome. But as a concrete demand expressing 
real black grievances at the low level of urban existence, it was 
not without impact. Leading figures in business circles were 
prompted to involve themselves with the issue; black poverty, low 
industrial wages and the need to step up productivity first 
became matters which employers and government were forced to take 
seriously. In this sense SACTU, as Feit observes, had achieved 
at least limited success. 58 By the early 1960s, however, 
SACTU' s form of "political unionism" was played out as its 
leadership was systematically eliminated by state security 
action. Over-extended financially, organisationally and 
politically, SACTU was for all practical purposes defunct by 
1965, if indeed not far earlier. Like the ICU, SACTU's own 
internal weaknesses had played a role: "SACTU did divert 
resources to political causes; it did dissipate its energies in 
too many directions; it did neglect strategic areas of the 
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economy 1159 But as another, less sympathetic commentator has 
observed, 11 ••• the astounding thing is not that SACTU functioned 
badly, but that it functioned at all. 1160 
Thereupon followed 11 a period of relative quiescence 1161 which was 
to extend into the 1970s. Black trade unionism, either as a 
symbol and rallying point for urban industrial grievances or as 
a low-profile organisational resource for day-to-day worker 
protection, almost disappeared from the scene. Almost - but not 
quite. Remnants of union organisation remained in clothing, 
textiles and food processing. Of more long-term import, the very 
issue of black unionisation could not, for a variety of reasons, 
be ignored by sections of the registered trade union movement, 
in particular those which comprised the very basis of TUCSA's 
existence. The previous chapter has recounted TUCSA'own efforts 
and accommodations regarding African unionisation, which amounted 
to a troublesome and vacillating record throughout the 1960S. 62 
Despite this fact, TUCSA's stance was to bear fruit in at least 
two directions when accumulating pressures led in the 1970s to 
a more benign climate for African unionisation. In the first 
place, the experience gained by the personnel of TUCSA's Affairs 
Section was to lead to the establishment of one of the major 
forces behind black unionisation after 1970 in the form of the 
Urban Training Project. And, second, the mere existence of a 
major trade union federation supporting the cause of black worker 
incorporation into the established structures of the trade union 
movement was to provide government with a useful ally when the 
time came for a major shift in state policy over labour in the 
late 1970s. 
Revival and Incorporation 1973 - 1979 
Rising real wages, expanding employment and the surveillance 
exercised by state security organs made for a decade of muted 
industrial peace after the early 1960s. From 1962 to 1968 only 
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2 000 black workers annually were on average reported as going 
on strike. 63 The major strike of the decade was not among black 
workers but among white miners suspicious of attempts to 
reorganise underground work on the gold mines. Black dockworkers 
did indeed stop work in protest over wages in 1969, but the 
strike was put down by the conventional methods of mass 
retrenchment of the largely migrant work force. The unionisation 
of the black labour force, opposed with varying degrees of 
hostility by government and employers alike, had declined to a 
historic low comparable to the years after the collapse of the 
ICU in 1930. Official policy propagated the alternative of the 
consultative machinery embodied in the Native Labour (Settlement 
of Disputes) Act of 1953. 
A number of factors were to combine to change this picture 
radically. In the first place, the boom years of the 1960s 
culminated in 1969/1970 in widespread shortages of skilled labour 
at wages employers were prepared to pay. The pool of suitable 
white, coloured and Indian workers was becoming exhausted. The 
continuing trend towards the employment of black operatives was 
accelerated by further job fragmentation, new technology and the 
introduction of a variety of industrial training schemes. 
Registered trade unions were perforce obliged to accept the 
"floating" of the industrial colour bar upwards, but many were 
increasingly alarmed by the spectre of an under-paid non-
unionised majority black work force. 
In the second place, the inadequacy of the industrial relations 
machinery for blacks was underlined by the failure of the works 
and liaison committee system to take effective root in the 
nation's factories. Only twenty-four statutory works committees 
were in existence in January 1973, for example. 64 In circles 
close to the government, the unsatisfactory nature of the 
situation gave rise to ideas of recognising ethnic or homeland-
based unions which would represent black workers without 
integrating them into the industrial relations structure for 
whites, coloureds and Indians. 65 
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In the third place, the opening of the decade of the 1970s was 
to see the revival of attempts by a small number of white and 
black intellectuals and unionists to promote unionisation among 
black workers. Former officials of TUCSA' s African Affairs 
Section established the Urban Training Project in 1970 and 
cautiously began to disseminate information on workers' rights 
on the Rand. By 1972 lecturers and students at a number of 
universities, again with the co-operation of trade unionists, 
were entering the field of industrial organisation and research, 
and in so doing providing an invaluable organisational resource 
for future black unions. Finally, as had been the case ever 
since the post-war years of the 1940s, international opinion and 
financial assistance favoured the regeneration of black trade 
unions. 
The catalyst which was to support and extend these tendencies 
came in the form of a series of largely spontaneous, mass-based 
strikes in the Durban-Pinetown region in January to March 1973. 
The "Durban Strikes", as these events were to become known, would 
seem to have been a response primarily to the inflationary 
pressures on subsistence and transport costs eating into the 
value of the wages of the black industrial work force. 66 As 
Bonner has argued, the strikes came after a period in which the 
authorities had attempted to impose migrancy and contract labour 
on larger and larger sections of the African labour force. Driven 
out of the rural areas by poverty in search of employment, these 
workers encountered an established African work force also living 
under conditions often of considerable deprivation and 
overcrowding. The strikes in 1973, preceded by a smaller upsurge 
on the Rand in 1972, "brought together urban and migrant workers 
in the first concerted attack on declining standards of living 
to be seen since the early 1960s". 67 The spontaneous, wave-like 
nature of the strikes, embracing some 100 000 workers in over 150 
enterprises, indicated that mass industrial action did not 
require the assistance of formal union organisation (and indeed 
may have been facilitated by the absence of ~ecognised black 
unions): 
254 
Social conditions of the mass of African workers helped 
communicate the mood of the strikers. In some cases, for 
example, the congregation of migrant workers from different 
firms in single quarter hostels and compounds undoubtedly 
served to facilitate the exchange of information; a 
situation also served by the packed and gregarious 
circumstances of the public transportation on which African 
workers find their way to and from work ... Paradoxically, 
the absence of trade union institutions and of recognised 
worker leadership also contributed to the remarkable, 
inter-firm, inter-industry solidarity manifest among the 
strikers ... it proved remarkably easy to pull out workers 
from widely unrelated enterprises. It was sufficient that 
African workers recognised their common plight in low wages 
and their inferior status throughout industry as a whole. 68 
The unexpected outbreak demonstrated the total inadequacy of the 
official conciliation procedures for black workers which had 
allowed a mass strike to take both employers and the state 
unawares. And the depth of support for strike action made 
traditional responses - such as dismissals or prosecution for 
unlawful striking - impracticable. 
The Durban strikes provoked another round of soul-searching in 
the dominant circles of employers and state. The latter, though 
insisting that recognised African trade unions were out of the 
question, promptly amended the 1953 Settlement of Disputes Act 
to allow for limited bargaining procedures by works/liaison 
committees and lifted the absolute ban on strikes by black 
workers. (Another major state reform in response to pressure 
came shortly afterwar~s when the Masters and Servants Acts were 
repealed in 1974, largely in response to threatened industrial 
action in the USA over the issue.) Employers, too, though often 
reluctant to abandon a hard-line stance on strikes by black 
workers in their enterprises, awoke to the need for a more 
sophisticated approach to industrial relations and personnel 
matters. 
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Perhaps of most significance, however, was the effect of the 
strike on the work force itself. As one study has concluded 
about the outcome of the Durban Strikes, "In some firms the 
workers went back without any concrete gains, but in most they 
won wage increases . . . For the workers the other main achievement 
of the strike is less tangible but perhaps even more important: 
it is a sense of solidarity and potential power. 1169 
Capitalising on the mood of confidence, existing and new efforts 
to organise black workers began to take firm root. At least four 
differing organisational tendencies emerged around this time, and 
provided the basis for the composition of the "independent" 
(i.e., not dependent on registered trade unions) worker movement. 
The Urban Training Project extended its scope and supported a 
number of black unions on the Rand which came to form the Council 
of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) at the end of the decade. Co-
operation between unionists and white intellectuals led to the 
formation of such bodies as Trade Union Advisory and Co-
ordinating Committee in Natal and the Industrial Aid Society on 
the Rand, similarly the basis for the creation of the Federation 
of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979. Independent 
efforts led to the establishment of the Western Province Workers' 
Advice Bureau in Cape Town in March 1973, later to transform 
itself into the General Workers' Union. Splitting off from the 
Urban Training Project, Black Consciousness activists began to 
interest themselves in worker organisation, resulting in the 
creation of the Black and Allied Workers' Unions, from which the 
South African Allied Workers' Union was to derive. 10 Major 
differences developed among these groupings on issues such as the 
use of works committees, legal procedures, organisational tactics 
and the participation of non-worker intellectuals (usually 
whites); all, however, shared a common feature of attempting to 
organise bla,ck workers without subordinating them to the 
interests of existing registered unions. 
Relationships with the latter, in particular registered unions 
affiliated to TUCSA, became indeed a major source of division in 
trade union ranks. With a few exceptions (for example motor 
256 
assembly and food processing) the registered unions looked 
askance at the growth of the independents, both suspecting their 
ideological commitments and fearing their potential for 
competition over future black members. The independents, in 
turn, argued that the majority of registered unions were little 
more than "benefit societies" on behalf of their white, coloured 
and Indian members, and would prove unable to reflect the 
aspirations of the semi- and unskilled black work force. The 
divide thus created remained a major source of friction into the 
1980s. 11 
By the mid-1970s, the organisational efforts outlined above had 
led to the creation of a relatively fragile but potentially 
expansive union infrastructure among tens of thousands of 
previously unorganised workers. It was an open question as to 
the extent to which the tolerance of the state would stretch in 
permitting this development. In the event, however, factors 
favouring the continuance of the new union grouping were to be 
further strengthened by the political turbulence beginning in 
1976 with the Soweto uprising. The immediate outcome was an 
apparent set-back, with the restriction orders served on a number 
of persons involved in the independent union effort in 1977. In 
the same year, however, the revision of state policy on urban 
blacks forced by the events of 1976 was in part responsible, as 
far as a valid assessment of governmental decision-making can be 
essayed, for the state's acceptance of the need for major changes 
to the system of industrial relations and to the occupational 
status of urban blacks. The upshot was the appointment of a 
Commission of Enquiry into the whole range of industrial 
legislation under the chairmanship of Professor Nie Wiehahn, a 
well-known advocate of liberalisation in labour policy. At the 
same time, a senior civil servant Dr P J Riekert, was appointed 
to consider the possibility of rationalising the immense web of 
statues and regulations within which the average African worker, 
urban or homeland in origin, was enmeshed. 72 
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The recommendations embodied in the Wiehahn Commission's Reports, 
beginning in 1979, amounted effectively to the dismantling of the 
dualistic structure of the statutory industrial relations system 
which had reached its culmination in the 1956 amendments to the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. The major recommendations were as 
follows: equal trade union rights for black workers; dropping of 
the prohibition on the formation of "mixed" unions; abolition of 
the job reservation clause introduced in 1956; and the opening 
of the apprenticeship system to black workers. 73 In addition, 
the Commission recommended the setting up of an Industrial Court 
to act as a means of legal redress and of dispute resolution over 
a wide range of industrial matters. Later reports of the 
Commission advocated the abolition of the restriction on the 
employment of blacks in certain categories of mining work; and 
the elimination of discrimination on grounds of sex. 
Taken all in all, these were major reforms to what had been a 
highly discriminatory system of industrial legislation. Left-
wing opinion was not slow to point out that the Commission's 
findings on matters such as the requirements for trade union 
registration could embody a major possibility for the control 
(and thus emasculation) of the proffered union rights for black 
workers. 74 Developments after 1979 were to suggest that these 
fears were exaggerated, if not totally without foundation. It 
was, as could be predicted, not the Wiehahn reforms as such, but 
their implementation and operation in an environment otherwise 
still highly discriminatory and white-dominated which were to 
prove problematic. The major loser in the post-Wiehahn era was 
not the trade unions catering for black workers, but the more 
intransigent elements of white labour. 
Industrial reforms flowing from the recommendation of the six 
Reports of the Wiehahn Commission resulted since 1979 in a 
relatively far-reaching transformation of the industrial 
relations scene. The principle of an integrated industrial 
relations system was given a firm legislative foundation. In 
response, the trade union movement, in particular the newer 
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unions catering largely for black workers, expanded and 
established itself as a force in South African society in a way 
never before seen. The area of industrial relations practice 
became complex, diversified and innovative. Issues previously 
untouched or only of academic interest were included in the focus 
of trade union pressure in negotiations with management. 
Although setbacks occurred, the general direction of the 
industrial relations field pointed in the direction of an 
integrated industrial society. 75 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The incorporation of the native population as a cheap labour force. but 
segregated by political rightlessness and severe social discrimination, 
is the single most important key to an understanding of all subsequent 
social and economic developments. 
- C de Kiewiet (1956) 
The existence of colonial-type societies, founded through 
conquest by intrusive settler populations, is an unstable matter. 
While the material monopolies created by mechanisms of social 
closure may provide strong reason for continued domination, the 
costs of coercive control tend over time to mount as subject 
groups turn to active resistance. There are of course 
alternatives to domination, and sooner or later such options are 
chosen or are forced upon the contending parties. The options, 
simply put, are fission or fusion, either of which may include 
elements of genocide. The early white settlers in the Cape were 
the unwitting perpetrators of the latter when they inflicted 
exotic pathogens on a hapless Khoi-Khoi population, and more 
witting exterminators in their approach to the episodic 
resistance of the San peoples. With the importation of slaves the 
option of fission was implicitly rejected in favour of further 
domination, the costs of which appeared minimal in a world of 
slave-owners. The possibility of fusion, which rested upon the 
acceptance of intermarriage or interbreeding of the dominant and 
subject populations, was never seriously considered before the 
19th century, and then only in limited parts of the future South 
African territory. Thus the southern African sub-continent 
evolved in colonial-style, with distinct populations mingled but 
not merged, except at the margins. Consciousness of community 
became even more starkly defined as different groups were thrown 
into closer contact by the dynamics of the moving frontier. 
One importance consequence, as the citation from de Kiewiet at 
the head of this chapter suggests, was the emergence of a 
distinct class structure of colonial form: Hierarchies and sub-
hierarchies of classes within each of the more or less endogamous 
coccoons which made up the segments of the South African plural 
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society. Each hierarchy however was not at the same level in 
terms of material reward and social esteem but was in turn ranked 
and even manipulated by those in a position to do so, the 
dominant grouping of European extraction. In a largely rural 
society the main axis of conflict was land and livestock, with 
labour distinctly secondary. With the sudden inception of labour-
intensi ve industry in urban conglomerations after 1870 the nature 
of the colonial interaction changed decisively. Sharp conflicts 
over political control - the struggle over the critical apex of 
society which in colonial situations means not just better or 
worse but potentially also survival or extinction - reinforced 
or reshaped the communal identities which grew out of the 
familial, linguistic, racial and class experiences of the 
population. And after periods of intense violence, such as the 
frontier wars in the Eastern Cape or the Anglo-Boer War later, 
everyday encounters in the labour and asset markets heightened 
the perception of groups in competition. 
It was a matter of great moment, though hardly of historical 
inevitability, that the section of the population which came to 
dominate the colonial apex was that section whose communal 
experience had most emphasised domination or fission as the means 
of group survival. The alternative of fusion by assimilation, 
gradual or otherwise, was firmly rejected, al though never totally 
extinguished. And for all this the climate of the times in an 
international perspective was of course also conducive: South 
African colonial ism flourished under the shelter of a world 
colonial system. Because of this, it is difficult if not 
impossible to assign final causal responsibility for the 
evolution of South African society in the 20th century to the 
autonomy of the internal elites rather than the tacit complicity 
of an international order where communal and racial domination 
remained deeply engrained. Those who controlled the South African 
colonial order looked outside and proclaimed that as they did, 
so did others in similar circumstances elsewhere in the world. 
A further coincidence with incalculable effect was that the 
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closing of the southern African land frontier occurred for 
practical purposes simultaneously with the development of large-
scale extractive industry, and the subsequent erection of a 
modern industrial base unequalled on the continent. The 
development of the latter was no foregone conclusion but appears 
with hindsight a matter of absolute - or rather geological -
fortuity. It can of course only be speculated what would have 
happened had land satiety not been accompanied by industrial 
expansion in the hinterland, as would surely have been the case 
in the absence of the mineral discoveries. The point being made 
here is that South Africa's development was no 'ineluctable 
unfolding of a given structural dynamic - of capitalism, of 
settler nationalism, of modernisation, or any other organic 
social system - but was marked by sharp breaks which moved the 
inhabitants of the region into patterns of confrontation which 
could not have been predicted from within any particular 
theoretical perspective. 
Any understanding of a phenomenon such as South African trade 
unionism in the 20th century, therefore, must combine both an 
appreciation of the contingent facts which came about without 
inner necessity, and the objective constraints which made this 
outcome rather than that a more likely one. Among the former must 
be counted the mineral discoveries, the influx of British 
artisans and miners after 1870, and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-
1902. Among the latter are the dynamics of split labour market 
competition, the sectional incompatibility of the interests of 
the divergent strata of a modern industrial work-force, and the 
tendency to the superimposition of ethnic or racial origin and 
class position (in either a Weberian or Marxist sense) in a 
colonial-type situation. Since life-chances in the asset and 
labour markets (the Weberian definition that is of class 
position) are highly structured in a coionial-type situation by 
ethnic/racial origin, the latter tends to be the preponderant 
existential fact for the inhabitants of such societies (and 
because familial environment also tends to derive from a specific 
ethnic/racial context). In real terms, such a conclusion does not 
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differ markedly from that developed by the Marxist scholar Harold 
Wolpe in his recent work where he writes that 11 ••• the simple 
opposition between race and class in explaining South African 
history must be rejected. Race may, under determinate conditions, 
become interiorised in class struggles in both the sphere of the 
economy as wel 1 as the sphere of politics 11 • 1 
Social identity among individuals is however but the beginning 
of the chain that leads through feelings of solidarity to 
collective action, organisation and institutional structure. 
Faced with an environment in which the main features of relevance 
to the actions of actors remain relatively stable, the response 
by functional groupings of human beings is to develop sets of 
guiding ideas and precepts which help direct action in often 
confusing day-to-day circumstances. In other words, organisations 
develop strategies which provide the cognitive framework from 
within which to tackle ongoing problems. New members of such 
organisations are socialised into such strategies, and their 
conformity or otherwise to them may determine their relative 
success in attaining major goals. Of course, a strategy which is 
at variance with the prior socialisation and the deepest aspects 
of social identity of newly inducted members may encounter 
resistance and if the newcomers are powerful enough may be 
rejected in favour of other more congenial programmes. The 
foregoing chapters have attempted to outline the shifting 
strategies which have attracted support from among the varying 
segments of the South African industrial labour force during this 
century. 
As the preceding discussion may indicate, trade union strategies 
have been a function of social identity (defined most 
significantly in terms of ascriptive membership of one or other 
of the ethnic/racial segments of the South African colonial 
order), of functional location in the occupational structure, and 
from the corresponding position within the competitive currents 
of a split labour market. Until 1979 the majority of trade 
unionists were those who found themselves in a defensive posture 
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in terms of this labour market, since they belonged to 
organisations which were protecting occupations which stood to 
lose (in some tangible short term sense such as wage levels or 
labour market competition or job security) from the dismantling 
of ethnic/racial particularism. Not only position in the labour 
market however, but also non-labour market considerations such 
as feelings of social honour (to use, again, a Weberian 
terminology) impelled workers to define what they saw as the 
proper role of the trade union in meeting the challenge of the 
multi-ethnic split labour market. Where trade unions had 
developed a strategy which ran counter to these feelings of 
social honour, deriving essentially from ethnic or racial 
identity, as was most dramatically the case with regard to the 
position of semi-skilled white workers in the 1930s to 1960s, 
conflict ensued over the mode of labour organisation. 
The question remains as to the dominant tendency, or the overall 
direction, which could be argued to characterise the history of 
trade unionism in such societies as South Africa. In the 
introductory chapter the rather large hypothesis was put forward 
that, provided the colonial-type society retained its integrity 
in the sense of its demographic make-up, the inclusivist, rather 
than the segregationist, imperative would come to predominate. 
It might be argued that such an outcome is trivially true: trade 
unionism follows the contours of society, segregationist under 
a racial order, and inclusivist when that order is dissolved. And 
yet such a conclusion is too sweeping for it ignores the ups and 
downs, the twists and turns of trade union strategy and structure 
at the various conjunctures which mark the history of the 
colonial-type society. It ignores too the question as to the 
actual mechanisms which shape the nature of traqe unionism in 
such societies at various times. 
In his major comparative study of societies structured along 
lines of racial or ethnic domination, Greenberg has argued that 
the early phase of industrial development and capitalised 
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agriculture was characterised by "a period of intensification, 
a period where racial domination was given a ·modern' form and 
where repressive features were elaborated and institutionalized" 
and where the "emerging class actors introduced conventional 
racial patterns into new settings, the factory and city in 
particular". 2 His further remarks identify crucial mechanisms 
which structured the nature of trade unionism in South Africa as 
well as in other societies with similar colonial-type 
configurations: 
... businessmen in the primary, extractive industries used 
the framework of racial domination to help organize and 
control a labor force, to keep the labor force divided and, 
at least in the areas of subordinate employment, 
unorganized; the artisan unions associated race and skill 
scarcity and effectively excluded subordinate workers from 
privileged sections of the labor market; the industrial 
unions, at least where subordinate workers did not dominate 
employment in an industry from the outset, used race lines 
in the work place and society to set off and protect areas 
of dominant employment. 3 
This period of intensification of racial domination was however 
according to Greenberg followed in all the four societies which 
he studied by a period of strain and disintegration of the racial 
order, producing what he calls a crisis of hegemony. At this 
conjuncture both forces within the dominant group itself and the 
re-emergence of resistance within a never-completely passive 
subject population combine to call into question on an ever-
widening scale the legitimacy of the prevailing racial order, or 
what has been referred to here as the colonial-type society. The 
major forces which push society beyond the point of an 
equilibrium of domination to a continuous instability are those 
the leading employer groups and their allies in the universalist 
professions on the one hand, and the resistance, often violent, 
of elements within the subject population. 
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Greenberg's analysis can be extended by considering the trends 
within South African trade unionism in the second half of this 
century which the preceding chapters have revealed and which 
contributed towards the subversion of the colonial-type society. 
One important tendency which trade unions may not have encouraged 
but which they reflected was of course the continuing 
occupational mobility of large sections of the white working 
population, from lower- to higher-paid, from blue- to white-
col lar - and in the process from unionised to non-unionised 
posts. Thus, as Greenberg notes, the edge was taken off the drive 
for white protectionism as "even white workers, securely 
encsconced in the upper reaches of the job hierarchy or in 
protected positions, considered allowing some exclusory practices 
to pass into disuse". 4 Other analysts have analysed the same 
trend in terms of Poulanztian Marxism, and have pointed to the 
creation of a "new middle class" from the ranks of the former 
white working class. 5 
Moving up in the wake of upwardly mobile white workers, coloured, 
Indian and especially African workers came to dominate in sheer 
numbers the industrial labour-force. By the 1950s, as Lewis has 
argued, the former militant "non-racial" trade unions in 
secondary industry such as the Garment Workers' Union had lost 
most of their white membership. 6 By the 1960s, as we have seen 
in Chapter 6, this trend was so strong that the leadership of 
TUCSA and its affiliates were complaining of the increasing 
unrepresenti veness of their organisations as African workers came 
to predominate in one industrial job category after another. For 
unions which had traditionally organised a "mixed" membership, 
there was little in their trade union thinking which made sense 
of racially restricted trade unionism. The logic of trade 
unionism in such situations pointed towards the extension of 
inclusive, open unionism to the new entrants to the labour 
market, albeit at the "rate for the job". 
Such trends began also to erode the previous intransigeance of 
the exclusively white trade union groupings, as was to occur in 
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the 1970s with sections of the Confederation of Labour. By no 
means all of the white unions were converted to open unionism, 
or at least to an acceptance of the indefensibility of the status 
quo. But mi 1 i tant rearguard actions, such as the 1979 Mine 
Workers' Union strike, were the exception, although they 
reflected accurately enough the feelings of what had always been 
the stronghold of right-wing labour: the semi-skilled white 
workers in manual or production jobs. However, the context within 
which such unions had operated was beginning to alter 
fundamentally, as crucial elements within the "ethnic state" 
began to align themselves with the demands of the leading 
employer groups, multinational companies and major investors for 
the elimination of racial discrimination in the work-place. 
An expanding economy had undercut the whole rationale of grand 
apartheid by 1970, and government labour policy gradually 
accomodated to the new urban industrial realities. 
A final decisive force from within the sphere of trade unionism 
was of course the revival of viable African trade unions on a 
widening basis after 1973. After initial resistance, such unions 
found that convenient partnerships could be struck with the 
managements of key multinational companies and the more far-
sighted of local employers. New forms of collective bargaining 
and union recognition outside of the established statutory 
framework laid down by the Industrial Conciliation Act added 
weight to the pressure for the extension of trade union rights 
to all workers in the industrial economy. 
Thus, in sum, the lessening of the long-standing appetite of 
white workers for occupational protection; the growing agreement 
on the indefensibility of racially exclusive trade union rights 
within signifieant sections of the established union leadership; 
the developing employer consensus on the untenability of 
discriminatory and anti-union practices; the revival of an 
independent, popularly-based non-registered union movement; and 
the increasing responsiveness of the relevant political decision-
makers to these pressures combined to dissolve the racial order 
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in the industrial sphere. It was, significantly, the first such 
major breach of the colonial-type social order, by introducing 
an industrial relations system which in principle at least was 
based on the universalist precepts which Wiehahn himself had 
insisted were the basic prerequisites for the successful 
restructuring of the country's industrial legislation. Widely 
recognised as incongruent with the remaining pillars of the 
colonial-type society in the other social spheres, this reform 
was also the true harbinger of the ultimate demise of the racial 
order as a whole. 
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